

**THE EMERGING CREATIVE INDUSTRIES
IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE**

Culturelink Joint Publications Series No 8

Course

Managing Cultural Transitions: Southeastern Europe
The Impact of Creative Industries

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The Emerging Creative Industries in Southeastern Europe

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Introduction

Introduction

The course on “Redefining Cultural Identities”, organized by the Institute for International Relations from Zagreb and the Inter-University Centre in Dubrovnik, has widened its program and evolved in the last five years to become the course on “Managing Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe”. During this period about 200 students and professors from the region and from all parts of Europe assembled in Dubrovnik to deliver lectures, to learn about different aspects of cultural identity change and to discuss cultural transitions in the Southeastern European post-socialist countries. An impressive number of issues have been covered within the course programs: identity changes and policies; social implications of cultural, media, language, minority and education policies (all redesigning cultural values and cultural life in general); intercultural relations; emergence and development of cultural industries; opening up of cultural exchange through cultural markets; introduction of new technologies and mediation of cultural contents; the social position of arts and artists; as well as other areas of cultural creativity. The list is not exhausted, neither is the interest of new generations of cultural professionals in the region. They actively contributed to the quality and discussions during courses, and established good friendly and cooperative links. New networks have been designed, and existing ones widened.

Programs and methodologies of work have been constantly upgraded. In 2004 the course directors and organizers agreed to implant a conference on Southeastern European cultural cooperation into the course program and thus increase time and vivacity of discussions. The results were encouraging, and this effort has turned out to be a good practice of the course. Visiting the Art Gallery Lazareti in Dubrovnik and discussing the plans for further development and widening of its activities was interesting and inspiring for the participants, both professors and students alike.

Now the papers that are prepared following the delivered lessons are in front of us. They are divided into two chapters: one on the creative industries in Southeastern Europe, and one on cultural exchange and cooperation in the region.

The creative industries or, rather, culture industries as they appeared in the Southeastern European countries, stem from the tradition of industrial and market-oriented cultural production taken to be low culture or even kitsch cultural production, undermined during the times of socialism. In the transition period these industries became more associated with the ideas of modernization and technological progress, and strongly prompted by imports of cultural consumerism based on pop cultural products. In the 2002 session of the Dubrovnik course, redefining cultural identities in the region was discussed through the analysis of cultural industries and technological convergence. It was already clearly visible that the small-scale cultural industries and productions might be both economically and culturally reasonable if supported by regionalist ideas and intra-regional cultural cooperation,¹ which might, perhaps, establish links among small and very diverse Southeastern European cultures. However, the influence of large transnational corporations, which are turning the region into a part of the global cultural market, has not yet been undermined.

Now Inga Tomić-Koludrović and Mirko Petrić add a new dimension to this discussion and show how the Southeastern European transitional societies, at best “mixed societies” undergoing different types of modernization process, may react to challenges relating to the development of creative industries and creative economies. The authors clearly stress that in spite of numerous commonalities, the differences between countries in the region, and also within them, may still produce very different reactions to the challenge of creative industries and the markets they may be cultivating. Jaka Primorac offers a review of how cultural/creative industries have been changing over time, and looks into the technological content of the term. Maja Breznik analyzes Slovenian publishing and outlines the position and role of small local publishers that are subsidized by the state to carry out their often demanding programs. Their efforts are diverted by the direct transfer of the publishing industry from abroad, done through a subtle set of measures that diminish local financial and creative efforts and thus show that the quality of content does not pay much in international competition. Aldo Milohnić discusses aspects of “flexible” employment in culture and thus adds an important asset to the further development of cultural and creative industrialization.

The discussions on cultural cooperation in the region, mainly based on analyses by Dona Kolar-Panov, Milena Dragičević Šešić and Corina Suteu have shown how

¹ “Redefining Cultural identities: Cultural Industries and Technological Convergence”, *Culturelink* (Dossier) Vol. 13, No. 37, August 2002, pp. 113-142.

transparent indeed their influence in turning the region into one market is and may be in the future. Linking parts of the region after the crisis of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has been largely concentrated in cultural and media fields, and supported by foreign foundations and companies. It appears to go from the top down, i.e., the elaborate formats of cultural and media cooperation and interaction are implemented in different cultures and parts of the region with a view to supporting their mutual interconnectedness. However, the application of the same format or the same TV program through local televisions is primarily meant to contribute to the standardization of the local (cultural) markets, and not to creative cooperation among local cultures. Although such programs include some aspects of formalized cooperation among local actors and institutions, they remain far from creating an appropriate form of communication that would touch the main problems of cultural identification and development, including that of cultural or creative industries.

The two issues, cultural/creative industries and regional cultural exchange, remain not only a challenging field of cultural research, but also the key elements for discussions on the institutionalization of cultural studies in university programs, or in analysis of multi- and interculturalism. The presentation of the cultural studies program of the University of Rijeka by Marina Biti, points out the need to introduce such a type of study and thus contribute to the rationalization and analysis of cultural developments. Cultural transitions unavoidably demand insights into intercultural relationships, and Melita Richter Malabotta offers here a reflection on different models and approaches to the issue. The ever more intense concentration of cultural developments in the cities of Southeastern Europe demands conceptual and policy analyses of the already developed models and their possible endogenization in the region, which is offered by the Petrić and Tomić-Koludrović text on the creative city and the Kulturstadt. The contribution by Lidia Varbanova stresses the importance of information flow and presents the project designed to help development of specialized cultural portals. All these contributions contextualize the further cultural development and cultural life in the region.

The editor would like to thank all the authors for their valuable contributions, for their Dubrovnik lectures, contacts with students and colleagues during the Dubrovnik seminar, and for their good will to help sustain an analytical approach to the most challenging issue of the development of cultural/creative industries and studies in Southeastern Europe.

The Editor

Creative Industries in Southeastern Europe

Creative Industries in Transition: Towards a Creative Economy?

Inga Tomić-Koludrović

Mirko Petrić

In a frequently quoted statement from his keynote speech at the “creative industries conference” that took place in Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2003, Chris Smith, former British Secretary of Culture, Media and Sport, and an incessant promoter of the “creative industries” claimed that the model he himself associated with the “advanced economies of Europe” was transferable to “developing countries”. Smith said:

“I believe [...] that we are living through a new economic revolution in the advanced economies of Europe. We have moved [...] over the centuries, from an agricultural economy to an industrial manufacturing economy to a service economy. And now I believe that we are beginning to move from a pure service economy to an economy that is based very substantially on creativity. And that is not just true of the economies such as the United Kingdom which have for many years had the advantage of the free market entrepreneur system. I think it is also true of economies in developing countries.”

This article attempts to examine whether such an expectation corresponds to the social and economic realities of the post-socialist countries of Southeastern Europe, to which policies associated with the notion of “creative industries” are currently being exported by the British Council.¹

¹ The Baltic states were the first among the post-socialist countries to be a target of such efforts (through the Central and Eastern European Pilot Project launched at the Vilnius conference in October 2003). The year 2004 saw the extension of the program to the Southeastern European (SEE) region, where it is administered as one strand of the British Council’s UK-SEE Forum. Both efforts are part of the British Council’s “creative industries in transitional markets programme”, aimed at economies which have “moved beyond the development stage but [are] still unable to protect intellectual property rights in creative goods and services”. The program takes expertise in economic data collection (“mapping”) “from a UK region to a transitional economy”, and also “explores the infrastructure needs and barriers to development facing the creative industries”. The pilot project for Latin America takes place in Colombia, while new pilot projects are currently being developed in the Middle East, Africa and South East Asia (British Council, 2005).

Given the recentness of these initiatives, a refutation of Smith's claim based on empirical evidence is obviously still not possible. This article therefore attempts to hypothesize, based on theoretical argument, that a direct transplantation of the term and practices associated with it is not possible in a social context radically different from the originating one.

Unlike Smith's statement, which is exclusively economy-focused, we emphasize the importance of the social context. Namely, in our opinion, and consistently with Weber's classical sociological approach, it is not possible to view economic phenomena separately from the type of society and its culture. This is especially the case when the notion of so-called creative industries is at stake, since it is inextricably related to cultural practices (as is, for that matter, the word "creativity" in general, even if reduced to an exclusively economic context).

Another reason why we focus on the type of society connected with various economic and cultural issues is that we think such a viewpoint is conducive to a more profound insight into the subject matter. Last but not least, it arguably also guarantees a larger degree of predictability of the practical outcomes of various planning activities.

It is relatively easy to notice that levels of efficiency of public administration and the judiciary in the post-socialist countries are not comparable to those in the "advanced economies of Europe". The same goes, at least partly, for the standard procedures of operation of the business and banking systems in these countries.² If widespread copyright piracy is added to the picture, it is equally easy to conclude that there exist numerous obstacles to a successful implementation of the practice of "creative industries" in non-EU integrated SEE countries. But to understand the problem more profoundly, it is necessary to grapple with the nature of the social and cultural context in which these obvious manifestations of difference come about.

2 It should be noted that business and banking practices in the transitional countries of Central, East and Southeastern Europe have changed significantly in the enterprises owned by foreign investors. The number of these has been steadily growing in the last fifteen years, in the banking sector especially since the mid-1990s. According to a recent *Wall Street Journal Europe* estimate (Singer et al, 2005), "international banks" now control 70% of assets in the banking systems of the group of countries including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia and Serbia. However, although foreign-owned banks are introducing Western-style standards of operation, business realities in transitional countries still largely differ from those in the West. For example, according to the same source, only one in three Poles has a personal bank account. Likewise, credit cards were used for only 2% of total Polish consumer payments at the end of 2003.

At the center of discussion in this article are sociological theories of modernization. We take these to be an apt frame of reference to describe the nature of the differences that arise when the “advanced economies of Europe” - to retain for a second Smith’s vocabulary - are compared with those of the post-socialist countries. In our view, these differences can be described as a consequence of different positions these societies and cultures occupy in the modernization process. While those compatible with the “advanced economies” are part of a “post-industrially modernized” social context, the post-socialist ones largely reflect the phenomena typical of the first, “simple” modernization.

We argue that the notions and practices of the “creative industries” and the “creative economy” are compatible with the former, and therefore not likely to be smoothly transplanted into the latter. But before we outline the differences between the “post-industrially modernized” societies and the societies of incomplete “first modernization”, we need to briefly discuss the notions of “creative industries” and the “creative economy”.

From “creative industries” to the “creative economy”

It is by now widespread knowledge that policy work leading up to the notion of the “creative industries” emerged in Australia in the early 1990s. However, it was only launched into international prominence in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 21st century, after the UK Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) set up its Creative Industries Unit and Task Force (in 1997), and carried out its two comprehensive mapping exercises on the subject.

Following the lead of Australia’s first Commonwealth cultural policy, *Creative Nation* (1994), the newly formed UK culture ministry,³ headed by Chris Smith, articulated its entire cultural policy as being about the development of “creative industries” (Gibson, 2001). These, in turn, were seen not only as culture-related in the strict sense, but important for the national economy.

The official definition of the term, coined in its infancy but still in force today, states that “creative industries” are “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS 2005).

According to British classifications, used in government-organized mapping exercises on the subject, the field of “creative industries” includes the following

3 The first New Labour government, elected in 1997, renamed the previous Department of National Heritage into the Department of Culture, Media and Sport.

sectors: advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video, interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer games, television and radio (DCMS 2005).

The two national mapping exercises, the results of which were published in 1998 and 2001,⁴ attempted to prove the economic importance and potential of the sector. In official documents, it is emphasized that “creative industries” accounted for 7.9% of the British GDP in the year 2000 and grew by an average of 9% per annum between 1997 and 2000, compared to 2.8% for the whole of the national economy over this period. Furthermore, the public is informed that “creative employment” totaled 1.95 million in December 2001, and achieved an average annual growth of 9% over the period between 1997 and 2001, compared to 1.5 % for the whole of the economy. Finally, export results and the potential of the sector are praised, as well as its role in the regeneration of deindustrialized cities and regions.⁵

Critics have argued that much of the data produced by “measuring culture” in general is “methodologically flawed, and says more about policy intentions than about actual impact” (Selwood, 2002). Tepper (2002: 163) also reports that cultural economists consider aggregate national measuring efforts such as that of the DCMS as primarily political and providing very little analytical or empirical insight.

When the impact of the “creative industries” is discussed, it is hard not to agree with James Heartfield, who claims that “much of the growth could be explained by different methods of counting” (Heartfield, 2005: 10), and that - to begin with - the expectations placed on the sector were far too great for it to live up to them (Heartfield, 2000). Heartfield (2005: 4-5) also claims that the growth the newly defined sector experienced came in largely on the wings of “the newly floated Internet company shares that suspended traditional rules about future company earnings”. These led to intense branding and rebranding of companies, creating work for advertisers and designers.

In a recent article, Garnham (2005) claims that the very term “creative industries” draws its political and ideological power from the prestige and economic importance attached to the alleged impact of information and communication technologies. According to Garnham, this prestige - drawn from information society theory -

4 Creative Industries Mapping Document 1998 and *Creative Industries Mapping Document 2001* are available in pdf format at the DCMS website.

5 In contrast with academic discourse, the websites of the regional development agencies linked to the DCMS site do not elaborate either on the economic hardship in the recent past or on the role intended for the “creative industry” in the process of overcoming it. Only indirect references to these topics can be detected in the phrases such as “sustainable economic development and regeneration” or “transformation” (of the economy). The usual New Labour term when speaking about the need to eliminate poverty is “social inclusion”.

sustains the unjustified claim of the cultural sector as a key economic growth sector within the global economy and creates a coalition of disparate interests around the issue of intellectual property rights.

Finally, when the notion of the “creative industries” is compared to related stricter definitions containing the term “industry” (such as Hesmondhalgh’s definition of the “cultural industries”⁶), it also becomes obvious that it includes activities lacking the industrial form of production and reproduction, such as the art and antiques market, crafts, and the performing arts. The addition of these activities to the definition of the “creative industries” can indeed be seen as a means of “the cultural sector’s statistical expansion”. In plain words, Heartfield describes this as “a matter of adding in more jobs and businesses in such a way that boosts the numbers” (2005: 11).

Having said all this, however, it should be added that independent and more reliable statistics from other “advanced economies” indicate over the long term a noticeable increase in professions that form part of the “creative industries” and what is elsewhere referred to as the “creative economy”.⁷

Florida (2005) quotes various sources in order to illustrate the intensified pace of “all forms of creative work” and to substantiate his claim that this kind of work “produced most of our economic growth over the late twentieth century” (2005: 26). Florida’s sources include statistics resulting from reliable empirical research. Among the data he quotes are those compiled by Kevin Stolarick from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, showing that “the creative sector of the economy accounts for 30% of US employment and nearly half of total wages and salaries” (2005: 27).

Florida also quotes the economists Frank Levy and Richard Murnane, who have analyzed comprehensive data from the US Department of Labor’s *Dictionary of*

6 According to Hesmondhalgh (2002), the “core” cultural industries include advertising, marketing, broadcasting, film industries, the Internet industry, the music industries, print and electronic publishing, video and computer games. These groups of activities are centrally concerned with the industrial production and dissemination of cultural “works”. In Hesmondhalgh’s classification, theatre, and the making, exhibition and sale of art works are seen as “peripheral” cultural industries, because they lack the industrial form of production and reproduction.

7 It should be said that the term “creative economy” is also used in Britain, and increasingly so. It can actually be argued that it is currently replacing the term “creative industries”, as was stated by a leading creative industries mapping expert Dr Calvin Taylor, Senior Lecturer at the University of Leeds and Director of the Creative Industries Development Agency (CIDA), in Question and Answer session at the UK-SEE Forum-organized Creative Cities Seminar, held in Plovdiv, on March 17, 2005. Taylor did not speculate on the reasons for this replacement, but it could be argued that it is happening because of the difficulties the “creative industries” have been facing since 2002 (according to Heartfield, 2005: 4), and because the term “creative economy” implies still less direct connection with “cultural” activities *sensu stricto* than the term “creative industries”.

Occupational Titles, detailing 12,000 individual occupations. Following their analysis one can conclude that significant changes have occurred “in the kinds of work people actually do over the course of the past several decades” (Florida, 2005). In Levy’s and Murnane’s estimation (2004) nearly all of the growth in jobs since 1969 has come in the fields they define as “expert thinking” and “complex communication”, while those defined as “routine cognitive tasks” and “routine manual tasks” have significantly declined and are expected to continue to do so.⁸

The sociologists Steven Brint (2001) and Steve Barley (1996) have estimated that “knowledge workers” make up between 30% and 35% of the US workforce and continue to grow fast, while a team of Canadian economists (Coulombe et al., 2004) has recently made “a breakthrough in quantifying creative capital, differentiating it from human capital, and demonstrating its importance to economic growth” (Florida, 2005: 33).

Viewed against this backdrop of long-term trends, critical accounts of the strategies adopted by the UK Department of Culture, Media and Sport acquire somewhat different meaning. They are certainly justified in criticising methodological flaws in measuring procedures, as well as interpretive distortions resulting from an intentional confusion of advocacy and evidence-based policy. But trends outlined in the research quoted above remind us that difficulties experienced by the “creative industries” in the UK should be viewed in the context of the current general economic slowdown. Likewise, it should be kept in mind that certain short-term changes in the type of economy are attributable to recent political events.⁹ The long-term trends in the “advanced economies” seem to point to the continuing

8 In Florida’s laconic interpretation (2005: 30-31), “expert thinking” jobs are those “that require creativity and expert problem solving, ranging from designing new products to diagnosing illnesses to creating unique dishes from fresh ingredients”. The field of “complex communication” relates to “high paying jobs in design, innovation and motivation or management of others that require face-to-face interaction”. “Routine cognitive tasks” refer to “jobs that require mental tasks that follow well-defined logical rules”, while “routine manual tasks” are described as “physical-labor jobs that follow defined rules”. The first two have grown rapidly since 1969. The latter have declined significantly in the same period and are vulnerable to outsourcing and automation. Levy’s and Murnane’s classification also includes “non-routine manual tasks”, i.e. “physical-labor jobs that are difficult to automate because they require ‘optical recognition’ and ‘fine muscle control’, including a range of factory jobs, but also personal-service jobs such as haircutting or housecleaning”. These jobs declined between 1969 and 1989 and have leveled off since then, since they are not vulnerable to outsourcing and automation.

9 Florida’s most recent book, *The Flight of the Creative Class* (2005), quotes the increasing restrictions on the movement of human capital into the US as one of the reasons for the crisis of its creative economy. These restrictions, although by no means the only reason for the slowdown, are themselves a consequence of a chain of political events.

importance of the sector which is referred to here as the “creative economy”, but which would smell the same even if called by some other name.

The social context of the “creative economy”

According to Tepper (2002: 159), many policy-makers have recently argued that certain changes in the economy are exerting a significant influence on the position of art and culture in society. These changes include “globalization, digitalization, the rise of the ‘knowledge’ worker, the boom in intellectual property, changes in leisure consumption”. Tepper reports that art and culture are now heralded as engines of economic growth and development, as scholars write about the central role of creative cities, creative clusters, creative economies, and the “rise of the creative class”.

As much as this new public prominence of “creativity” may appear to be new, it is worth remembering that, thirty years ago, in his book on the *Coming of Postindustrial Society* (1973), Daniel Bell foresaw a rise of the society whose economy would be marked by the centrality of theoretical knowledge. Bell also foresaw the growth of a “knowledge class” of scientists and engineers, and a move from manufacturing to services. In a separate book, he also analyzed *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976), coming about as a result of a clash between a Protestant work ethic and the exigencies of an increasingly hedonist consumer culture.

In the meantime, a new conception of work has come about in which the two aspects coexist without contradiction: the journalist David Brooks (2001) has argued that the new culture represents a blending of bourgeois and bohemian values. This suggestion has subsequently been theoretically elaborated on by Richard Florida, who also claims that the members of the new “creative class” effortlessly integrate multiple interests and personae into a unique creative identity (2002: 13).

But what is important to us in the context of this article is that Bell’s analysis clearly outlines its research premises (“axial principles”), and takes into account the socio-cultural context of technological and economic phenomena. In our view, such an approach to the analysis of the phenomena related to the “creative industries” and the “creative economy” enables a more profound insight into their character than the purely econometric focus of the various mapping exercises in the field.

When placed in a sociological context, the notions of the “creative industries” and “creative economy” reveal compatibility not only with the type of society referred to by Bell as “post-industrial”, but also with what various social theorists call the “second” (Beck), “reflexive” (Beck, Giddens), “late” (Giddens) or “liquid” (Bauman) modernity.

Common to all these theorists is a focus on the modernization process as a key force shaping contemporary social organization. What Beck (1986) refers to as “first” or “simple” modernity is typical of industrial society and the social change it brought about in relation to pre-industrial social institutions. It has affected various aspects of social organization, but never so radically as “second” modernity - now underway in what Smith refers to as the “advanced economies” - promises to do. Namely, this is a modernity attempting to modernize its own foundations (hence the adjective “reflexive” in Beck’s alternative label for it).

According to Beck, “second modernity” is directed at everything that “first” modernity left “unmodernized”: family and gender roles, workplace relations, individual biographies and sense of belonging. Central to it is the process of individualization, forcing social actors to question and reflect upon all the basic assumptions, limitations, and contradictions of modernity. This thinking through is done at an individual level, in a “risk society” context, where everybody is forced to make decisions, increasingly without resort to the disappearing traditional collective support mechanisms, ranging from the family to the nation-state.

The societies faced with “second modernity” are marked by an increase in post-traditional forms of social organization, serving as a backdrop to what Florida describes as “the rise of the creative class”.

The kind of economy that took place in the emerging “creative centers” of the 1990s obviously depended on the individualized, highly qualified and highly mobile workforce, turning their individual “cultural capital” into a production resource.

The accompanying post-traditional forms of social organization included an ever-increasing number of people living by themselves, which Beck mentions in his account of the “risk society”, as well as tolerance for alternative lifestyles and sexual preferences, emphasized by Florida.¹⁰

10 According to Florida, diversity stimulates growth in the innovation-based high-tech economy. In his *Rise of the Creative Class* (2002), he used “gay index”, developed by Gary Gates and a group of economists (Black et al., 2000), as an indicator of tolerance in an area, with the explanation that gays have been subjected to a particularly high level of discrimination, and that the attempts of this group to integrate into mainstream society have met substantial opposition. Since homosexuality, to some extent, represents the last frontier of diversity in the US society, Florida considers it “a good indicator of the low entry barriers to human capital that are so important to spurring creativity and generating high-tech growth” (Florida 2002, 256). Florida’s use of the “gay index” is based on the assumption that “a strong and vibrant gay community [is] a solid leading indicator of a place that is open to many different kinds of people” (Florida 2005, 60) and as such a good predictor of technological development and economic growth in the “creative age”.

When the social context of the “creative economy”, even as fragmentarily presented as here, is taken into account, the task of transplanting “an economy that is based very substantially on creativity” into a transitional social context begins to appear much more complex than the quoted Smith’s Vilnius statement implies.

“Creative economy” in the SEE context

The social context of the “transitional markets” of the SEE region differs radically from the social context in which both the notions of the “creative industries” and “creative economy” originated.

While these are clearly “second modernity” societies, characterized by social and cultural phenomena compatible with the “reflexive” stage of advancement of the modernization process, the societies that form a backdrop to the “transitional markets”¹¹ in SEE countries are clearly more compatible with the characteristics of “first modernity”.

These are the societies in which the notions that Beck summarizes as typical of first modernity are still present, at least as memories or idealized principles of social organization. These include: “[n]ation state society, collective patterns of life, full employment society and rapid industrialization with the ‘unseen’ exploitation of nature.”¹²

Since post-socialist countries do not live in a vacuum, they are also affected by challenges that Beck summarizes as “globalization, individualization, unemployment/underemployment, gender revolution and, last but not least, global risks ([such] as the ecological crisis and the breakdown of global financial markets)”.

However, in the post-socialist context, the character of social responses to these challenges is different from the processes taking place in the societies exhibiting pronounced features of “second modernity”. For instance, it cannot be denied that one of the effects of the transitional period has been a certain individualism in the economic sphere. However, this is certainly not individualization typical of “second modernity” and based on Inglehart’s “post-materialist” values. Rather, it is what

11 This is the expression used on the British Council’s website to describe the target of the current campaigns devoted to the export of the notion of the “creative industries”. No reference is made to “culture” and “society” in the section describing the proposed actions, where the term “transitional markets” figures prominently.

12 This lapidary characterization applicable to the societies of the post-socialist, “transitional” countries has been taken from an interview with Beck conducted by Danilo Zolo. The original article was published in *Reset* No. 53 (March-April 1999), and is now available in Italian and English at <http://dex1.tsd.unifi.it/juragentium/en/index.htm?surveys/wlgo/beck.htm> [visited October 2, 2005].

Beck (1993) terms *Armut-Individualisierung* (individualization induced by poverty). This form of individualization is based on the wish to differentiate oneself from others on the basis of possession of material goods.

This is in sharp contrast with what is happening in the societies of “second modernity”, in which members of the creative class primarily strive to define their own identities in post-materialist terms. As Marcus (2005: 14) says: “status and identity of the members of the creative class are not principally related to the goods they have, because living standards have grown so much that the material goods no longer represent a measure of the status. Rather the quality of what they experience defines the quality of their lives.”

In the transitional context, one should note that the wars of Yugoslav succession and transitional economic hardship have brought about a reversal of trends even in those parts of the SEE region that exhibited post-materialist values in the period preceding the disintegration of socialism (Croatia, urban centers in the north of Serbia).¹³ During the 1990s, the whole region was dominated by trends indicative of what Inglehart (2000) classifies as “survival values”, and not by “self-expression values” characteristic of both democratic societies and “advanced economies”.

Another example of the discrepancy between the “post-socialist” and the “post-industrially modernized” countries can be found in the different approaches to the spatial resources in an urban context. The members of the creative class that Florida described in his initial book on the subject (2002)¹⁴ value “authenticity and uniqueness” of places coming from a mix of features offering “unique and original experiences”. Among other things, these features include “historic buildings”, “established neighborhoods” and specific cultural attributes of a place. “A place full of chain stores, chain restaurants, and nightclubs is not authentic”, Florida says, yet this is exactly the direction in which a number of urban settings in the post-socialist countries is heading.

The clash of “first modernity” and “second modernity” is especially clearly visible in the tourist resorts on the Croatian Adriatic coast, where new construction -

13 The results of a large-scale empirical survey of Yugoslav youth carried out in 1986 indicated that the youth populations of Slovenia and Croatia consistently exhibited individualist values (Ule 1988; Radin, 1990). The findings of this survey were confirmed by another survey carried out in 1988 (Ule, 1989). The northern Serbian province of Vojvodina and the city of Belgrade were also noted as places where there existed a pronounced distance to the authoritarian collectivist paradigm. In a wider context, the existence of post-materialist values among the youth in the late socialist Yugoslavia can be attributed to a larger degree of openness to the West and higher living standards that it enjoyed in comparison with the socialist states of the Soviet bloc.

14 The characteristics of urban settings that attract the members of the creative class are described in detail in chapters 10 (“The Experiential Life”) and 12 (“The Power of Place”) of Florida’s *The Rise of the Creative Class*.

frequently illegal - is endangering the mix of “authentic” architectural features and patterns of living that the members of the creative class find attractive. Because many of the latter visit as tourists or intend to acquire property in the area, it becomes a place where wasteful exploitation of natural and cultural resources characteristic of “first modernity” meets directly with the quest for “authenticity” and preservation of the existing character of historic places.

Finally, speaking of tolerance that is so highly valued by Florida as a precondition for growth of the “creative economy”, on the basis of newspaper reports it is not hard to conclude that the region is not only pervaded by pronounced ethnic distance but also by equally pronounced intolerance for openly gay lifestyles.¹⁵ Judging by the yardstick that Florida considers to be crucial in the North American context, the SEE region has a long way to go before it becomes open to diversity that in turn enables economic exploitation of creativity.

Even if we leave aside the discussion of cultural phenomena indicative of social and economic trends, and concentrate for a moment on possible structural explanations, we see very little prospect of an imminent development of the “creative economy” in the region.

In a recent article, Böröcz and Sarkar (2005: 160-161) have argued that by the time the European Union’s new applicant states from East-Central Europe came within arm’s length of the Union, they were already profoundly transformed into “second-tier service and manufacturing sites [...] reconstructed almost exclusively by foreign capital [...] to produce for the EU market”.

Such a structure of the local economies is by no means conducive to the flourishing of the “creative industries”, as they are understood in the post-industrially modernized countries. To make things worse, the only three countries from the region represented on Florida’s emerging “global creativity index” (2005: 156) are EU candidate countries Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia.¹⁶ These countries can expect the

15 In the case of Croatia, Tomić-Koludrović (1996) has argued that the dominance of the “war paradigm” in the 1990s was detrimental to the previously achieved levels of tolerance in this regard as well. In spite of such setbacks for the gay community, it should be added that it has become more publicly visible in the transitional period than had previously been the case, thanks to the possibilities offered by the new technologies (community websites have been established in various parts of the region), increased contacts with the international gay rights activists, and organization of gay pride marches in the largest urban centers (Belgrade in 2001, in Zagreb every year since 2002, this year also in Bucharest). Less publicly visible gay pride events have also been organized in other centers in the region.

16 Florida describes his Global Creativity Index as a composite measure of national competitiveness based on his presumed 3Ts of economic growth: technology, talent, and tolerance. Sweden tops his list of 45 nations, followed by Japan, Finland, and the United States. Croatia ranks thirtieth and Bulgaria thirty-first, while Romania is the last, forty-fifth country to be included on the list. Other SEE countries are not represented.

same kind of “reconstruction” of their economies that East-Central European post-socialist countries had experienced before their full integration into the Union.

Conclusions: potential remedies and policy considerations

Is there anything to be done? Taking into account the social and economic trends that have been evolving since Bell’s first vision of a postindustrial society, it is not hard to agree with Marcus’s statement that “the new society and economy favours the sector’s development” (2005: 10). But what if it is not there? What if neither the structure of the economy nor the social configurations seem promising for the sector’s development?

If an analogy can be drawn with the picture of the post-transitional, EU-integrated East-Central European economies painted by Böröcz and Sarkar (2005), the role assigned to the newcomers into the Union will certainly not favor the sector’s development, but at best the imports of the sector’s products.

In terms of their social structure, the transitional societies are at best “mixed societies”, simultaneously undergoing modernization processes engendering both “first” and (to a significantly lesser extent) “second” modernity phenomena. What’s more, even this limited extent of “second modernity” configurations can be said to be present only in selected locations, and certainly not universally across the region.¹⁷

17 There have been no topic-specific region-wide comparative empirical surveys on the basis of which one could gauge the presence of “first” and “second” modernity phenomena in individual transitional societies in the region. What can serve as a substitute to a certain degree are the results of Inglehart’s World Values Survey. In the diagram drawn on the basis of this research (Inglehart, 2000: 85), one can discern the position of individual countries in the region with regard to values compatible with second modernity tendencies. What results from the diagram representing “locations of sixty-five societies on two dimensions of cultural variation (survival vs. self-expression, and traditional vs. secular-rational authority)” in the quoted article is that countries in the region cluster in the following way: when self-expression values are concerned, Croatia is grouped together along the axis with the countries such as Portugal and South Korea, followed in the descending order by Bosnia, and then Macedonia. Yugoslavia comes next, while Bulgaria and Romania trail behind it and form the final group of SEE countries represented on the diagram. That Croatian transitional society is a society in which two modernities are simultaneously at work has been argued on the basis of empirical research of women and youth presented in Tomić-Koludrović/Kunac (2000) and Tomić-Koludrović/Leburić (2001). On the basis of this research one can also conclude that “second modernity” tendencies are significantly less present in Croatian society than “first modernity” ones, as well as that certain phenomena that appear to be compatible with “second modernity” tendencies actually contain “first modernity” values in “second modernity” visual and lifestyle disguise.

The question asking whether in such conditions one can expect a significant development of the “creative industries” and the “creative economy” is easy to answer. The answer is an emphatic “no” for the present, and a “maybe” for a possible fragmentary development in the future.¹⁸

A question much more difficult to answer is whether anything can be done from a practical point of view in order to create preconditions for the development of the “creative economy” in the region. And, connected with this, is such a project worthwhile embarking upon in the first place, given numerous limitations and foreseeable obstacles to its successful completion?

The answer to the latter question is “yes”. If recent history of the region has taught us anything it is probably that phases of historical development cannot really be skipped, but can perhaps be accelerated. Given the profile of various activities in the “creative” sector, and their closeness to the field of culture, it is only logical that a part of the planning activities should be undertaken from a cultural policy perspective.

But what exactly should a policy maker do? It is hard to provide any general recipes, since – in spite of numerous commonalities – there also exist marked differences between the individual countries in the region, as well as between their individual parts.

As a general rule, however, we are of the opinion that policy-makers would be well advised not to confuse the cultural sector and the “creative industries”, as James Heartfield claims DCMS has done in the UK (2005: 10-11).

It would be hard to argue that a rich and varied cultural sector in any given community would not, at least in an indirect way, contribute to the development of the “industrial” aspect of creativity implied by the designations “creative industries” and “creative economy”. In contrast with that, it does not necessarily follow that an insistence on the “industrial” aspect of the creative activity would bring about the

18 In addition to the already discussed ones, a number of other limiting factors can be mentioned with regard to this development, ranging from continuing “brain drain” and “brain waste” phenomena to the region’s generally unfavorable position with regard to the global economic flows, especially when issues of intellectual property ownership and other topics considered central to the sector’s vitality are concerned. On the other hand, possibilities of the sector’s partial development are few: one concerns the possibility of exports of the local “creative” products through the tourist industry, the other one the adoption by the local companies of the production strategies practiced by their Western counterparts. An example of the latter can be several Croatian companies (X-nation, Magma, Skandal, Wulf sport) producing fashion design items in such a way that the design segment is located in Croatia while the actual manufacturing is outsourced to the Far East. It remains to be seen whether such mode of production will remain operational after the country joins the European Union.

flourishing of culture and the arts. On the contrary, such an insistence can in effect lame the cultural practitioners. Cultural policy, as well as development policy of a region or a city in general, should therefore not approach culture and the arts in an instrumental way.

For example, if Florida's "3Ts" (technology, talent, tolerance) are seen as a precondition for economic growth in the high-tech sector, cultural policy should be limited to the planning activities obviously affecting the latter two "Ts",¹⁹ and not try to squeeze "technology" into cultural activity by force. Likewise, culture and the arts should not be justified on account of their presumed positive contribution to the development of the "creative economy", although it is beyond doubt that they play such a role as well.

On the other hand, the "industrial" aspects of creativity should be dealt with and promoted by the agencies specializing in economic development. What can be learned from the UK's New Labour government in this regard is that support structures should be in place to enable business development in the regions where the "creative industries" do not function "by themselves", as they seem to do - on account of their concentration and sheer volume of output - in a global capital such as London.

However, even in the cases where economic development agencies deal with the promotion of the "industrial" aspects of creativity, we argue they would achieve better results if they conceptualized their activity as a long-term social investment.

After all, this is exactly the position that the current UK Department of Culture has recently arrived at, following a long period of insistence on the "industrial" aspects of creativity.²⁰

Even from the point of view of those who would merely like to sell their products in the region, it should be clear: "transitional markets" can only become fully developed when "transitional societies" move to maturity as well.

19 It could, of course, be argued that the use of culture to positively affect the development of tolerance or contribute to the development of human resources is also instrumental. It would indeed be exactly that if projected as a goal of the planning process. However, what we had in mind is an indirect positive general effect (a side-effect, so to speak) of culture and the arts in this regard.

20 Eight years after DCMS and the UK government embarked upon their "creative industries" program, the current UK Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell proclaimed the need to "support culture on its own merits" and the call for politicians "to stop apologizing for it by speaking only of it in terms of other agendas" (Jowell, 2004: 16). Jowell has also argued that subsidy for "high culture activities" is a proper task for the government, because "public subsidy produces what the market may not sustain" and because there is a "personal value added which comes from engagement with complex art".

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Development of Cultural Industries and the Spread of New Technologies

Jaka Primorac

Introduction

In the last couple of years the term “cultural industries” has become a buzzword in the social science research communities. The proliferation of texts on the topic of cultural industries, and lately creative industries, has increased immensely. These texts have mostly come from economic policy, regional policy, urban policy analysis and cultural (policy) research. The research done on the topic is rather diverse, its scope varies from the descriptive approaches towards economic assessments of the field. As Ratzenböck et al. (2004: 10) note on the question of “creative industries” studies: “They are generally rather descriptive versus analytical and they build not so much on a theoretically funded and logically consistent differentiation of the term ‘creative industries’ but on a definition that may be operationalised in terms of economic or cultural policy.”

The aim of this paper is to give an outline of the development of the “cultural industries” field taking into account the new technologies as the agent of change in time. It is an attempt at a historical linear overview, although it should be noted that the changes presented did not occur in such a (simplified) form. In this way, this paper aims to show how the terminology around cultural industries has developed over time - how it has shifted from the culture industry, cultural industries, towards creative industries, and “other” industries. In this context, the key reference point taken to show this development is the spread of new technologies, that is, how cultural industries were developing and what the role of the new technologies is in this picture. What are the implications of the new technologies and what spaces do new technologies create that are important for the development of the culture industries? These are some of the questions that will be tackled in this paper. It should be stressed that technological development and consequently technological convergence are not the only factors in the development of the cultural industries and of terminology

connected to it, but we shall take it to be seen as a key trigger of its development, bearing in mind that not only is technological innovation crucial for the development of the knowledge-based society, but for other processes of innovation as well (Flew, 2002: 9). Resulting changes on the global level are numerous, for instance the changing nature of work, changes in patterns of creation, distribution and consumption of creative products, etc. Some theoreticians note that in this context we can talk about the creation of a new class - the “creative class” (Florida, 2002).

The theoretical background for this overview of the development of cultural industries is the field of cultural studies and sociology. The notion that “culture is ordinary”, that triggered research into pop and mass culture, is a sort of a “family tree” where the research of cultural industries has its roots. The research into the position, value and development of cultural industries as symbol creators and presenters of certain values, developed over a period of time, that is, from the importance of the relationship of culture and everyday life as crucial for cultural research, as Hoggart, Williams and Thompson highlighted in the 1960s (Barker, 2000: 15). This was “something completely different” from the cultural pessimism of Adorno and Horkheimer who saw the rise of the culture industry as an end to the critical abilities of culture. Therefore, it is important to stress that “the cultural studies sociologists were concerned with the limited and incomplete nature of attempts to extend capitalism into the realm of culture. They saw the cultural industries, in other words, as contested, a zone of continuing struggle” (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 16), and this dynamic nature of cultural industries is our main interest.

Dual “nature” of cultural and creative products

Connected to the discussion on cultural industries is the ever-present discussion on the value of culture: one has to bear in mind the duality of the nature of cultural products - their concrete presence and their immaterial value. That is: “cultural products and services have both a tangible element such as the platform or product format (CD, computer disk, printed paper or film reel) and an intangible element, which determines their content, through meaning or symbolic representation” (UNCTAD, 2004: 6). One has to note that the duality is present on another level as well - cultural products are not only available as consumer goods but they can also be in the form of cultural services. In this context one has to stress that new technologies are influencing directly as well as indirectly both aspects of cultural products. It is not a one-way process, and new technologies are not the only influencing factor, but they are important considering the role they have and how they are used, taking into account radical changes including mp3, p2p, various intranets, broadband etc. Therefore, cultural and creative products are not like other products, or as Venturelli (2000: 7) stresses: “Unlike automobiles, toothpaste, appliances, or textiles,

information products are not consumed one unit at a time. Rather each product unit is designed to be utilized repeatedly by many, thus becoming more valuable with use". Therefore, research in the cultural sector is even more complex, as the value of products can change over time depending on the current fashion, not to mention the ever more complex issue of defining culture as such.¹ One has to add that the "cultural industries" have almost replaced the term "culture" concerning how much the term is used, as it is more popular to talk about the cultural industries rather than just culture.² This shift towards the instrumentalization of culture and creativity is related more to the process of introduction of knowledge and information to the mode of production, as Castells noted, to the informational mode of production (Castells in O'Connor, 1999).

In the beginning there was "The Culture Industry"...

Taking into account these key characteristics of cultural and creative industries let us now take a look at how the development of the culture industry occurred. What triggered the shaping of the field and how did the terminology change over time? How did we come from the Culture Industry, through cultural industries, creative industries, content industries, copyright industries and even experience industries? How did this combination of the terms culture and industry occur? These are some of the questions that will be tackled later on in the text.

To answer some of these questions we should go back to the year 1944, when Adorno and Horkheimer introduced the term "Culture Industry" to cultural research. It started as a critique of "mass culture" and the standardization of all means of production (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1993 /1944/). The term itself appears in the period of the development and massification of cultural products and contents through the new technology of that time i.e. radio, TV, film and photography. The negative influences of these new technologies on culture were the main preoccupations of the critique of Adorno and Horkheimer. They saw it as a degradation of the critical capacities of culture, that through commodification it becomes part of the system: "The assembly-line character of the Culture Industry, the synthetic, planned method of turning out its products (factory-like not only in the studio but, more or less, in the compilation of cheap biographies, pseudo

1 A number of articles start with a sentence like: "As Raymond Williams noted, the word 'culture' is the most complicated word in the English language" (see in Flew, 2002; Oakley, 2004; etc.). It seems that everybody forgets that it is a complex word in other languages as well.

2 I dare say that this disappearance of "culture" is rather significant, i.e. the instrumentalization of it in urban development research, and the switch of cultural towards creative industries show the tendency to allow the whole field of culture to be left to market forces.

documentary novels, and hit songs) is very suited to advertising: the important individual points, by becoming detachable, interchangeable, and even technically alienated from any connected meaning, lend themselves to ends external to the work.” (Adorno in: Katunarić, 1990: 203). Their severe critique can be traced back to the shock of being introduced to American culture (books sold in the shape of cigarette boxes, improvised jazz music, Mickey Mouse, for example), that is, it was a shock for Viennese intellectuals in love with classical music and “high” culture. We can, therefore, thank them for coining the term, although the later development of the term did not have much to do with its original meaning.

Cultural industries

The next step in the development around the concept is the shift towards the term “cultural industries” in the plural. Key development of the term comes from the work of French authors led by Bernard Miège (1979),³ who wrote key works on cultural industries (*industries culturelles*) for UNESCO (as well as some seminal works in the field of cultural production). This change in terminology signified the abundance of cultural production that occurred in the second part of the last century (this abundance was triggered by the new technology of that time, the introduction of TVs to every home, the development of broadcasting, and later the introduction of video. This change in terminology towards cultural industries was also an attempt to distinguish the field from association with the negative critique of the term that Adorno and Horkheimer posited in their work (Hesmondhalgh, 2002), and to present it as a legitimate and complex field of research.

On the other hand, a serious change was on the way in the neighborhood of Miège and partners. On the other side of the channel, in 1988, during the Thatcherite period in England, John Myerscough published a report entitled “The economic importance of the arts in Britain”. In this context cultural industries were perceived as “...those activities which deal primarily in symbolic goods - goods whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value” (O’Connor, 1999). On a broader scale this triggered wide discussion and research in the field of culture-led regeneration, connected mostly to urban surroundings, but also on a regional basis. The importance of the field on the European level was recognized in 1999 in the Essen declaration: “Ten Axioms for the Culture Industries in Europe”.⁴ One can also note that the

3 “The term was picked up by French sociologists (most notably Morin, 1962; Huet et al., 1978; Miège, 1979), and by activists and policy makers and was converted to the term cultural industries” (Hesmondhalgh, 2002: 15).

4 Available at:
http://www.ericarts.org/web/files/134/en/culture_industries_essen_declaration.pdf

tendency to research and map *cultural* rather than creative industries is still more present in continental Europe.

“Creative industries”

The origin of the term “creative industries”, the broader counterpart of the term cultural industries, can be found in Australia in the early 1990s,⁵ “but was given much wider exposure by policy makers in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s, when the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) set up its Creative Industries Unit and Task Force” (UNCTAD, 2004: 4). It is a broader term than cultural industries as it covers software production, advertising, PR and similar activities that are making the field of creativity into a relevant factor in the creation of products and services. With the high expansion of new technology and the swift development of the Internet, there began a boom period for new software and other Internet companies (i.e. the rise of Silicon Valley and similar companies jointly known as “the Internet bubble” that recently “burst”). Considering the influence of new technologies for the development of this sector, what is crucial for its rise in importance is digitalization. Digitalization changed immensely the ways of communication, production and distribution and in this way (among other things) it provided the possibility for the creation of various small businesses (as well as the fast development of existing ones) connected to design, software and advertising. But one should stress that the consequences of digitalization were not only positive, but also negative - easier availability to piracy, etc.

However, one has to understand that it is rather difficult to engage in a terminological discussion about the creative and cultural industries. What is important for this discussion is the notion that creative industries are, as already said, a broader term than cultural industries “cultural industries make up a subset of the creative industries, while the even broader cluster of copyright industries consist of both creative industries and distribution-based industries” (UNCTAD, 2004: 4). In the last couple of years what has occurred is the use of these terms interchangeably. What is even more difficult, however, is the changing of the scope of the term for every other piece of research.⁶ This is of course legitimate, but it confuses the situation even more. The new technologies are to be partially blamed for this shift: “With the start of the New Media boom, at the latest in the mid-1990s, the concept of ‘cultural industries’ as based on a narrower definition of art and culture, proved to be insufficient. The new growth branches of the multimedia and software industries could not be classified with conventional categories, which resulted in the first

5 In the document *Creative Nation: Commonwealth Cultural Policy*, October 1994.

6 One has to bear in mind the differences between academic and policy research as well.

disengagement of ‘cultural industries’ from the field of art and culture” (Ratzenböck et al., 2004: 10).

The most influential definition of creative industries is the one by the Creative Industries Task Force, used in the first UK national mapping exercise in 1998. In this document creative industries are considered to be: “[t]hose industries that have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property”. One has to be aware that this shift from cultural to creative industries terminology can be perceived as a change in ideological discourse - towards the neo-liberal approach, a political construct of the 1997 New Labour government (Mercer 2001: 5). It is interesting to see how the introduction of economic aspects to culture, and the review of methods of earning profit from cultural industries happened in just one decade. “Culture” as such has disappeared from the main/key discourse of the Department for Culture, Media and Sports. Most notably, the definition of creative industries does not include the word culture at all.⁷

“Other” industries

The definition of creative industries also proved to be problematic as it was rather broad and seen “...as merely an amplification of the ‘cultural industries’ by affirmative technology sectors (multimedia, software, etc.). At the same time, it is often attempted to define the concept of creative industries by the content of a product or service.” (Ratzenböck et al., 2004: 10). This resulted in the shifting of the focus onto “intellectual property” and copyrights, broadening the field even more, and thus resulting in the introduction of the new terminology, that of “copyright industries”. “Howkins (2001) has observed that in 1997, copyright became the American economy’s leading export, and the US produced over \$414 billion worth of books, films, music, TV programmes and other copyright products in that year” (Flew, 2002). These questions as to the value and ownership of cultural and creative products/content, are key questions in the “free culture and free software” debate that has become a burning issue over the last couple of years. Authors such as Richard Stallman, Lawrence Lessig and others have introduced other possibilities for the protection of intellectual property rights such as “copyleft”, “creative commons license” (CC), “general public license” (GPL), and “open source software”, and some other theoreticians are advocating for a world without copyright (Smiers, 2003). These models aim to give more control of creative work to those who created it and those who would like to use it rather than just to give it away to big multimedia, multinational corporations.

7 For this insight I would like to thank Mirko Petrić and Inga Tomić-Koludrović.

The impact of the creative industries concept has proved to be of great influence - case studies have been done in Australia, Singapore, the US, etc. In this context, in some research communities the same concept took another name. As Tobias Nielsén (2004) notes: “[t]he term experience industry is mainly confined to Sweden, but the phenomenon is a global one (...) The experience industry is based on creativity, which takes the form of people who contribute energy, creativity and knowledge.” On the other hand, those chiefly interested in the development of Hollywood-like production and the gross income of the products connected to it, were more prone to use the term “entertainment industry”, for a part of the creative industries sector. Some prefer to call them “the content industries” (this is mainly present in the US), as the content is usually regulated through copyright law, but also through other means of regulation.

Obstacles in the cultural industries

After presenting an overview of the development of the cultural industries, what should be highlighted are two key problems that are perpetually resurfacing in contemporary discussion of the field. These are questions of access: firstly the question concerning the accessibility of the new technologies, and secondly, the question of access to cultural and creative content. Digitalization as such offered not only various possibilities for the development of creativity, but also possibilities of stifling it. There are several problems connected to cultural and creative industries that are highly problematic: although the rise of the digital technologies has given a strong boost to access to development and the involvement of a larger number of people in creative industries, this type of technology is still mainly concentrated in the richer countries.⁸ The digital technologies are cheaper every day and thus more accessible: if we take a look at the rise of film production in Africa (Smiers, 2003), it gives access to the less privileged, but this is still rather limited.⁹ This gap is, therefore, still vast and not only does it perpetuate the North-South divide, but also this division, more precisely this polarization, is present in the societies of the North as well. “While the economic and employment-generating potential of these industries is vast and many developing and transition countries have great potential in this area, most are still marginal players, despite their rich cultural heritage and

8 In terms of place and space, when one speaks of creative industries one speaks more of cities (see: Pratt in Flew (2002) or Landry (2000) and of “clusters” such as Silicon Valley and Silicon Alley (see Porter in Flew (2002: 23) as the environment for creative industries, rather than of countries, as noted in Castells (1996).

9 What is more used in the South in terms of the possibilities of new technologies is the easier access to creative goods, through piracy mainly.

inexhaustible pool of talent. That position reflects a combination of domestic policy weaknesses and global systemic biases” (UNCTAD, 2004).¹⁰

The majority of the profit of cultural as well as creative industries is based on the profit made from the copyright they create, or from the copyright that they own and there are several issues connected to this. The interests of multimedia companies have dominated the regulatory processes: “[a] sign of this imbalance is the fact that copyright is not only addressed by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), but by the World Trade Organization (WTO), bringing intellectual property (as a tangible good) to the trade negotiating table. This move was initiated by the USA and Europe to give them more power and control over the flow of intellectual capital - turning intangible rights to be negotiated within the framework of world trade. In fact, intellectual property is considered to be the fast-growing component of the national economy and represents a significant amount of the GDP in the United States” (ERICarts, 2005: 8). The creative industries conglomerates perceive p2p and other similar networks as an enemy to the industry, the legislation concerning digital technology is lagging behind and this together creates absurd cases of copyright infringement, such as lawsuits against students and schoolchildren (see Lessig, 2004), starting with the most famous case - the Napster case. This raises questions as to whether there will be significant further development of the creative industries or will there be stagnation in the field due to the untouchability of the possible pool of knowledge, due to the threat of the creative content becoming owned by multinational conglomerates (be it media conglomerates, pharmaceutical ones, etc.). If this is the case, how are we going to freely create our own culture, if no cultural or creative content will be available in the public domain? That is, if all cultural content is going to be owned by multinationals?¹¹

10 For illustration in this context, one has to mention the key problems of cultural industries in the Southeastern European region such as the question of accessibility of new technologies, dependence on state aid, small markets, limited production, the influence of international cultural industries and problems with distribution (see Primorac, 2004).

11 These are some of the arguments of the Free Culture movement; for more see: www.freeculture.org. One has to note that to resolve some of these issues, there are several dimensions to be discussed. What is a special dimension of the discussion on cultural and creative industries is its policy dimension. In general when talking about the development of cultural industries and new technologies one has to note that it is a broad intersection of different fields; it tackles not only the question of cultural policies but other public policies as well. Issues such as status of the artist (mobility, freelance community), intellectual property rights, digital archiving and such are of key importance, and they have to be taken into account at all levels.

Instead of conclusion

After an overview of how the cultural and creative industries have changed over time due to the influence of new technologies, a couple of key characteristics of cultural and creative industries should be highlighted. Firstly, it should be noted that cultural industries (and the broader term creative industries) are high-risk industries (UNCTAD, 2004: 4; also Caves in Flew, 2002: 7). This comes from the fact that the value attributed to cultural goods can change rapidly over a certain period of time - one can easily go out of style/fashion. Secondly, both cultural and creative industries as well as new technologies are always connected to urban surroundings and need its infrastructures. “Castells’ contention that the global economy has given increased importance to the city/region level at the expense of the nation state is certainly true of the cultural industries” (O’Connor, 1999). And thirdly, the cultural industries sector is a sector of highly qualified employees - culture and creative workers such as artists, engineers, and designers usually have university degrees or similar.¹² These key characteristics that are intertwined illustrate some of the reasons why cultural and creative industries became so “fashionable” in the last decade. They have been the key instruments in the models of urban regeneration - making culture and creativity a catalyst in regional and local development. Furthermore, some authors insist that in this context we are talking about the rise of a totally new class, the “creative class” (Florida, 2002), that is, we have shifted from blue collar, through white collar towards a no-collar workforce. And finally, one can note the changing nature of work in creative industries: due to the influence of products of new technologies (mobile technology, broadband, Bluetooth, etc.) one is more likely to be “outplaced” from the traditional workplace. On the other hand, what is more visible is the increase of people working part-time, on a contract-to-contract basis.¹³ The question is how new is this problem to the cultural sector, as Lash and Urry note: “[o]ur claim is that ordinary manufacturing industry is becoming more and more like the production of culture. It is not that commodity manufacture provides the template, and culture follows, but that the culture industries themselves have provided the template” (Lash and Urry, 1994:123 in Flew, 2002: 22).

Therefore, from the “culture industry”, cultural industries, towards “creative industries” and other analogous industries, a lot of changes have occurred as a result of rapid technological progress, and they are also part of the globalization process. This has largely influenced other sectors, changing the relationships between producers, distributors and consumers. The characteristics of cultural and creative

12 It is worth noting that their work is largely of a collective nature.

13 This topic gained wide popularity with the publishing of *Free Agent Nation*, Daniel H. Pink’s 2002 bestseller.

industries mentioned in the above text are also changing rapidly as the global knowledge-based economy is showing uneven development. This is evident through the lack of access to new technologies on one level and to the diminishing of access to the pool of cultural products as a result of inadequate copyright regulations. These problems have to be taken into account when discussing such a rapidly changing field and are crucial issues of what the future production of artworks, software, music, etc., will look like.

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Slovenian Publishing: Enigma of Local Cultural Industry

Maja Breznik

In the recent publication *Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe* Jaka Primorac introduced the question of cultural industries in Southeastern Europe. She presented some general data and trends giving an all-encompassing picture of cultural industry in the region. We will start from here; to this we will add a study of a particular local cultural industry, the Slovene publishing industry. We will pay special attention to the effects commercialization has on publishing programs, reading cultures, and general access to cultural goods. We want to show the complexity of the social effects that new local cultural industries produce.

In the beginning of the 1990s, all publishing houses were privatized and many new publishing houses were established. Since then, publishers are eagerly applying models of liberal capitalism. Government pulled out of the sphere of publishing with the exception of some specific domains (subsidies for literal fiction in Slovene, the humanities and social sciences). The empirical research of Slovenian publishing I am going to present, was done in 2000 and 2001, ten years after the privatization of Slovenian publishing and after the close encounter of Slovenian publishers with global industries. Inevitably, we are going to speak about the globalization of cultural industries and its effects on local population.

In the background of the prevailing idea of globalization, there is the presumption of two kinds of cultural industries: local industries and global ones. The official standpoint of respectable institutions such as UNESCO and the EU is that the dialectical encounter between global and local cultural industries can produce many positive effects, even to the benefit of little anonymous cultures threatened by global hegemonic cultural actors. If local cultural industries receive some economic encouragement, the argument goes, they will be capable of guaranteeing many important tasks in the public interest, such as the preservation of the cultural heritage, maintaining local cultural (national) identity, preservation of cultural diversity on the global scale, and assurance of general access to cultural goods and services. These

ambitious pretensions for local industries deserve a closer look. We will try to assess whether local agents can really accomplish such goals.


Speaking about global and local cultural industries can be a convenient political jargon. However, under structural analysis this distinction vanishes. In its place, a new demarcation line appears between the “traditional cultural production” and cultural industries. Both produce “cultural goods”, but the nature of the product is very different. In traditional arts production and consumption of the artefact usually take place at the same time. A good example is theatre performance, where living actors perform in front of an audience: we could say that this type of artistic production consists of “living labor”. Performance can be repeated but every repetition of performance demands the presence of actors. Live music and opera are similar to theatre in this sense. Painting, a traditional art too, produces artefacts that are separated from the process of creation, but has nonetheless a very limited public. The only old technique which enabled the reproduction of many copies of identical art products was printing. Cultural industry, on the contrary, is nothing more than mass production based on a great capacity for reproduction. Once created, the artistic object (manuscript, song, film) can be reproduced in numberless copies (books, audio and video cassettes) and easily distributed in all parts of the world and through all possible communication channels. In this case, production and consumption are separated, while artistic objects take over the form of “reified labor” or “objectified labor” which can be economically exploited on a large scale.

The basic characteristic of cultural industries is the reproducibility of artistic objects in numberless copies that can be distributed all over the world. The next characteristic of cultural industries is their control over circulation: this control is twofold. First, multinational companies hold control over circulation because of their monopolistic position in the world economy; second and more importantly, cultural industries control the circulation on the basis of special privileges that proceed from authors’ rights or copyrights. Both laws allow them to demand special indemnities from consumers, which they justify with their presumed contribution to arts and culture. Special juridical protection enables cultural industries to hold a unique position in the world economy: additional charges imposed upon consumers increase their profits and help them gradually conquer systems of distribution and impose on all distribution channels their own rules and values. Hollywood domination in cinema is a case in point.

The figure below presents the world trade in cultural goods: it shows the enormous economic expansion of cultural industries during the last decades. No wonder that cultural industries became such an important matter in international economic and

juridical relations. The figure also shows the gap between the developed and the developing countries in their share of the world market. While developing countries contribute only one quarter of cultural goods to the world market, developed countries keep three quarters of the world market for themselves.

Figure 1: World trade of cultural goods (in millions of dollars)



Source: Study on International Flows of Cultural Goods between 1980-98, UNESCO, 2000.

The UNESCO brochure *Culture, Trade and Globalization* points out that one quarter of these three quarters was at that time controlled by seven major companies: Viacom, Time Warner, Disney, News Corporation, Seagram, Sony and Bertelsman. These seven controlled a variety of communication channels (such as cinema halls, TV channels, newspapers, journals, music and book publishing ...) all over the world, and controlled an important part of distribution related to cultural goods. And, as Henri Bergson said, those who control the distribution will control the world.

Figure 2: Top 10 global media companies worldwide in 2004

	Country of origin	FY 2004 Audiovisual sales (billion EUR)	Growth rate (2003/2004)
Time Warner	USA	23,6	8,5%
Viacom	USA	18,1	8,2%
Walt Disney****	USA	16,5	11,9%
Comcast	USA	15,5	10,4%
News Corp.***	USA	11,6	22,8%
NBC Universal	USA	10,4	np
DirecTV	USA	9,1	21,2%
Vivendi Universal	France	5,9	np
ARD*	Germany	5,5	-3,0%
Sony**	Japan	5,4	-5,8%

* Fiscal year ending in December 2003

** Fiscal year ending in March 2004

*** Fiscal year ending in June 2004


**** Fiscal year ending in September 2004

Source: <http://www.idate.fr>

Within this general frame, we will focus upon one small cultural industry, analyze its internal logic and compare it to the logic of global cultural industries. We will analyze the Slovenian publishing industry, a relatively advanced industry with its 4,000 titles in the year 2000. It enjoys the support of an important network of public libraries that realized 22 million borrowings that year, i. e., every inhabitant of the country statistically borrowed 11 books in a year. In our empirical research, we collected the empirical data about the books published in 2000 and included almost all titles published that year in the examination. We also collected from public libraries the information about how many times and by whom these titles were borrowed the next year, in 2001. We completed the empirical research with the information gathered directly from the publishers who answered a questionnaire where we inquired about circulation numbers, prices and so on.


Figure 3 gives some general information about Slovenian publishers in the year 2000. 80.6% percent of publishers only published from one to three titles that year, while only two publishers published 61 titles and more. Among all the 752 publishers, 39 publishers printed 16 titles and more: this group held 51% of the market.

Figure 3: Slovene publishers, 2000




We grouped the published titles into thirteen publishing programs. First, into four publishing programs intended for specialized readers: children’s programs, schoolbooks, reference books (lexicons, encyclopedias, maps ...) and manuals (practical guidebooks about hobbies, pets, psychological help ...). We broke down the rest into programs defined by their contents (fiction, human sciences, religion, economy, law, medicine, mathematics and natural sciences, technics, and art). The part of each of the thirteen publishing programs in the overall publishing production in 2000 is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Slovene publishing programs in 2000




One quarter of the whole book production belongs to the publishing programs of schoolbooks; four publishing programs (books for children, manuals, fiction and human sciences) cover about 15% each, while other publishing programs are considerably smaller. The picture shows an unbalanced book production where natural sciences are very much neglected: medicine, mathematics and natural sciences, technics are hardly represented at all. Among well-represented programs, those destined to be profitable prevail, like books for children or manuals and those with reliable customers and guaranteed purchase, like schoolbooks. This general overview covers the production of all the publishers, big ones and small ones alike. To present a more discriminate picture, we will separately show the composition of the production of the biggest publishers in Slovenia. This will offer a general idea of what kind of programs the biggest publishers in the local publishing industry sustain and promote.

Figure 5: *Mladinska knjiga*, publishing programs in titles



The biggest publisher in 2000 was Mladinska knjiga with 263 titles. Figure 5 shows that its publishing programs exclusively concentrated upon the first five programs: books for children, schoolbooks, reference books, manuals and fiction. Within the total number of fiction titles (55), 18 were from the book-series *Relief* [Oddih] with authors like Rendell, Dexter, Clark, Grisham, Quick, Steel, Harris, Sheldon, Simmel, etc.

Figure 6: DZS, in titles



The second biggest publisher was DZS with 225 titles. Its production was strongly dominated by one publishing program: 166 titles (or 73%) are school books, while the rest are dispersed among the other first four publishing programs. Obviously, the biggest two Slovenian publishing houses are by no means traditional publishers who would evenly develop all types of publishing programs (commercial programs for sure, but also fiction, social sciences and natural sciences) and who would strive for a monopoly in all the important domains of publishing. Mladinska knjiga and DZS have definitely renounced these traditional publishing policies and now exclusively maintain profitable programs.

Figures 7 to 14 present the publishing programs of the next eight biggest publishers (those who published from 43 to 60 titles in 2000).

Figure 7: *Družina*, in titles




Figure 8: *Učila*, in titles




Figure 9: *Modrijan*, in titles




Figure 10: *Cankarjeva založba*, in titles




Figure 11: *Mohorjeva družba Celje*, in titles




Figure 12: *Rokus*, in titles




Figure 13: *Karantanija*, in titles





Figure 14: *Tehniška založba Slovenije*, in titles



Figures 9-14 reveal a phenomenon that could be called “monoculture” after the agricultural practices in colonized countries where one type of fruit, wheat or nut dominates. Eight publishing houses show substantial inclination toward monocultural publishing programs: the majority share of school books is concentrated in the hands of three publishers, two publishers mostly produce books for children, and religion predominates in the programs of two Catholic publishers. Cankarjeva založba is the only exception with a program that breaks out of the monoculture. Its program to a certain extent resembles the programs of traditional publishers, although even here social and human sciences are underrepresented.

These figures induce the question about the “reading cultures” these publishing programs could possibly represent. The majority of all the publishing programs is intended to serve the needs of the state institutions and educational apparatuses either directly as school books or indirectly as reference books and literature classics. Can we speak about a “reading culture” in the case of a publishing program which is intended to be used under constraint? Besides educational programs, big publishing houses cherish commercial programs such as practical manuals like gardening, cookery books, psychological help, and Anglo-Saxon fiction known as best-sellers. Two big publishers perform the task they have received from God, and educate their readers in various religious subjects. Big publishers which actually represent the cultural industry in Slovenian publishing have little to do with the development of reading cultures and cultural advancement of the population since they strictly serve the short-term needs of the educational system and commercially exploit the use of print for leisure.

Comparing the publishing programs of the big publishers with the programs of other Slovenian publishers, one is justified in concluding that more demanding publishing programs (fiction, the humanities and natural sciences) are predominantly developed by the small publishers. According to the government reports, 40% of all the titles in the publishing programs of fiction and the humanities are subsidized by various governmental bodies. Small publishers and state subsidies, upon which almost the whole of the non-commercial program depends, are therefore of crucial importance for quality publishing in Slovenia, while big publishers thoroughly avoid risky and more demanding book programs.

Since Slovenian opponents of the state subsidy system accuse the system of being inefficient, we compared subsidized and non-subsidized books in terms of the number of copies printed and sold, and in terms of price. Figure 15 presents the data for fiction and Figure 16 for the humanities.

Figure 15: Subsidized and non-subsidized editions, fiction






Figure 16: Subsidized and non-subsidized editions, human sciences



Prices of subsidized and non-subsidized books are almost the same. State subsidies do not seem to help to make books more accessible to the public since the prices are similar. But comparing one and the other category we see that the number of printed copies of the subsidized books is 50% lower than the number of non-subsidized books. Given the small scale of the production and the specific conditions of subsidizing, the price of the subsidized books would be the double of what they cost now – if they were not subsidized. With such high prices these books would be practically inaccessible to the public since regular prices are already too high for Slovenian buyers who have significantly reduced the number of their purchases during the last decade. If prices of subsidized books were double what they are now, surely nobody would buy them any more. We can conclude that state subsidies do not help to make some titles more accessible to the public; they ensure that these books are published at all and are available to the public. Without state subsidies more serious and demanding publishing programs would not exist. Our conclusion goes against the neo-liberal argument according to which state subsidies presumably deform the market processes and the operation of free enterprise, since they presumably give to some agents economic advantage over the others. In the case of Slovenian publishing, the state of affairs very obviously contradicts this notorious argument.

Since the system of public libraries is complementary to publishing and offers the best test for the analysis of what reading cultures are preferred among Slovenians nowadays, we have gathered information about public lending in 2001 of the books published in 2000. Figure 17 shows the number of borrowings per item, that is, per copy that the libraries bought. General data about public lending show that the demand is much more equilibrated than the supply: library members borrowed natural science books as frequently as other genres, while this type of book was almost absent from the publishing programs. Books for children were the most frequently borrowed in Slovenian public libraries, then fiction, but immediately after that medicine books, mathematics and nature.

Figure 17: Lending in Slovenian public libraries, 2001



We extended our research to the public libraries because we suspected that this enormous public system of reading, although closely related to publishing, probably operates with different goals. We wanted to know whether public libraries are indifferent to the type of materials they are lending or if they are carrying out their job with certain objectives. Besides, there was an interesting political and economic issue with regard to the public libraries that particularly called for an analysis of them in correlation with publishing. In other words, the number of book purchases has been constantly declining during the last decades, while the number of borrowings has been rapidly increasing, placing itself at the top of the European list. Success of the public libraries provoked enraged jealousy among publishers who suffered a persistent and critical decline in the number of printed copies and consequently launched an infuriated campaign against the public libraries as their presumably unfair competitor on the market. Publishers demanded that the government punish the libraries for their success and impose upon them various restrictions in order to protect the publishers. They proposed that the prices of books be more expensive for libraries than for individuals, that libraries could only purchase books with one year delay, that public lending rights be introduced and so on - with the argument that every borrowing in a public library steals a purchase that would otherwise have been made in a bookshop. It was not the content itself that was the most interesting in this

debate, but the complete amnesia about the traditional role of the public libraries which struck all the involved parties. Everybody spoke about the library as if it were a videotheque, an institution which is simply lending objects, while nobody thought of the traditional social role of the library as distributor of information material, as an important guarantee that knowledge and information are available to everybody and as an incentive for the population to read, study and educate themselves. Besides, it has often been shown that the people who borrow more books in the library, also buy more books, and, on the contrary, those who do not go to the library do not go to the bookshop either (Hersent 2000, Robin 2000). Therefore, we wanted to observe the modern library from this traditional point of view and to see what social effects the modern library has.

Picture 18: Number of copies public libraries bought, fiction




Figure 18 shows which books, published in 2000, were bought by Slovenian public libraries in 2001. There are two graphs, the first one for the profit publishers and the second one for the small, non-profit publishers. The comparison shows that public libraries buy many more non-subsidized books from the big publishers than any other group of books. Since the opposition between subsidized and non-subsidized very often means the opposition between non-commercial and commercial books, this means that public libraries are more inclined to purchase commercial books published by the big publishing houses than the more demanding subsidized books of the small publishers. Public libraries ignore small publishers although they publish books of higher quality. The final effect is that not all state subsidized books are

available even in the 60 central public libraries of Slovenia. There is a contradiction in the fact that two state programs, the state subsidy program and the acquisition of books for public libraries, do not match: the state, on the one hand, subsidizes the publishing of certain books but, on the other, it does not make these books available in all the central libraries, not to speak of smaller local libraries. Acquisition of books is an important matter: Figure 19 demonstrates that there is a strong correlation between the number of copies that are available and the number of copies that are actually lent. The more copies of one book a library had bought, the more frequently these copies were borrowed.

Figure 19: Interrelation between copies available in libraries and lent copies





Figure 20 even more clearly demonstrates the points we have made up till now. It shows various fiction genres (classics, poetry, best-sellers, and contemporary novels), the number of copies available in public libraries, and the number of borrowings.

Figure 20: Bought copies and lent copies in public libraries (per 1,000 inhabitants)



It is almost unnecessary to comment on this figure given that commercialization of public libraries is so evident. Instead of blaming only libraries we have to say that the government policy contributed a great deal to this situation. The government assesses the efficiency of libraries by the number of borrowings they achieve. As a consequence, libraries have been stimulated to put into circulation as many books as possible no matter what quality they are. It was in the interest of librarians to buy books of easy genres that would be borrowed as many times as possible. In this way the government stimulated the commercialization of reading in public libraries.

The Slovenian publishing industry is one of the most excellent in Europe regarding the number of new titles published every year per inhabitant. It is also convincingly outstanding in the number of loans in public libraries. Nevertheless these brilliant superficial results cannot hide a deep rottenness underneath. Slovenian publishing is plagued by the products of global cultural industry such as best-sellers which invaded the public library system as well. We can therefore hardly speak about a presumed competitiveness of the local cultural industry with respect to the global one since it is almost impossible to distinguish one from the other. The Slovene publishing industry is then killing itself by hyperproduction of highly commercial books which can be kept in circulation only a short time and can only achieve a limited number of printed copies. The really dark side of these processes in publishing is the reflection of publishing programs in the library stocks which increasingly privilege leisure reading. In this way, the public library more and more resembles an ordinary videotheque.

It doesn't seem that these overall processes are likely to change their direction. The Slovenian authorities and the public have no intention of stopping commercialization and protecting the traditional role of publishers and libraries as primary agents of cultural, intellectual and scientific progress. The government shows no intention of encouraging big publishers to perform their cultural role more significantly. State subsidies for books are lower from one year to the other and endanger small publishers who maintain publishing of their books with a high degree of self-exploitation. And this certainly is not a good foundation for the development of quality book publishing. The government recently intervened in the sector of book sales with a few supporting programs, but evaluation of the effects would be premature. However, support to bookshops will maybe stimulate more purchases of books, but they will surely have little influence on the quality of book programs. As regards public libraries, the status quo is maintained. Since authorities claim that every type of reading is positive no matter what the content, they have no intention of questioning the role of public libraries and the effect of commercialization on reading. A recent intervention was the introduction of public lending rights into public libraries. This system, which rewards commercial authors and not those whose cultural and intellectual contribution is significant, changes the position of public libraries. The model of libraries as institutions in the public (general) interest is replaced by a model of institutions which can economically benefit certain groups. The latest state interventions (support for book sales and public lending rights) show a tendency that the state is more willing to assist economic agents (mostly big publishers and the publishing industry) than cultural agents.

These indicators demonstrate that Slovene publishing is losing its cultural and social foundation. Slovenian publishers like to say that publishing is a cultural activity in an entrepreneurial context. Big publishers might be relatively successful in the entrepreneurial sense, but they leave cultural tasks behind to small publishers. Cultural missions obviously do not go hand in hand with economic interests in this case, so those who still feel attached to it are small enterprises outside the real publishing industry. To define the local cultural industry in comparison with a global one, we would say that it is just like a global one only much smaller.

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On “Flexible” Employment in Culture

Aldo Milohnić

People employed or self-employed in the culture sector represent indispensable human capital; authors, artists, cultural operators, workers in post-production and in service and technical departments are a prerequisite for the operation and development of this sector. Furthermore, employment in culture deserves our attention and research interest because of labor’s general importance for the economy of any society. In the production of cultural goods, and production within the public cultural sector in particular, labor costs represent a large share of production costs.

But how can one define with any precision which categories of occupation and education may be said to belong in the area of “employment in culture?” To illustrate this problem, we will use several statistical estimations of the scope of the category of “culture jobs” in Slovenia where meaningful quantitative differences come to light. All the figures are estimations by international bodies based on the data obtained from local resources. So, for example, the report of the expert committee of the Council of Europe says that, at the time of writing, there were “about 3,500 permanently employed cultural workers” in Slovenia (Council for Cultural Co-operation, 1997: 318). Some years later, Eurostat came up with the figure of 21,000, which is a number accounting for 2.5% of all employees in Slovenia.¹ According to the Council of Europe and ERICarts (2004), whose estimation is based on the database of the Statistical Office of Slovenia, in 2002 there were 10,449 persons employed in the culture sector (8,286 in public institutions and 2,163 self-employed). This accounts for 1.33% of all the economically active population. These large discrepancies arise from different definitions that determine the scope of the analysis.

In order to be able to formulate an integral approach to the definition of “employment in culture”, it is important to be aware of the difference between the

¹ A press release by Eurostat, 26 May 2004; the data is for 2002. Cf. <http://europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat/Public/datashop/print-product/EN?catalogue=Eurostat&product=3-26052004-EN-BP-EN&mode=download> (last accessed on 24 August 2004).

category of education and that of occupation.² The former denotes educational attainment; the education system trains future workers for carrying out specific types of work and tasks. Yet every category of workers with a certain type of education, and a certain level of education, also includes a certain number of those who work in occupations that do not necessarily match their qualifications. “Occupation” hence denotes a specific type of work requiring specific knowledge and skills, which, however, does not necessarily tally with the education of a person performing that type of work. When defining the area of employment in culture, the duality education-occupation points to the necessity to take into account not only cultural occupations, but also those that represent necessary supportive types of work not belonging in the field of culture. Similarly, it is necessary to take into account persons with culture-related education but employed in other sectors. This leads to three structural positions that may be considered as belonging in the area of employment in culture:

1. employees with education in culture working in culture;
2. employees with education in culture working in other sectors;
3. employees with education in other fields working in the culture sector.³

Whether one, two or all three structural positions will be taken into account when assessing the number of culture workers, determines whether we will say that Slovenia has, for example, 3,500 or 21,000 culture workers. In other words, the methodology used in defining the scope of the available data will to a large extent determine the final count. Although the accuracy of data also plays a part in these estimations, crucial disproportions are generated by differences in the basic methodological starting points. Anyone insisting on the purely “conservative” assessment of employment in culture would probably take into account only the first of the three categories, meaning workers with education in culture working in culture. Anyone advocating an even stricter selection would perhaps exclude from these

2 This differentiation is significant for the understanding of trends on the labor market. At least in Slovenia, it is the basis for the assessment not only of labor demand, the number of the unemployed and so on, but also for the resulting analysis of these trends by the Employment Service of Slovenia, which uses the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) in addition to their own code list of vocational and professional education.

3 The fourth group would comprise those workers who do not have cultural education and work in other sectors. Since in this case there is no direct connection (of education and occupation) with the area of culture, this group represents that part of the labor market that is not taken into account by the researchers into employment and work in culture except when comparing the culture labor market and other labor markets (or labor market in general).

“core” culture jobs all those workers without regular (permanent) employment in the culture sector (e.g. those with second jobs, those with part-time jobs etc.). It is possible – although we do not know this for certain – that when giving the figure of 3,500 culture workers in Slovenia, experts from the Council of Europe started from such a “conservative” assessment of the actual extent of employment in culture. What is certain, though, is that the Eurostat analysts came up with an essentially higher number, i.e. 21,000 workers in culture, on the basis of the calculation of a special “culture coefficient”. It was precisely this methodological tool that played the crucial role in an attempt to isolate those structural positions on the labor market for which it would be acceptable to say that they belong in the analytical corpus of the “employments in culture”.⁴

The next problem is how to determine which occupations and activities should be categorized as belonging in the culture sector. This is indeed the key problem of the sector as a whole and not only of the issue of employment in culture. In fact, if the subject is not well defined, and if the meaning and the scope of the terms in use are not clear, then it is undoubtedly very difficult, if not impossible, to make a consistent theoretical and applicative analysis of the sector.⁵ A precondition for any consideration of the extent of employment in culture is a “catalogue” of activities and occupations. There are two catalogues of that kind that are the best from a reference viewpoint: the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE) that is harmonized with the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC). These standard classifications therefore provide the basic methodological tool for determining the scope of the field of research as well as the analysis of trends inside the chosen field. It was also the basis for the latest – and at the moment the most referential – European study on employment in culture, which was part of the wider Eurostat project “Implementation of the EU methodology for statistics on cultural employment”, where the key role was played by the French

4 These are primarily categories 2 and 3, since category 1 is, at any rate, a core category comprising “indisputable” culture workers belonging there by virtue of both their education and occupation.

5 In connection with culture, this problem is even more obvious since sociologists of culture, cultural studies scholars, theoreticians of cultural policies and similar experts cannot agree on the basic issue of how to conceptualize and interpret the concept of “culture” and whether this field comprises the activities that presumably “cultivate” (nature, objects, people etc.), or whether it should be understood more in the sense of artistic production. Similarly, no clear-cut demarcation line has been drawn between entertainment and cultural activities in the narrow sense of the word. This is also the source of the conceptual problem when attempting to define various “industries,” such as creative, cultural, entertainment etc.

Ministry of Culture and Communications.⁶ The project is a result of the years-long effort on the part of the EU to harmonize the methodology of data collection and processing in the area of culture, and to standardize statistical methods which would, in turn, enable the comparison of data supplied by the statistical offices of member states.⁷

* * *

So far we have briefly recapitulated several methodological issues that are important for the definition of the field of research. We will now proceed to examine a trend towards greater flexibility of employments in culture occupations. Recent research and statistical sources actually indicate significant structural shifts in general employment policy and in temporal, physical and other organizational aspects of production in particular.

When speaking about the flexibility of work it is necessary to take into account one important organizational change in the production process that occurred in the mid 1970s in western economies. The Fordian model of production that was predominant until then involved a relatively stable employment, i.e. unlimited full-time employment. Since this type of employment was in place for a long time, and since it is still predominant, it is also referred to as “standard” or “typical” employment. All other types of employment, including temporary, part-time or split time employment, as well as work from home, second jobs etc., are by analogy called “atypical” or “non-standard”. These types of employment were introduced at the transition from the Fordian to post-Fordian (still ongoing) phase of production. Tendencies towards increasingly greater flexibility of work and working time gathered pace especially in the 1990s, with the accelerated development of the so-called new economy propelled by the advancements in information and communications technologies. With these new types of employment, the borderline between work time and leisure is increasingly blurred. Work is project-based and workers are expected to demonstrate creativity and innovation, to network and so on. The significance of so-called immaterial labor has been increasing, i.e. work related to the production of ideas, images, design, advertising, communications services etc. Although these more flexible forms of employment do have many advantages (e.g. a more dynamic social environment, more options for individual choice of working time etc.), they also have

6 “Definition and production of harmonized statistics on culture in Europe”, Batch 1: Cultural Employment, Chapter 3, report based on a study conducted between June and December 2003 by the Department of Studies and Prospective (DEP), French Ministry of Culture and Communication, February 2004.

7 Initially, from 1997 to 1999, this task was the responsibility of the LEG (Leadership Group), and later of the Eurostat Working Group. The monitoring of new findings related to the area of employment in culture is entrusted to the Taskforce on Cultural Employment.

a series of negative effects, one of these being diminishing social security and the related feeling of uncertainty. In that sense, a “classic” confrontation of interests known from the Fordian system persists in the post-Fordian model of production as well: on the one hand, there is a wish of the employer to achieve a more “efficient” use of the labor force, and on the other, there is an understandable wish of employees to protect their (already gained) workers’ rights.

Despite many hesitations and much skepticism regarding the general “flexibilization” of work, for many theoreticians it has already become a given fact. The post-Fordian shift in effect created a situation from which there is no way back to the Fordian paradigm of the industrial organization of the production process. As a result, current atypical and non-standard forms of employment put the worker in a precarious situation, but what is actually needed and what should become a standard flexible employment is a situation aptly expressed by the coinage “flexsecurity”. It denotes the flexibility of employment accompanied by the development of instruments that would provide social security not tied exclusively to “standard” employment.⁸

Some theorists of post-Fordism, among them Paolo Virno, see culture as the area where the flexibilization process actually originated: “Within the culture industry, even in its archaic incarnation examined by Benjamin and Adorno, one can grasp early signs of a mode of production which later, in the post-Ford era, becomes generalized and elevated to the rank of *canon*” (Virno, 2001). This trend has not essentially changed, and this is also evident from the Eurostat report on employment in culture based on the common methodology for all 25 members of the EU. The data actually indicate that – according to all key indicators of employment flexibilization – employment in culture occupations is “atypical” more than the average. Below are some data from the Eurostat report on employment in culture (May 2004) clearly showing the place of Slovenia with regard to other EU states.

According to the Eurostat data, in the Slovene economy as a whole the percentage of part-time workers is 5% (the EU average is 17%), while in the segment of cultural occupations it is three times higher, namely 15% (the EU average is 25%). Compared to other EU members, Slovenia, in addition to Greece, has the largest discrepancy in

⁸ “Flexsecurity” roughly corresponds to a situation already attained by “freelance” workers in France at some point in the past. Unfortunately, the state began to undermine it by reducing the compensation for the period of unemployment, which led to mass strikes and protests of independent culture workers (“intermittents du spectacle”). They described their situation as “continual work and discontinual payment”. (Cf. GlobalProject/Coordination des Intermittents et Précaires d’Ile de France. 2004. “Spectacle Inside the State and Out. Social Rights and the Appropriation of Public Spaces: The Battles of the French Intermittents”. *Republicart*. <http://republicart.net/disc/precariat/intermittents01_en.htm> (last accessed on 29 September 2004).

the ratio of part-time workers in culture to part-time workers in other sectors of the economy as a whole.

The percentage of workers with second jobs (again in the Slovene economy as a whole) is 2% (the EU average is 3%), while in the segment of culture it is only slightly higher in Slovenia (3%) and radically higher in the EU (9%). Slovenia and Luxembourg have the lowest share of culture workers with second jobs.

In the Slovene economy as a whole, the percentage of self-employed persons is 9% (14% in the EU), while in the segment of culture this percentage is 20% in Slovenia and 29% in the EU. In this respect, Slovenia is comparable to Denmark, Finland, France, Slovakia and partly Hungary. The data in the annual report of the Ministry of Culture for 2003 indicate a very fast increase in the number of self-employed persons in culture. Compared to 2000, the total number of persons employed in culture increased by approximately 2%, while in the same period the number of self-employed persons increased by almost 30% (Ministry of Culture of Slovenia, 2004: 45).

The percentage of workers with temporary jobs was 15% for the Slovene economy as a whole (the EU average is 12%), and the percentage of these workers in the culture sector was 26% (in the EU it is 18%). In this respect, Slovenia is well above the EU average and occupies fourth place, after Portugal, Spain and France. However, if we look at the total number of employees with temporary jobs (meaning not only in culture, but in all sectors), Slovenia occupies third place (after Portugal and Spain). It seems appropriate here to draw attention to the findings of some domestic research studies on the flexibilization of work, which suggest that the trend towards temporary jobs in Slovenia is continually on the rise. The relevant data clearly show this: at the beginning of the 1990s, temporary jobs accounted for somewhat less than 6% of all jobs; towards the end of the 1990s, this percentage was around 11%, and in 2002 it reached 15% (Ignjatović, 2002: 28). If this trend continues, Slovenia is firmly on its way to becoming a country with the biggest relative share of temporary jobs in the EU (according to the harmonized methodology used by Eurostat). Since a further increase in temporary jobs is stressed as one of the strategic orientations of both cultural and economic policy of Slovenia,⁹ it would be necessary to take a closer (and critical!) look at this issue from the perspective of the findings or assumptions that have led to such a strategic orientation, and from the perspective of the Eurostat report which places Slovenia well above the European average.

9 “Restructuring of labor relations in artistic professions with the aim to gradually increase the percentage of temporary employed workers” (Resolution on the National Program for Culture 2004-2007, UL RS 28/2004, p. 3105); “Slovenia must achieve greater flexibility of the labor market and employment, more part-time and temporary jobs, and an easier flow and mobility of the labor force” (Development Strategy of RS. The Government of the RS and Office for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development, June 2004, p. 60).

Data on labor demand and on the factual number of new employees as a result of that demand are also illustrative. Relying on data supplied by the analytical department of the Employment Service of Slovenia, we made a calculation which shows that the trend towards an increase in temporary jobs continues both in cultural occupations and all other occupations. The figures show that the share of temporary jobs in culture increases faster than the average (i.e. as a share of all temporary jobs in the Slovene economy as a whole).

One should keep in mind, however, that the labor market as a whole (i.e. not only new employments, as presented above) is still strongly dominated by permanent jobs and that employers are obviously very cautious when employing new workers. In other words, they first opt for temporary contracts and are ready to change these into permanent arrangements only after a time, that is, within the legally defined limits.¹⁰

The selected case study of the “flexibilization” of employment in culture in Slovenia is here only sketched owing to limited space and it should be analyzed in more depth in some more extensive and more focused discussion. Even so, it evidently points to the need to establish mechanisms and criteria for continual and methodologically harmonized monitoring of the trends in the culture labor market.

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¹⁰ The Labor Relations Act (Article 53) restricted the temporary employment contract to two years, except in cases explicitly stipulated by law. In this respect, culture workers are much worse off now, since the Exercising of Public Interest in Culture Act (Article 46) stipulates that there is no restriction on concluding a new fixed-term contract after the expiration of the first contract “[w]hen so required by the special nature of work in the field of artistic or other cultural activity”.

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Cultural Exchange and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe

Television and cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe

Dona Kolar-Panov

When a population becomes distracted by trivia, when cultural life is redefined as a perpetual round of entertainments, when serious public conversation becomes a form of baby-talk, when, in short, a people become an audience and their public business a vaudeville act, then a nation finds itself at risk; culture-death is a clear possibility. (Postman 1987: 161)

When Neil Postman talks about the “ways by which the spirit of culture may be shriveled” he opts for the Huxleyan way, not the Orwellian approach, as Huxley “teaches us that in the age of advanced technology, spiritual devastation” comes from an “enemy with a smiling face”. Thus “in the Huxleyan prophecy Big Brother does not watch us by his choice”, but rather “we watch him, by ours” (Postman 1987: 160). Of course Postman is talking about television.

Television has from its beginnings raised controversies, and there is an impressive body of literature on its influence on society, from daily life to politics and culture. Sometimes the titles of the books signal us that very power that television has on its audiences. Just to mention a few: *The Ideological Octopus: Exploration into Television Audience* (1991) by Justin Lewis; *No Sense of Place: The Impact of Electronic Media on Social Behaviour*, by Joshua Meyrowitz (1985); *Making Sense of Television: The Psychology of Audience Interpretation*, edited by Sonya Livingstone (1998); *Television and Everyday Life*, by Roger Silverstone (1994); *Amusing Ourselves to Death*, by Neil Postman (1987), and the list is endless. Not only have academics debated television and its power endlessly, the other media have had a field day with it. Questions have been raised about television’s influence on children’s violent behavior, television’s role in copycat killings and television’s role in inciting ethnic violence. Television has often been called “an idiot box”.

Because of the public debates and its high visibility no one is questioning the power of television over its audiences any more.

However, something else is still questioned. Is television a form of art? Even though television studies have been established as an academic discipline (see Newcomb, 2000: 2-5) in the past few years, the question remains open. The exclusion of television from the canonical systems of arts and culture is still an obstacle to including television within a “serious” art and cultural policy. I do not wish to enter here into the discussion of the difference between elite or high culture and popular culture; my intention is to show how television can be and is used for cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe (SEE) using the example of a case study of a co-produced children’s television program that is broadcast in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro, and for a comparison with this show to look briefly at the commercial reality show with the same name, *This Is Me*, that was broadcast until recently by Macedonian public service broadcaster MKRTV. The common thread for these two entirely different television shows is that both claim that they promote “[c]ommunication and understanding among young people in the Balkans”.

However, before we proceed with analysis of these two television shows let us look at some facts about television viewing in SEE.

Some facts on television in Southeastern Europe

Technological developments in the later part of 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century have offered a new platform for television in SEE. In the multi-channel universe television is now received via cable and satellite and as the “old” terrestrial broadcasting. The availability of a variety of types of channel, which have expanded the range of programs, thus giving people a greater choice, has had an impact on average viewing time. And the average viewing time is a good indicator for the importance of television in our everyday life. The average viewing time is more than four hours in countries of SEE (and it is on the increase), which is higher than the average viewing time in Western Europe which is estimated at about 3.5 hours daily (IP International Marketing Committee, 2004: 25). If we add to this that the average viewing time in the US is 4.5 hours (ibid.), it certainly proves that television is exerting a global fascination and that after sleep and work it is the most consuming daily activity.

In Western Europe average viewing time per adult in 2003 was 217 minutes (ibid.), but let us see how is it in SEE.

Table 1.

Country	Average viewing time in minutes,in 2003
Bulgaria	185
Croatia	254
Macedonia	259
Romania	235
Serbia and Montenegro	278
Slovenia	178
Albania	N/A

Source: IP International Marketing Committee (2004: 305, 315, 378, 397, 414, and 433)

It is significant to note that during the conflict in Macedonia in 2001 the average viewing time went up to 325 minutes a day, to drop to 282 minutes a day in 2002 when the conflict was over (ibid: 25).

It is important to understand that television is the most researched of all media and that audience research provides a common currency for the three intertwined markets exchanging goods around television: the markets of program production, broadcasting and advertising sales (ibid: 30). The key word here is the market. Because television is mainly understood on market and commercial bases, accordingly the program structure is aimed towards maximization of profits, and because of this it is left to the public service broadcasters to attend to the question of cultural programming for television.

Television and cultural policy

The influence of television on cultural identity, on its formation and maintenance has been well researched and documented (e.g. Morley and Robins, 1995). Because of this both the European countries and the European supra-national institutions have paid special attention to imported foreign cultural material on television, regulating that import in various ways by national broadcasting laws and supra national policy (mainly audiovisual policy). I have written elsewhere about the relationship of the policy and the import of foreign programming (Kolar-Panov, 2001a; 2001b), but it is important to note that cultural identification can exist both within and across nation states and these can be different from and often are in direct conflict with what might be called the “national culture” or cultural identity (Moran 1998: 176). Because of this, cultural cooperation that takes advantage of the fluidity of linguistic spaces in Southeastern Europe could be very important.

Emmanuelle Machet and Serge Robillard in their study *Television and Culture: Policies and Regulations in Europe* (1998), analyze the legal framework governing cultural policy on both the national and international level, the policy that determines the function of television in a cultural field. They remind us of Denis McQuail's emphasis on the relationship between television and culture which is "many sided and complex" and they consider this relationship on three levels:

1. television is an instrument which, through its programs, produces and disseminates culture in the broad sense;
2. it offers the various cultural groups and institutions a means of expression;
3. as a result, television is likely to have a significant impact on the cultural environment of each individual (ibid: 14).

These three functions of television are seen as a reason why national governments and supra-national institutions have taken an active interest and are involved in the development of cultural policy in the audiovisual field.

Machet and Robillard distinguish three concerns relating to cultural policies in the audiovisual field, concerns which impose on broadcasters a number of cultural obligations and are closely linked with cultural programming.

These concerns are:

1. the idea that culture should be accessible to the largest possible number of people;
2. the idea that each society has a number of inherent cultural values which characterize it, i.e. it has a recognizable cultural identity;
3. finally, the affirmation that hierarchy exists between various forms of culture, which justifies the protection and active support given to certain cultural events (ibid).

The study by Machet and Robillard (1998) places the debate on cultural programming in the economic and political context and considers the future of public service broadcasting in the information society. However, the analysis of the legal framework in this study shows that there are many problems in the finer definition of cultural policy that determines what television supplies in the field of culture on a national and international level.

Starting from the very definition of what represents "cultural programming" (ibid: 16-19) it is argued that cultural programs are still considered a province of public service broadcasting. In the current crisis of public service broadcasting in SEE,

among other things, these services are faced with a paradox: “In order to remain competitive should they adopt the view that “everything is culture’, while giving priority to their function to entertain, or should they opt for a restrictive vision of culture” (ibid: 138).

We will see later how the Macedonian public service broadcaster MKRTV opted for the solution that “everything is culture” and thus gave preference to entertainment over the two other missions of the public broadcaster, which are: to educate and to inform.

However, the adoption of the more restrictive view of culture by public service broadcasters and the rejection of entertainment might lead to the creation of “cultural ghettos”, such as Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) in United States (ibid: 139). The solution is to find a fine balance between the two options, which is obviously not so easy. As the television industry is defined by profit, and cultural programs are often regarded as unprofitable, we can understand why entertainment is often valued above culture.

Such difficulties faced by cultural programming on television are mirrored in possible cultural cooperation via television.

Co-production of television programs with a cultural content does not happen very often in SEE, and there is no established protocol for exchange of cultural programs, with very few cultural events shown outside their country of origin.

This does not mean that there are no TV programs from neighboring countries watched in SEE. For example, in Macedonia there is satellite and cable television, which allows 45% of the Macedonian population to watch television not only from neighboring countries, but also from all around the world. The latest ratings for Macedonia in February 2005 show that Croatian HRT 1, Serbian Pink TV, Croatian HRT 2 and Bosnian OBN Television (in that order) are the most frequently watched foreign channels in Macedonia.¹ Besides that, the terrestrial broadcaster, especially those on a national level, often import drama serials from Serbia, especially the ones that were produced in the time of former Yugoslavia. So it can happen that all four commercial national broadcasters in Macedonia have different Serbian serials on their programs at the prime time between 20.00 and 21.00. Of course these programs are subtitled in the Macedonian language.

This is understandable if we take into consideration that Serbia always had a strong television industry, which has its roots in the fact that in former Yugoslavia Belgrade was one of the leading centers for television production. One might ask, and what

¹ All the data relating to audience ratings in Macedonia was made available by courtesy of Strategic Marketing, Skopje, Macedonia.

about products from Macedonian cultural industries on the Serbian market? The answer that there are no television products imported to Serbia from Macedonia can be easily justified by the claim that television production in Macedonia is almost non-existent. Even the music video spots by popular interpreters from Macedonia are produced for the Serbian market in Serbia. Moreover, the lyrics for music video spots from Macedonia are translated into Serbian for the Serbian music market. In some cases a paradox occurs, the video spot or the CD with the Serbian version of the Macedonian song becomes more, or just as popular, in Macedonia, as the Macedonian original of the same.

There is an occasional co-production of television programs between Serbian and Macedonian commercial television such as the co-production of the international reality show program “Pop Idol” that is titled “Idol” for this market, a co-production between Macedonian A1 Channel, BK Television from Serbia and IN Television from Montenegro.

The question is, can this co-production really be seen as a case of cultural cooperation, since it represents the regionalization of global television formats that is a result of the evolution of global television (see Waisbord, 2004: 379). “Idol” was at first broadcast in Macedonia with no subtitles or translation for the parts of the show that were in Serbian. However, after the reaction by the Macedonian Broadcasting Council pointing out the breach of the language provision in the Broadcasting Law, A1 Television started to simultaneously translate, into Macedonian, the parts of the show in the Serbian language.

The success of “Idol” both in Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro only shows the power of global television formats that get “glocalized” or regionalized. However, “it would be a mistake ... to celebrate formats as harbingers of cultural diversity. Just because formats are ‘glocalized’, they do not necessarily usher in multiculturalism or stimulate cultural diversity” (Waisbord, 2004: 380).

The consequences of the globalization of the television industry might be seen rather as “missing opportunity for cultural diversity to be expressed” (ibid.). The very fact that the Macedonian public broadcaster opted for the spin-off of the international reality show format of “Big Brother” rather than a regional co-production of a children’s television mosaic (as we will see later) and that the national television broadcaster A1 Television co-produces another reality show, “Idol”, with the Serbian BK Television and Montenegrin IN Television that is also carried on BK’s satellite channel, and the knowledge that a production of such television shows comes at a fraction of the price of the production of quality programs such as documentaries - all of this creates a situation where television stations and independent production houses simply do not bother to produce cultural programming. This is understandable

since the local or/and regional versions of global formats bring in high ratings, and with them also good advertising revenue.

This makes it extremely difficult for so-called cultural programs to compete on the market, and leaves the production of the same at the mercy of public funding and private and civil society funding.

This is well known, but there is still a false dichotomy as to whether cultural development should be led by the traditional arts or by modern semi-commercial media industries. Even though there is an awareness that “media cooperation on contemporary cultural issues (throughout the region and between the regions in Europe) needs to be supported” (Wagner, Chenal and Schwartz, 2004: 21) the media is traditionally the third, somewhat neglected, component of cultural policy besides arts and culture and education. Furthermore, in the past 14 years the media has been seen by international organizations as important for the democratization of Southeastern Europe, and just as Milena Dragičević Šešić and Corina Suteu (2003) pointed out that in Bosnia and Herzegovina uncoordinated international donation created a paradoxical situation in the fields of art and culture, the same has happened in the field of the media throughout Southeastern Europe. The support of international organizations and foundations went into the creation of independent media that would promote democracy, and in this way numerous independent radio and television channels were created. When the donor money was no longer available the market in Macedonia was left with 56 commercial television stations. This created a very fragmented and weak broadcasting market. The failure of the international organizations and foundations to support the transition of the state public broadcaster into a public broadcasting service, and the subsequent failure to help the development of a strong public broadcaster, leaves Macedonian broadcasting in a situation where the public broadcaster needs to compete with the commercial broadcasters for advertising revenue, and as a consequence has to turn towards producing and broadcasting programs that maximize audiences, thus leaving cultural programming on the margins.

If we add to this that the current EU cooperation mechanisms regarding Southeastern Europe such as the Stability Pact and the European Commission’s CARDS program do not include a cultural chapter in their mandates, and also that the private donors and foundations are currently reducing their support for arts and culture in the region, it is obvious that the prospects for cultural cooperation - especially in the field of television - lies entirely in the hands of the respective member states of the SEE region.

Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness in the member states of the European Union of the need for cultural cooperation with wider Europe.

Thus recommendations in the field of cultural policy call for:

A growing awareness that fostering cultural exchange and dialogue is not an embellishment of foreign relations or corollary to the 'tough issues' (like economy, trade, security, migration) that dominate the agenda of closer integration within the wider European context; combating cultural ties among EU members and their new neighbours would significantly further the development of open and inclusive European space, and thus enhance the citizens of Europe's sense of 'Europeanness' beyond EU frontiers (Wagner, Chenal and Schwartz, 2004: 17).

Such recommendations have their merit, but a lot more effort and money will have to be provided by EU institutions in order to achieve such goals. Until then the support for cultural cooperation in SEE will depend on continuing support by independent international foundations and on European networks, the support that until now has proven to be very important and very effective (Dragičević Šešić and Suteu, 2003).

Two shows by the same name, *This Is Me*: a case study

What the two shows that I am describing and analyzing have in common is the fact that both claim that they promote communication and understanding among young people in the Balkans. The first show I will discuss is the international reality show *This Is Me* that used the prefix "Balkan reality show". It was broadcast on the first and second channels and on the satellite channel of the public broadcaster in Macedonia, MKRTV. The show was broadcast in 15-minute slots six times a day with a daily wrap (a sort of summary) of one hour in the evening. The evening show was a mixture of late night show format with the viewers calling in and SMS messages displayed continuously at the bottom of the television screen. It also contained the most interesting moments from life in the house during that day.

It is important to say that the show also had its website on the Internet, and that the producers claimed that visits to the site exceeded one and a half million.

Even if the producers of the show continuously denied that it was a "copycat" (Moran, 1998) of the "Big Brother" format, it had the structure and all the characteristics of the "Big Brother" (BB) reality show.

Much has been written on the Big Brother format, but it is important to mention that Big Brother has been subject to much speculation in the press, on television, on the Internet and among the public. This is mainly negative speculation with the most frequent questions asked being: "Is Big brother voyeuristic?" and "Why do viewers become addicted to watching a reality show that really is about nothing?"

Arguments that “BB is not all-round entertainment but rather an “extraordinary media event” whose life span may be short lived” (Hill, 2002: 324) are being put forward, or that BB is about “nosey sociability” (Corner, cited in Hill, 2002: 324) or it is popular “because it is interactive” (Jones, cited in Hill, 2002: 323).

However, Annette Hill (2002: 324) thinks that viewers watch BB for many reasons: because it is something new, and it gives you a sense of power since you can vote people (the contestants) off if you do not like them. It also provides a good conversational topic, since everybody is watching it.

Whatever lies behind the huge popularity of the BB format is responsible for it becoming a kind of cultural phenomenon since its launch in 1999. However, the fact remains that: “... *Big Brother* is a typical product of our commercially oriented age in being a hybrid, a combination of various genres designed to maximize audiences” (Hill and Palmer, 2002: 251). Just like another international TV format, *Who Wants to be a Millionaire*, a game show that is produced and broadcast in all Balkan countries, the BB format - even if it is an international format- makes it possible to have a domestic taste to it by revealing the national characteristics of the country it is produced in.

The first and the second seasons of the reality show *This Is Me* were produced with all the contestants in the house being of Macedonian nationality, and were shown only on MTV in 2003. The show had moderate ratings not even approaching the ratings of its third season.

However, for the third season the concept of the show was changed and the show was advertised as “The first Balkan reality show”.

The producers came up with the idea of placing contestants of different nationalities from former Yugoslavia in the house. As a result of this all four - or should I say five - languages (Slovenian, Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian and Albanian) from the former Yugoslavia were spoken in the house, and by the hosts of the daily summary of the show. No subtitles. No translation.

However, as was noted in the press (Jovanovski, 2005) the Serbo-Croatian language soon become dominant, with all the contestants attempting to communicate among themselves in Serbo-Croatian. Even if the hosts of the evening show attempted to speak in their respective national language they often lapsed into Serbo-Croatian. The Macedonian hostess was singled out for speaking not always the most fluent Serbo-Croatian (ibid.).

This only proves that “in a world saturated by Hollywood content, mediated vernaculars are both cultural binders and reminders of belonging to distinctive communities” (Waisbord, 2004: 373), in this case that community being the former

Yugoslavia. As “television normalises the ties between language and nation” (ibid.) the Yugonostalgic element and the attempt to recreate some of the atmosphere of the former Yugoslav culture was obvious.

The reality show *This Is Me* was also broadcast by OBN TV in Bosnia and Herzegovina, B-92 Television in Serbia, and by a commercial broadcaster in Slovenia. However, the fact that it was shown on the satellite channel MKTV SAT made it accessible to all viewers with cable or satellite access to that channel. This resulted in a real international audience, with callers to the evening show from all around Europe and as far away as Australia. Most of the callers were, however, of former Yugoslav origin or belonging to one of the linguistic communities in the region.

If the popularity of the reality show *This Is Me* can be at least credited to the established formula of Big Brother, we cannot ignore the Yugonostalgic element to it. This can be seen from the fact that international market research shows that BB formats in other countries are mainly watched by a younger audience between the ages of 16 and 44 (Hill, 2002: 331). This is not the case with the Macedonian audience. The viewer profile for the Balkan reality show *This Is Me* shows a reach of 8.8% for the population between 40 and 49, a 6.0% reach for population between 50 and 70 and only a 5.6% reach for the ages between 10 and 19 and a 5.8% reach between ages 20 and 29, thus placing the age-group of 40-49 in the first place. This indicates an older audience than in other countries.

The cumulative reach for Macedonia was as follows: 27% in December 2004, 50% in January 2005, and 53.3% in February 2005.

The concept of the “First Balkan Reality Show” that attempted to show “[h]ow young people from the region and from neighboring countries interact after all the conflicts that happened” (Jovanovski, 2005: 65) was obviously working, since the audience reach in Macedonia almost doubled over the short span of three months.

This recreation of former Yugoslavia “under one roof” in the environment of the joint day-to-day living in one house by young people of different nationalities did not, despite expectations, lead to any conflict among the contestants that had any nationalistic ring to it. Most conflicts were on a personal level. Only the occasional SMS message had a nationalistic ring to it, hardly enough to put it into the category of hate speech.

In Macedonia the public debate about the show revolved around the issues of decency and morality at first. It most excited the Macedonian public when the much-used formula of exhibitionism in BB format was used and an act of masturbation by one of the contestants was caught on camera and shown to the public

(Georgievski, 2005a: 6). However, the public debate soon turned into the debate: should such a show be broadcast on public television?

The Broadcasting Council promptly issued a warning to MKRTV first for the breach of the language clause in the broadcasting regulation which required subtitling or dubbing of foreign languages. However, when the public outcry caused by the masturbation scene reached its peak, the Broadcasting Council of Macedonia initiated legal action against MKTV (Georgievski, 2005b: 6). The outcome of that legal action is still pending. In defense of the show the director of MTV just repeated endlessly in numerous newspaper interviews that “the purpose of the show was to explore possibilities for communication between people from the region, especially from the territory of former Yugoslavia” (ibid.)

It also turned out that MKRTV had signed a very unfavorable contract with the producers of the show, which left all the advertising rights in the hands of the production house. Thus the public broadcaster did not have any financial gain from the broadcasting of the reality show *This Is Me*, and the only benefit to MKRTV was a temporary boost in its ratings.

The Macedonian Broadcasting Council in their statement on the role of public broadcaster in this case concluded that broadcasting such shows as the reality show *This Is Me* is in direct conflict with the public broadcasters’ mandate and in conflict with Macedonian and European regulations (ibid.).

Another kind of This Is Me

While the public debate about the first Balkan reality show was taking place in the Macedonian media, the children’s television show with the same name, *This Is Me - Balkan Kid’s TV Mosaic*, was broadcast on the Macedonian commercial national broadcaster Telma TV. There was no public debate, not even an acknowledgement of its existence in the press.

This children’s program could be taken as a good example of successful cultural cooperation in the field of television production in the region.

We could argue that this is a real regional project which is not constrained by the national boundaries of the states in the Balkans, but what it has rather taken into consideration are the linguistic boundaries. The show is produced in three different languages: Serbian, Macedonian and Albanian, and in four countries, Serbia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia.

The duration of the episodes is fifteen minutes, of which three minutes are for an introduction by three presenters in three different languages, while each language

group has four minutes for the presentation of the content of the show. In this way children are exposed to three different languages in only fifteen minutes.

The show is produced by Belgrade-based DTV Production, but the actual production of each linguistic segment takes place as follows: the Serbian language segment is produced in Belgrade or Podgorica; the Albanian segment in Tirana or Prishtina or in Skopje; and the Macedonian segment in Skopje, with plans to bring the production to Pustec in Albania, where there is a large community of the Macedonian minority.

Each of the production centers has a team of independent producers and all the teams are coordinated by a supervisor from Belgrade. The teams meet on a regular basis mainly in Skopje because of the unsolved visa problems between Kosovo, Albania and Serbia and Montenegro.

The content of the shows is planned jointly but production takes place independently. The content is aimed at introducing themes that are common to all children but also shows cultural specificities.

The purpose of the show is to bring the children from these three linguistic communities (and four countries) in the Balkans closer together. Children can learn from the show that even though they live in different countries and speak different languages they have a lot in common. The show is divided into four thematic wholes each month, with educational, entertaining, information and serious content.

The two years of the preparation for the show was funded by OSCE Kosovo. In November 2002, 18 producers from Belgrade, Podgorica, Tirana, Pristina and Skopje met for the first time with the idea of a joint TV Mosaic for children. In January 2004 a pilot program was shown, but it was not until September 2004 that sufficient funds were raised and the budget for the first 24 shows was put together.

On 16 October 2004 the first show was broadcast. It is presently broadcast on a weekly basis with one premiere and two repeats. The show is broadcast in the Albanian language by KTV - Kosovo television, and by the Albanian national broadcaster from Tirana, as well as by the local commercial television channel in the Albanian language in Skopje, TV ERA. In the Serbian language it is broadcast by BK Television (including its satellite program) and by TV Crna Gora, the national broadcaster from Podgorica (Montenegro). In the Macedonian language it is broadcast by the commercial national broadcaster Telma Television, as mentioned earlier.

The show is subtitled in a respective language depending on the linguistic community it is broadcast to. The production of *This Is Me: Balkan Kid's Mosaic* is financed entirely by foreign organizations and foundations mostly from Belgrade:

IREX-Belgrade; USAID-Belgrade; Goethe Institute Belgrade, IFA-Belgrad; the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, sponsored by Germany, and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo.

After the initial 24 shows (Oct 2004 - Feb 2005) funding was raised for 16 more shows and they ran until 15 May 2005. The producers of the show are hopeful of raising funding (at the time this is written) for at least another 6 months, which would bring the number to 64 shows all together.

The show is considered a cultural program by all stations that are broadcasting it, which means that no advertising is allowed during the show.

This show which is considered a cultural program that promotes understanding and cohabitation in the Balkans has hardly shown up in the ratings, while the Balkan reality show described earlier was the second most watched television program on MTV in Macedonia, right after the news.

It is also important to note that while the Macedonian public broadcaster initially agreed to broadcast the children's show *This Is Me*, it later pulled out, despite the fact that the show could have been broadcast in all three languages since MKRTV has an entire channel for broadcasting in minority languages.

So much for the fact that cultural cooperation is most often seen as a mandate of the public service broadcaster.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that because of technological development and the globalization of the media cultures have become more connected. As their development becomes more integrated globally and as cultural exchanges intensify over time, at the core of global media are the transnational media. Also, as the world becomes more integrated economically and culturally, it has become more difficult for local media to stay away from the global influence. Moreover there is an increased pressure to adopt international formats and foreign ideas and genres, as they are perceived as being more competitive and because they simply "do better on the market".

Besides this, we cannot overlook the fact that we watch an average of four hours of television a day, and the fact that our first encounter with other cultures comes mainly from television.

I do not wish to re-open the debate around how much influence the media, especially television, had on the conflicts in former Yugoslavia; too much has already been said and written about it. However, what I would like to point out is how much could be gained by cultural cooperation in SEE if we utilized television as a medium

representing not only the diversity of our cultures and showing the cultural difference, but rather telling the story of how much we in SEE have in common.

Unfortunately, in the past 14 years of SEE's transition to democracy, the media, and with it television, have been too often seen only as a vehicle for the promotion of the democratic values of free speech, while often forgetting the role it can play in cultural understanding.

Because of this, we might want to remind ourselves once more of the power of television and the role that it can play in popularizing art and culture as a means for the development and reconciliation process, for communication, exchange and transborder understanding.

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Challenges of Cultural Cooperation in Southeastern Europe: the Internationalization of Cultural Policies and Practices¹

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“Everything is simple
So simple that it becomes incomprehensible...”
(Nichita Stanescu, Eleventh elegy)

Context for cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe

The cultural cooperation logic marking the last 14 years in Southeastern Europe (SEE) has to be regarded from a broad perspective as driven not only by the consequences of the collapse of the communist institutional order, but also as a result of the general transformations taking place at a European and international level: the challenges resulting from the liberalization of markets, globalization processes and technological revolution (new technologies, information support for knowledge, deepening inequality North/South, the redefinition of the role of culture and the growing tendency towards transversal governance, replacing the pyramidal paradigm of authority).

In the beginning of the 1990s the discussion about the need for radical restructuring of the heavy institutional cultural legacy began, primarily in Central and Eastern Europe. What was ignored however, was how unprepared Western Europe was institutionally and politically for the new geopolitical order and how culturally

1 This exercise is exclusively aimed at pointing out a certain number of important issues and basic statements that influenced the design of cultural cooperation policy in the region in the previous fifteen years; it is far from an exhaustive analysis; its aim is to challenge and explain the importance of Western European and SE European cultural policies approach to one another by what the French Euro deputy Olivier Duhamel called in his speech about the European Convention: “Trying to give up the protective illusions cradled by our certitudes and launch ourselves in the courage of consensus” (from French original, European Convention debate, 15 May 2003).

ill-equipped it was to cope with the isolated nations that the fall of the Berlin Wall set free upon the world. In order to discuss the above, we have to consider the following:

First, it is hard to realize and therefore comprehend the exact process that, more or less, influenced the last 14 years of cultural policy in SEE. Some of the factors are internal and inherent to the region's history and geography; some are purely administrative legacies of a former regime. Others are related to the logic of change i.e. too many cultural ministries were brought in; Romania had ten ministers of culture, Bulgaria eight and Albania eleven, between 1990 and 2003. The cultural administration could not immediately be replaced, therefore culture was - shortly after 1990 - put in a secondary position on all governmental agendas; economic and social priorities took precedence over cultural ones that were too closely associated with ideology.

Also, the notion of "state" was in crisis and the nature of it as a representative and recognized as a legitimate authority took years to recover in the eyes of the community. It is still considered today in the region that the ministries of culture alone are "the guilty ones" for all that is lacking in the cultural sector, from legislation to salaries, institutional disorder to the degree of funding. Very few cultural operators consider the finance ministry or the social affairs ministry to be responsible for the lack of support to civil initiatives. The incompetence of the cultural commissions in parliament remains unnoticed, as well the administrative chaos resulting from the collapse of a highly rigid regime.

Second, we have to admit that the effort made by Southeastern European cultural communities at a political and civil level was immense, in spite of shortage of time and various difficulties. The wish for recuperation, rebuilding and rejoining democratic values was highly important. From this perspective, Western Europe often failed to give the correct long-term response and prove its understanding of the real significance of this effort. It would have surely been more appropriate, instead of employing a tutoring or humanitarian aid approach (thus reinforcing the "assisted" (passive) mentality of the "newly liberated societies") to develop a coaching, accompanying kind of attitude, which would surely have had more success in bringing a sense of autonomy sooner to the region.

In this context the idea of a "Marshall plan" would have probably worked well.² Its successful implementation would have been essential to empower the local

2 It is interesting that after finishing this study we found out that the Belgium Walloon government had created a "Marshall" plan - Plan of priority actions for the Walloon future. The cultural analysts made an ironic comment - "as it was war in Wallonie" (see Ruwet, 2005: 3).

communities on a long-term basis as opposed to reinforcing their sense of inferiority - but a new “Marshall plan did not exist”!

Nevertheless, on a short-term basis, the power and importance of the Council of Europe, UNESCO, French agencies such as AFAA, in Britain the Arts Council and British Council, as well as the Goethe Institute in Germany, was never in doubt, at least at the cultural public policy levels (administration) in the region. UNESCO’s actions were directed towards the heritage protection, the Council of Europe program of evaluation of cultural policies to the empowering of policy-makers, while the Mosaic program was dedicated to training, cultural diversity and relations with the civil sector, also using the mobility bursaries for cultural managers. Numerous were the bilateral programs run by French institutes. The British Council and Goethe Institute were of great “tutoring” importance in the revival of a sense of common values and opportunities for mobility. For the civil sector, the Soros Foundation and the cultural networks played an accompanying role and played it successfully in as much as concerns the artistic exchange, mobility and modernization of taste or emergence of contemporary forms.

Last, but not least, in an interesting interview about the notion of post-communist “third Europe”, American scholar Tony Judt observes that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the notion of Central Europe might become, in its turn, an isolationistic one (Romanians would not accept Bessarabia as a part of Central Europe and Croats would not accept Serbia in the same circle) (Judt, 2000). Of course, this statement is rather radical, but we have to admit that the Southeastern European geographical and cultural borders are not one and the same, according to the criteria one applies in “reading” this territory. This is the reason why, in the following, we draw out an artificial classification, separating those eastern European countries according to the only criteria (exterior and technocratic) of that part of the continent that will not yet enter the EU accession process before 2007.

Typologies

This being said, we will nevertheless risk considering further an empirical split between three categories of countries in SEE (taking now as a main criteria the socio-political differences during the post-World War II period):

- a. Romania and Bulgaria;
- b. Yugoslavia-Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina;
- c. Albania.

While the countries in **group a** went through a very hard form of communist domination (Romania even totalitarian and Bulgaria conservative, strongly

dominated by Soviet influence), despite the traditional relation they formerly had with Western Europe, Yugoslavia, in **group b**, was formed of countries who had lived together since World War I, long before communism, sharing similar languages, life styles and habits, thus sharing a “sense of belonging” to the Europe of 19th century and first half of the 20th century and even, we might say, starting with Tito’s time, a sense of participation in the 1960s and the 1970s in the main world trends (in the sense of having a say at international level, in intercultural communications, participating in “consumer culture” of the Western World, etc.).

Finally, Albania (**group c**) was isolated within the Eastern European block, separated from all other neighbors, victim of a totalitarian communist policy even more radical than that of Ceausescu’s. Historically, the Albanian population was less mobile (contrary to the Greeks, Armenians, even Serbs). The number of their intercultural contacts throughout history was relatively limited. While Serbs, Romanians, Croats and Bulgarians had left already in the 19th century to study abroad - mostly in Germany, Austria, France, engaging in both commercial and intellectual exchange - for Albanians it was the exception.

While neighboring governments since the 19th century have tried to attract foreign “investment” and the educated “human resource”, so that a number of artisans, people with different skills (like printers, publishers, doctors, musicians etc.) arrived from the Austro-Hungarian empire, throughout the Balkans, Albania did not enter this process.

This largely explains the chronic isolation the country is still partially a victim of, after the end of communism, as well as its genuine lack of capacity to recover a sense of European openness and enter, as Romania, Bulgaria and former Yugoslav countries did, into cultural cooperation.

Internationalism and cultural cooperation in the Balkans

The “artistic” versus the “bureaucratic” time

Ralph Dahrendorf says that while political change of post-communist countries can be achieved in six months, economical change in six years, cultural change (Dragičević Šešić, 1997) needs 60 years to be achieved. This is because cultural change implies change in the scale of values. Along the same lines, the director of the alternative space *La belle de mai* in France speaks about the “time of artists” as compared to the “bureaucratic time” and Milan Kundera ponders in his “Intimate Journal” that the only thing that will remain from Europe will not be its “repetitive factual history”, which has no value in itself, but the history of its arts”, because art is

not the “Orpheum, accompanying History’s March” but art creates its own history, at its own pace, and this is the only history that counts (Kundera, 1999).

These largely shared opinions stress the extent to which the time factor has to be taken into account in the impressive mutation taking place culturally during the post-communist period, the measure of a successful transformation being not so much the political reforms and their bureaucratic shape, but the genuine reinvention of artistic forms. In other words, the reconstruction of cultural identities of post-communist societies has to be identified in the rhythm of artistic resurrection.

Recapitulating the developmental phases of cultural cooperation in the post-World War II Europe, Raymond Weber (2000), former Director General of the Directorate of Culture and Cultural Heritage in the Council of Europe, identifies five: “reconciliation, reciprocal recognition, creation of a common discourse, imagining common solutions, awareness awaking of multicultural challenges”. He is underlining that “while in Western Europe these values had the time to develop and install during half a century, the Western community is waiting from Central and Eastern Europe to acquire them in only some years”.

It seems, indeed, that the above quoted aims of cultural cooperation (valid for post-World War II Western Europe) are still not valid today for the Balkans. The process of *reconciliation* had been started from the top-down, even better to say, from outside, and has, therefore, not been achieved. Albanians from Kosovo and Serbs are supposed to get together because of international pressure more than because of grass-rooted intercultural incentive exchange. The three nations of Bosnia compromised, but that society did not find reconciliation with post-war (1993) trauma. Neither was *reciprocal recognition* achieved truly between Macedonians and Greeks. The “common discourse” has not been created, like in Western Europe, through partnership, debate and public dialogue. *Common discourse* is imposed from outside - vocabulary such as interculturalism, multicultural society, cultural diversity, truth and reconciliation, capacity building, sustainability, re-training of cultural administrators, policy issues etc. came “from the top”, from pro-European political elites, and were imposed as key words on cultural actors in the region, while no one really introduced them as values in primary education and within general public space, with adequate policy measures in all fields of social life. Those who wanted to enter “the game” had to learn and to adopt this vocabulary, without having the time to independently discover, integrate and assimilate it internally and organically.

Hence, it might be interesting to describe the phases of cultural cooperation in the region in a rather different manner than what one might expect, starting from the rise of communism.

I. Socialist period

1945-1948 - participation in building the world's communist utopia

1948-1965 - walls in between Balkan countries (even with harassment of minorities - Serbian in Romania, Montenegrin and even Albanian orthodox in Albania, Macedonian in Greece)

1965-1989 - officially a limited number of contacts (bilateral ones) were implemented; minority policies now stimulate cooperation (Serbs in Romania and Romanians in Serbia actively participate in bridging one culture to another).

II. Transition period

1989-1995 - concentration on itself - looking for cooperation out of the former communist block (independent cultural operators start to cooperate on an ad hoc basis, the official cooperation between ministries collapses and needs time to rebuild)

1995-2002 - a freshly born new agenda of international cooperation is imposed on SE European governments by the Council of Europe, Western European cultural cooperation agencies, UNESCO and the EU - regional NGOs emerge and start developing authentic Balkan networks (the civil sector is largely supported by the art and culture network, the OSI program, in Budapest)

2002-2005³ - reshaping of the cooperation logic according to mainly EU reshaping priorities and the enlargement process (new division: accession countries and the others, often non-eligible for majority of EU programs and schemes).

Still, we have to explain more here the phases within the transition period, as their outcomes have impact and relevance still today. After 1989, we can, however, notice that there are two key contradictory demands in cultural policies that had both specific and not always positive influences on the cultural cooperation measures within the region.

The first one – **identity questioning** could seem to be the one leading to greater mutual regional cooperation, but in fact this one constituted itself in a barrier and was more of a constraint, because identity in the region is built on traditionally accepted differences, not on strong characteristics. On the other hand, each nation wanted to

3 In 2005, the major shift in the European Union happened: ten new countries joined the Union, but the Constitution was rejected in the referendums in France and the Netherlands, and the decision postponed in Great Britain. This shows in fact the change in public opinion, which now fears future enlargement, and is especially divided on the issue of Turkey. So, this year will definitely mark the turn around in cultural cooperation of Europe with its “neighbors”.

rediscover the “old roots of common identity” with Western Europe or other regions outside the Balkans representing strong historical reference. Those links between Romania and France, Croatia and Germany, Serbia and Russia, even Belarus, Armenia, Bosnia and Austria, Montenegro and Italy were all out of the SE European territory. Links and historical roots which are important among Albania and Serbia, Greece and Macedonia, Croatia and Serbia, etc., for mainly political reasons, had been expelled not only from school programs and history books, but also from museum exhibition projects, festivals etc.

In opposition to this quest for a lost national identity, the second characteristic, the **need of integration in the world**, was also “destimulative” for Balkan cultural cooperation. To become present in Paris, London and New York became a crucial demand and guaranteed the feeling of being acknowledged as part of the world, of global culture, of the values that count, i.e. values recognized abroad.

These two aspects explain why, during a first phase of post-communist transition (1989-1995), the number of regional exchanges, touring, translations and book publishing, had diminished severely, while the number of books translated from English had risen by up to ten times. For some cultures that were isolated for a long period, e.g. Romania, it was also a necessity. They already had quite a lot of translations from neighboring countries, but that was linked to the 1960s and 1970s. The new generation of artists and art activities ceased to communicate, because bilateral cultural conventions expired and new ones had not been created in the region. Therefore, the transition focus of public policy was toward the west: entering the francophone space, exploring possibilities of British Council/Visiting Arts, Goethe Institutes etc. Neighboring countries did not have their cultural centers or agencies to stimulate regional cooperation and the situation of cultural policies was still unstable up to the end of the 1990s in all Southeastern European countries.

A new phase started only after the Dayton treaty (1995), when the Stability Pact imposed regional cooperation on the Balkans as a precondition for financing. It was again a top-down measure aimed to re-launch regional cooperation, but, unfortunately, culture did not have its “table” within it - so the projects were analyzed through “educational”, “youth” or “civil society” lenses.

Strategies for Southeastern European cultural regional⁴ and international cooperation

At the level of Southeastern European cultural governments, the regional cooperation issues do not represent a priority line between 1989 and 2003, and international cooperation programs are much more strategically oriented to joining Western

4 In our context, “regional” means SE European, “Balkan”.

partnership and intergovernmental organizations' programs, or to be acceptable for the "EU" requirements, than to engage in artistic collaboration with neighbors.

The important artistic public institutions are suffering deeply from a lack of resources and the economic transition and restructuring of social and economic mechanisms does not encourage a quick restoration of the social and economic function of these public institutions. Again, a helping hand is required from Western Europe or other wealthy foreign partners (US, Japan).

SE European ministries meet often, e.g. in 2000 because the Council of Europe took the initiative and the Austrian Government offered the money, or recently, because the Slovenian Minister of Culture gathered the Slavonic SE European countries, creating a new relationship between Slavonic and non Slavonic SEE or, closer to Central Europe, because the Hungarian Ministry of Culture supported the Budapest observatory meeting and included Romania and Bulgaria among its guests (in a meeting about accession countries), etc. But all these initiatives have an ad hoc aspect and their result remains patchy for the region's cultural development.

To support this, the cultural policy evaluation program of the council of Europe brings important data. We can thus find in the Romanian, Croat and Serb ones, the following quotes: "Due to the breaking of all international contact in previous years one of the most important tasks of the Ministry of Culture was re-establishing the broken links with all international institutions and organizations" (Serb national report). Past history legitimizes Croatia to see itself as a future Western European country and defines the present transition as a "coming back to Europe (...) the frequent partners of Cultural cooperation are: Italy, France, Germany, UK, Austria, followed by Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Netherlands and Slovakia" (Croat national report, 1998, Council of Europe, p. 39, French version); or: "special efforts are made to prepare and organize the Ministry and cultural institutions for pre-accession process of entering the WTO and EU" or that "the Ministry is also very active in initiating and designing new models of bilateral agreements of cultural co-operation. A special attention has been paid to stimulate institutions to enter regional and international co-operation projects or networking (information distribution), but there are no special mobility funds or funding for network fees or international projects" (Serbia) or "set up of a think tank to define a new image of Romania abroad and the role that culture can play in this regard" (Romania, international experts report, Council of Europe, English version, 2000, p. 30). Albania limited itself to founding an "international cultural center", cautioning it with a cultural cooperation action line.

Interestingly enough, Bulgaria is the only country in the region that explicitly affirms that the priorities in cultural cooperation are both with Western Europe and the Balkan region: "bilateral cultural relations with Balkan countries have a particular

significance for the republic of Bulgaria”, stressing however that the “foreign policy aim of Bulgaria today is to be a stabilizing factor in turbulent Balkans and insisting upon the fact that it is developing relations with Greece, Turkey, Romania, and particularly actively with Albania”, links which are only “threatened by the big financial challenges we face” (Bulgarian national report, Council of Europe, English version, 1997, p. 224).⁵

One can observe that even the methodology of the evaluation of cultural policies in itself marginalizes the importance of international cultural cooperation (only 4.2 out of 55 themes approximately treated!) (Council of Europe and ERICarts). Also, too much attention is placed on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU and to use UNESCO, the Central European Initiative (CEI), and the Stability Pact as donors, instead of trying to develop coherent cultural relations with neighboring countries. We will also note a strong tendency to restore the bilateral cooperation instead of multilateral schemes.

This may all be considered natural, after such a long period of ideological contamination and cultural isolation, if the region still didn't have to solve a huge “memory black hole” that the communist period succeeded in creating, and didn't urgently need the restoration of internal bridges before the building of external ones. This delicate point is one of the keys to prospective thinking in the programming of future cultural cooperation policies in the Southeastern European region. Stability and accepted diversity, a democratic policy towards minorities, the sustainable economic and social development of the region and its positioning in a stronger and “broader” Europe, but also in a redesigned global landscape, will all depend on the capacity to develop inter-regional grass-root cultural cooperation successfully. This has to complete the legislative, administrative and financial regulations that the EU accession top-down action has already achieved. “A strong state and a strong civil society” is the model that Slovene policy-maker Vesna Copic (2003) is putting forward as a guarantee for inner reconstruction of Southeastern European countries.

Cultural cooperation and the partnership between ministries and civil society

Related to what was previously said, the idea of partnership between the public and the civil cultural sector was introduced via the Council of Europe policy guidelines and gained a place at the end of the 1990s in the emerging Southeastern European democracies. This lapse of time was also necessary in order to develop the national cultural NGOs in Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia.

5 In her well known book ‘Imagining the Balkans’, Maria Todorova considers that Bulgarians are the only people in the region to have a positive idea about the notion of ‘Balkans’ and about a regional identity.

The Council of Europe also imposed participation of the civil sector in the process of writing (not only debating) cultural legislation – especially in the field of media, which the international community considers crucial for the development of democratic institutions.

Still, governments finally used to offer the parliament their versions of a law, and sometimes even ignored the proposals of the civil cultural sector. A good example of this is in Serbia and Romania, where the specialized unions (Romanian Uniter and Serb union of theater people) were not listened to in the process of the drafting of the theater law. Bulgaria diplomatically avoided the problem by proposing the “law for the protection and development of culture” (2001/2002 source - Policies for culture (PFC) - www.policiesforculture.org), too general to create sectoral civil sector frustrations.

One of the most successful examples of regional cultural cooperation projects, including the partnership between the public sector at national and local level, civil society and the legislators, remains, since the year 2000, PFC. Jointly initiated by the European Cultural Foundation, Amsterdam and the Ecumest association (operating from Amsterdam and Bucharest in all SEE regions), Policies for culture combines a public policy approach towards the sensitivities of civil society to the legislative problems related to culture, with the public authority responsibilities but also with the civil sector empowerment instruments in the design of cultural policies. Today, PFC has a great platform of representation, contacts and antennas, gathering ministry representatives, independent cultural organizations and legislators, as well as experts from Southeastern Europe. It gained recognition from the Central European Initiative, it is frequently quoted, but its key success is the idea to bring together both ends (the top-down and the bottom-up approach) and to do it for the entire region, with no artificial split between Slavonic, Orthodox, Balkan east or west etc.

Together with the Mosaic program of the Council of Europe and the Soros long-term initiatives – such as the cultural policy component of the Art and Culture program, (and, of course, inspired and catalyzed by them), PFC is the only one genuinely created by an East/West equal cooperation and by two politically independent “European” entities.

The impact of international operators and programs on cultural cooperation policies

Complementing previous observations, we can now return and see the extent to which cultural cooperation dynamics in SEE have mostly been initiated in the last 14 years by “outside actors” – European institutions such as the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and the European states (especially through the Stability Pact), but also independently through bodies such as KulturKontakt (Austria), French

cultural centers and the Goethe Institute, or Pro Helvetia. These bodies have launched programs not only of bilateral, but also of regional character. Examples are numerous. Among them, the seminar for managers of music festivals from the region, organized by the Goethe Institute, created an approach which stimulated cooperation; sometimes they suggested a “regional touring” component to the applicants, paying, specifically, the costs of the project; the British Council’s “seeding a network” project; French NOROC “la danse en voyage”; the French/Romanian theatre; and the Austrian KulturKontakt programs for cultural management training and visual arts, etc.

It is an important feature that these kinds of programs were mostly used by independent cultural organizations, capable of dealing with the grant forms and adapting to the managerial requirements better than the decaying, under-subsidized and over-staffed public cultural institutions.

The efforts of independent international foundations and of European networks have been important and very effective. Foundations and associations such as the European Cultural Foundation (ECF - Amsterdam), the Soros Network (Open Society Institutes - OSIs), the Felix Meritis Foundation, Transeuropéennes, etc., developed specific projects for SEE or had this region as a priority area in their project which covered Central and Eastern Europe. Many of them gathered together in matching funds to reinforce the impact in the region, such as the Gulliver Connect Program, which was realized between 1998 and 2003 through joint efforts of the OSI Budapest (Soros), KulturKontakt (Austria) and Felix Meritis (Amsterdam), or programs like Art for Social Change and Kultura Nova (capacity building for NGOs) which were developed by ECF and the national Soros offices in Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia.

In the beginning, the European networks created during the mid-1980s had few members from SEE (mostly from Yugoslavia - in the Informal European Theatre Meetings (IETM), pre-European network of Cultural Administration Training Centres (ENCATC) phase, etc.). However from 1989 onwards, they approached this area quite actively (IETM, the European League of Institutes of Arts (ELIA)). Some organizations even created specific networks or subdivisions within themselves or during their general assemblies: ENCATC Balkan platform, Banlieues d’Europe Romanian antenna for the SE European region, IETM and Relais CULTURE Europe “Balkan express” in cooperation with PAC Multimedia in Macedonia, Trans Europe Halles (TEH) integrating new SE European members, Cultural Information and Research Centres in Europe (CIRCLE) asking Eastern European members to join the executive committee, the Forum of Cultural European Networks dedicating three specific platforms between 1998 and 2001 to the Balkan region, the European Forum for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH) integrating more and more the accompanying

solutions for future EU accession countries. Specific networks for SEE were created (Apollonia, the South East European Contemporary Art Network (SEECAN), etc.). Some networks have developed specific fundraising activities to secure and enable participation of the members from Central and Eastern Europe in network projects (Thomassen Fund in ENCATC).

As a result of this cross-fertilization, many autonomous Balkan networks and independent organizations were created: BAP (Balkan Association of Publishers) and BAN (Balkan Art Network), two networks created after the Sarajevo conference.⁶

A special mention has to be made about the Sarajevo conference formerly quoted, “Reconstructing cultural productivity in the Balkans”, initiated by ERICarts and other local and international organizations, as a proof of the catalytic effect this kind of event, well-timed and well-placed, can have on the acceleration of constructive processes.

The International Contemporary Art Network (ICAN), a network of ex/SCCAs (Soros Centers for Contemporary Arts Network) is also an example of an outside initiated network. Those networks started their work together, mostly trying to achieve greater European presence. BAP’s main activity is their presence at the Frankfurt book fair, while BAN organized exhibitions in Brussels - the “Balkan art generator” in 2000 (for the Cultural Capital). This network was mostly concentrating its efforts on bringing artists from the Balkans to Harald Szeemann, for his exhibitions of contemporary Balkan art – “Blood and Honey”.⁷ (The name of Szeemann was needed to raise visibility and marketing impact of the project, because a Balkan art generator with a Balkan curator had passed completely unnoticed in Brussels 2000!).

The spirit of “networking” has provoked many other NGOs in the region to create their own authentic entities, such as Balkankult in Belgrade, Ecumest in Bucharest, Project DCM, centers like the “Red house” in Sofia, “Mama” in Zagreb, PAC Multimedia in Macedonia, “Rex” in Belgrade, MAD and UNITER in Bucharest, acting as informal hosts of other networks or other numerous programs and projects

6 Conference organized in Sarajevo in 1999 by ERICarts, FINN Ekvit, Blue Dragon, Culturelink and supported by UNESCO, the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture, in the context of the Finnish Presidency of the EU, KulturKontakt, the Austrian Federal Chancellery and the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

7 Blood and Honey, an exhibition curated by Harald Szeemann, was held in Klosterneuburg near Vienna in the Essl Collection, from 16 May to 28 September 2003, engaging 73 artists from Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia and Turkey.

of European and regional scale. This process is, however, recent and was only strongly installed in the year 2000.

Of course, for many among them who had their own program production, it was also the way to raise more publicity, to facilitate fundraising, but in essence, it was evident that they had developed, through networking, many projects which had no official support. Despite this, the NGOs found ways to proceed to further implementation of these projects.

Needless to say that for all these programs and projects, the existence of Soros and the Arts and Culture network program with its initiatives “Culture link” and “Looking inside” (two mobility programs), was of extreme importance.

Media networks have also been of crucial effectiveness, not only for bringing democracy and promoting human rights (Association of Independent Electronic Media - ANEM), but also by stimulating a greater sense of involvement by the younger generation, like “Cross Radio”, which is mainly focused on stimulating cultural cooperation and promoting urban cultures. Many of these media networks had an impact on the interest shown in Europe for the region (as a region of conflicts and isolation), and developed specific “communication projects”. Many reviews were created, such as *Balkanmedia* (Sofia), *Balkan umbrella* (Remont, Belgrade), *Balkanis* (Ljubljana Slovenia), *Sarajevske, Biljeznice/Sveske/Cahiers* etc.

Many Balkan festivals, such as Skomrahi in Skopje (festival of drama schools from the region), Thessalonica manifestations, visual art exhibitions, concentrate mostly on presentations and basic communication, while, on the other hand, workshops and summer schools communicate directly with art and work with the youth of the Balkans (summer school of the University of Arts in Belgrade, summer schools for art students in Bulgaria, Buntovna proza (Rebellious prose) - UNESCO Bosnia project, Bucharest Dance East/West project, Sibiu International Theater Festival (Romania), Euro-Bulgarian Center Film Festival, etc.).

These initiatives generated new networks and new projects, such as the Counter-rhythm Arts Summer School in Subotica in 2002, which regrouped students from different schools in the region, participating in self-created follow-up projects.

The importance of festivals like Skomrahi or Belef is apparent in that for the first time, and long before the politicians, artists and arts organizations from the region could be presented and seen together (first appearance in Belgrade of Sarajevo artists had been during the Belef festival - Ambrosia; the first links with Albanian artists through Balkankult conferences or during summer schools, etc.). Festivals like the Urban festival in Zagreb, organized by the “Local base for refreshing culture (BLOK)”, regrouped new and fresh initiatives from the region, contributing in this way to presenting each other’s work in areas usually not very popular for

policy-makers. Some manifestations focused on the region itself, helping in areas such as knowledge transfer and creating a new synergy. They were often focused on politically engaged art and artists whose projects are relevant for the region only. Others are more “open” and address thematic issues, but focus on methods – experiments, laboratory works etc. This rich capital is now present and growing.

Western expertise and influence had positive outcomes at the level of cultural administration and legislation. The lottery model, inspired by the UK and the Netherlands to the Hungarians and Romanians, drew respective governments to try innovative models for the funding of culture. French laws on heritage and taxation or copyright were used, sometimes successfully, by many Eastern European countries. The law on cinema in Serbia was drafted with French expertise and the recent (2004) creation of a National Serb Cinema Center is entirely due to this influence.

The problem of foreign expertise appeared when missing links became apparent, when the necessary time was not taken for a process to mature and all its components to become accomplished. We have numerous examples of using foreign expertise for completely unadapted situations, but also of potentially good expertise that had to be implemented in too short a time or with missing data. This created in the long run a sense of distrust in SE European ministries of culture and among cultural operators about the reliability of the “Western models”. It is clear that immediate post-communist euphoria regarding these models and post-awakening rejection of them are both wrong and superficial. Inspiration for cultural policy and legislation can be reliable, but has to take the necessary time and allow reciprocal understanding and questioning. For the time being this was more of an approach for cultural operators, but not for cultural policy levels (nationally and internationally).

Of course, EU, Council of Europe and UNESCO initiatives in cultural institutional strengthening and their impact on the cultural cooperation logic cannot be ignored. The Phare (EU) and Mosaic programs (Council of Europe), the International Council of Museums (ICOM) network and the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) publication acting in the heritage sector resulted in:

- the creation of the Euro-Bulgarian Center (Bulgaria), the formulation of a first complete 10-year strategy for the Ministry of Culture in Romania and in the performing of comprehensive training for cultural administrators in five Romanian regions as well as in support for independent cultural projects focused on cooperation and diversity (PHARE Bulgaria and Romania);
- important legislative and administrative measures and fundraising realized for museums, heritage restoration and new managerial organization for the museum sector (the Romanian Brancusi triptych was restored also with

UNESCO support; UNESCO positions stopped dangerous initiatives of destruction of national and regional heritage (Rosia Montana, Dracula Parc (Romania), Sarajevo, Vukovar, Kosovo), and engaged international responsibility in the rebuilding of Yugoslav regions touched by war;

- the Council of Europe Mosaic project and the program of evaluation of cultural policies provided, between 1996 and 2002, the ground for important advancement in awareness about the needs and key weaknesses of the transition period and its impact on cultural policies, thus preserving the cultural subject on Southeastern European agendas and training the national public authorities in the region in an open, democratic and developed approach to the complex issues of the enlarged Europe.

The only general reproach that can be put forward about these programs would be that they were too short sighted (between 1 to 3 years) and that their indirect impact was more important than their visibility in the large socio-economic SE European audiences (public and independent), thus their follow-up was weak and their direct action was limited to those who had direct contact with them (the already discussed top-down syndrome). Partnership with civil society operators was in all cases more formal, rhetorical, than real and effective. And this prevented these initiatives becoming as important as their initial potential led us to believe.

Last, but not least, European training courses in cultural administration and management allowed the participation of SE European students and educated and empowered some of the leading young cultural figures, by giving them the instruments for the necessary institutional transformation and by facilitating them with international contacts in order to create an open perspective in the Southeastern European region: the Marcel Hicter Diploma in Cultural Project Management in Belgium, the Masters degree in Dijon (ECUMEST program), the Formation Internationale Culture in Paris, ARSEC in Lyon, AMSU in Amsterdam, ICCA in Salzburg (with Kulturkontakt support), Warwick University in the UK, being only a few examples. Others are organizations like the Interarts Observatory where many Southeastern European students found an ideal in-learning place to develop vision and skills in cultural cooperation logic and in understanding the importance of the correct reading of a global context to inform local action.

Special mention must be made of Belgrade University of Arts, which was the first in SE Europe, already in 1991, to include a cultural cooperation perspective in the syllabus of its MA in cultural management, and is a really regional program with professors coming from the majority of the Balkan countries since 2002.⁸

8 The MA in Cultural Policy and Cultural Management obtained the title of UNESCO Chair in Interculturalism and Mediation in the Balkans in 2004.

To complete the picture of the importance of foreign impact and its sometimes ambiguous consequences on the cultural institutional balance between the public and the civil sector, we will use the following example. During the 1990s we saw that a number of exchanges between SE Europe and Western Europe and joint projects had been developed. However, we have observed that too often the differences and inequalities in the region have been reinforced. New divisions entered the game, resulting from the momentous “popularity” of a certain country.

Bosnia is a cruel example of such a policy. During the siege of Sarajevo the whole world had taken Sarajevo as a symbol, many artists and intellectuals went there to see and to be seen as giving support, and many foundations entered directly after Dayton in 1995. Of course they invested in the development of the NGO sector - leaving the public sector to their political divisions, administrative confusion and lack of know-how. This created a very particular artificially-created situation, where a country has a highly developed civil sector, with salaries ten times greater than the public sector, encouraging the final exodus of the remaining artists and intellectuals from the public sector to NGOs, further weakening the stability and quality of work in the public sector. Five years after Dayton, nearly all the foundation agencies left Sarajevo, leaving behind an unfinished system of public institutions, an unsustainable NGO system with highly-qualified staff, but active in the context where services and activities of NGOs cannot be financed either from the public or from the underdeveloped private sector. At the end of this year the UNESCO office will be closed and also the majority of the foundations set up in 2000 in Serbia, when the 5th October “revolution” made Serbia very “trendy” all of a sudden.

Many donors (their representatives in the region), had been aware of the mistakes committed in Bosnia, but had no authority or possibility of persuading the decision-making bodies of their foundations or agencies, that their policy had to be reshaped as well as their operating methods. Of course the popularity of investing in the civil sector cannot be compared with the feeble “attractiveness” of giving money to the public sector, but without good public museums, libraries, art education etc., we will not have a high-quality art scene, only at the NGO level, or it will be for a very limited and short period of time. This brings us back to the “strong state and strong civil society balance desiderata” that Copic speaks about.

A challenging synthesis: what are the missing links / a possible conclusion?

This overview sets out what we consider today to be the most important topics that cultural cooperation policies have to address urgently, from both a prospective and a pragmatic perspective, in order to include SEE organically in the enlarged European process and avoid a repetition of past errors with long-term consequences.

As formerly demonstrated, one of the crucial problems of cultural cooperation in the region can be considered as “ethical”. Misbalance and unequal treatment can be felt at different levels and translates in various ways. If and when the cooperation project is launched by a Western European organization, the Eastern European local partners can usually assume that they are chosen mainly because they are facilitating easy fundraising for the Western partner. In the cooperation process the dominating Western logic has to take the lead in terms of main choices, orientation or profile of the project and the weak financial resource that usually the Eastern partner has at his disposal reinforces the strong/weak opposition of this so-called institutional partnership. In most cases, in the training sessions organized with local and international expertise, local experts are usually paid much less than Western ones, and, at the same time, it is often the case that the Western experts are not as knowledgeable about the specifics of the region (how could a good British marketing expert teach this in his/her UK lecture to a Kosovan, Bosnian, Bulgarian or Romanian manager, when in the SE European countries, all economic mechanisms are still in transition from a purely centralized infrastructure, where the system inherited is a mix of post-Austro-Hungarian and Russian legacy and the liberal market NEVER really existed.)

A second crucial aspect would be the danger of the normalization of this top-down approach and the mentality of the Western model of cooperation (rhetorical encouragement for cultural diversity and annihilation, for understandable pragmatic reasons, of the complex problems emerging in cooperation with the Balkans). It is significant the extent to which the rhetoric and model of cooperation of Western agencies are the same throughout the world. Western governments are not real partners for dialogue, but exporters of national models in the cultural field and by now, Southeastern European countries have understood that the French cultural administration is very different from the British and German ones, the Dutch, Italians and Spanish, not to mention the Belgian and Swiss! But Western European countries have become used to ignoring other Western cultural models apart from their own, therefore their praise of “openness” and consensus at times seems doubtful and contradictory to the SE European eye. Today, the Southeastern Europeans know to what extent, for example, the liberal British model of cultural management is adaptable to their centralized institutional legacy, but also how to avoid replacing the former communist bureaucratic cultural administration with the heavy Italian or French one.

A third point is that it is worrying to see, at high political EU levels, the strong link between cultural cooperation and the rebinding of social ties interculturally, and placing culture center stage in support of social reconstruction in the Balkans is IGNORED. The multicultural and multiethnic societies in the Balkans are an ideal laboratory for finding challenging reconciliation formulas, but also a vision of an

enlarged Balkan region, not limited to Yugoslavia and some of its neighbors, but including Greece and Turkey (not so developed, but already “European” countries, but as cultural partners and historically binding communities). Greece should stop excluding Macedonia from artistic cooperation, for example, and European and Balkan reconciliation would gain an important step forward. Instead of perpetrating an image of conflict and tension around the Balkans, the encouragement of a perception of the region as a “laboratory” for the future and as a “potential world”, as compared to the Western “saturated world” (Liiceanu), would be desirable.

Cultural cooperation policies should be engaged with broader time and space limits: long-term sustainable programs and cooperation with countries beyond Europe would be desirable. Southeastern European countries do not know much about Southern Europe or, for example, about African, Asian, Arab cultures. Perhaps their different socio-economic and cultural behavior from Western Europe would revitalize and inspire the regeneration process of the SE European region, presenting a new, unexpected and unexplored perspective, issues that are up till today exclusively regarded from an East/West confrontational point of view. This would also help demystify the Western model (still so present in Eastern Europe) and deepen the understanding of global mechanisms that drive the world’s cultural and economic dynamic. At the same time, cultural cooperation in the region beyond Europe might facilitate the dissolution of nationalism and bring a conscience about the European roots of the Balkan people as compared to Arab, Asian, African ones.

But, these policies should rely on broader values, such as freedom of communication, freedom of expression, minority (subcultural) rights. As Joost Smiers underlines: “Communication freedom is an essential value for society, so governments should not only refrain from interventions in cultural and artistic processes, they also have the duty to create the conditions in which citizens can communicate with each other freely, including through the arts” (Smiers, 2003: 199).

Not visible in Europe, and even less in the Balkans, are cultural debates about the conservative and retrograde tendencies of setting up cultural “clusters of values” considered to belong to Western (Anglo-American) society. Huntington’s theories (2004) have been widely known and criticized among political scientists, but his statement about “core values” of Western (American) civilization remained ignored among cultural scientists and policy-makers (the Christian religion, Protestant values, work ethics, the English language, British traditions of law and justice, the legacy of European art and culture, liberty, equality, individualism, representative government (limited power), private property, etc.). Seeing that these core values are important for their unifying effects, national security and national power, he adds: “erosion of any clusters of collective ideals, leads to weakness and vulnerability”. At the same time he emphasizes as the threats: bilingualism, affirmative action,

cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum), pluralism (Walzer), multiculturalism, new immigrants and the transnational businessman (“Multiculturalism is in its essence anti-European civilization, an anti-Western ideology”). These statements are not naïve theoretical thinking. If we remember his highly influential and important book, *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order*, concerning Balkan politics and the war situation, the new book might, in a few years, influence relations in international cultural cooperation, having a specific impact among right wing political elites in Southeastern Europe. That is the reason why debate and critical analysis is even more urgent and important in Southeastern Europe, as a base for future policy-making in the cultural sphere, and more specifically in the field of international relations and cultural communication.

Possible concrete demands to national and international cultural policy-makers

- mobility schemes, providing not only scholars and students, but also cultural professionals with the possibility to study and understand foreign culture inside and outside the region, inside and outside Europe;
- platforms for debate and meetings of researchers and analysts in cultural studies and cultural policies (introduction of cultural research in national sciences agendas);
- that European organizations and national governments in the region, together with the most representative NGOs (easy to identify today), should gather regularly and formulate a long-term agenda for cultural cooperation, reshaping and redistributing responsibilities and re-balancing the outdated idea of the ignorance of the region in facing the international challenge;
- understand and apply strategies to encourage efficiency and support the “human capital” in the SE European region, thus preventing its disappearance; it is a very positive step to see this issue underlined by parliamentarian Doris Paak, president of the delegation of the EU Parliament for SE Europe in her speech to the EU parliament,⁹ because supporting the human capital means supporting the diversity of the cultural and spiritual asset of the Balkan region.

It is obvious that cultural cooperation is today dependent more on the global factors engendered by technological advancement, provision of material resources, access to information and its rapidity, than through conventional accords and complicated bureaucratic programs; this aspect has to be taken into account if we

⁹ Source: Serbian daily *Danas*, 19 May 2003.

want SE Europe to share and acquire European democratic values and not orient itself to other more tempting overseas “ready to help” partners. It is by developing a culturally and economically rich Southeastern Europe that it will begin to have responsibility.

Now we have to face the new reality of a “new” divided Europe – the Europe of the EU and its accession countries (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia with Turkey), the Europe of inclined “outsiders” (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania ...) and the non-Europe within Europe (Belarus, the Russian Federation, Moldova and even Ukraine, three Caucasus countries). So, the Europe of the Council of Europe has several important internal borders. But at the same time, for Southeastern European countries that stayed outside, it is clear that there are no developmental opportunities outside the EU. However, two main questions remain to be answered:

- how to engage with new standards in cultural policy-making in Europe (issues like cultural diversity, territory...);
- how to engage with the world market economy (WTO standards) threatening the cultural industries of small countries.

It will take some time before cultural policies in Southeastern Europe abandon the concept of ethnically- (imagined national community-) driven cultural policy, and start to be preoccupied with a “territorial” technical concept which brings more “justice” in cultural practices to all citizens of one state.

Last, but not least, despite our conscience that the Balkans are an extremely complex region, our task is to end the stereotypes and prejudices and to recreate collective memory beyond political division, wars, unachieved compromise, etc.

Yes, the Balkans are a bridge and a crossroads at the same time. It is therefore *our* task to build our bridges, because only we will know the best place for them; we cannot wait for people from the outside to come and build these bridges for us. They may be very nice bridges, but far away from our customary paths of communication. The danger is that we will only use them on rare occasions, for nice promenades, not for our daily, operational, *real* cultural existence.

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Cultural Cooperation Contexts

The *What* and the *How* of Rijeka Cultural Studies

Marina Biti

The immediate motive for this discussion is the recent launching of the undergraduate and graduate curriculum in Cultural Studies at the University of Rijeka.¹ However, let me distance myself, right from the start, from the celebratory implications related to the notion of “the beginning”. While indeed there is a date to the day on which a mechanism involving a number of academic courses, academic staff and most importantly, students, labeled under the name of Cultural Studies, was set in motion, the idea which it wishes to promote is not at all that of identifying itself with the act of its institutionalization. In saying this, I am not simply attempting to pay the well-merited courtesy to the few deserving Croatian colleagues who introduced the spirit of Cultural Studies into our environment,² or to the many international predecessors whose work enacts the ideas upon which the Rijeka program has grown into being, all of which aptly contributed to the event of institutionalization of Cultural Studies in Croatia. My intention is, rather, to reflect upon the fact of institutionalization as opposed to the concept of Cultural Studies which we wish to make part of our reality.

The opening reflection may, by its very nature, recall the much discussed topic of *what is Cultural Studies*, as well as being likely to recall the various contents that make up the Rijeka curriculum as the basis for a legitimate search for a possible answer. However, the aspect which I would presently like to highlight is that of *how* rather than that of *what*. This is not only because the extent and the variety of *what is Cultural Studies* is likely to escape any description, but also because of the relevance which I am inclined to attribute to the inter-relatedness of the *how* and the *what* in the setting of the goals for the important issue of *what role we want Rijeka Cultural*

1 The first generation of students of the Rijeka Cultural Studies program was enrolled in the academic year 2004/5, and the program was launched with approval from the Ministry of Science and Technology of Croatia (document dated 28 October 2003).

2 I am primarily referring to the work of Dean Duda, the initiator of the Cultural Studies module within the postgraduate programme in Comparative Literature at the University of Zagreb, as well as to his publishing activities, which helped popularize the field.

Studies to play in the Croatian academic environment and how we want to position it against the pre-existing background of Cultural Studies, or, in other words: what we want Rijeka Cultural Studies to become.

Starting from the *what* and *how* which emerge from the curriculum itself, it needs to be said that the *what* of the Rijeka curriculum³ includes study of various disciplines as pathways towards the construction of possible concepts of culture, while the *how* is manifested through a selection of approaches and methodological tools for quantitative and qualitative research which enable content linking and more in-depth analysis. Topics are thus derived from areas of (cultural) history, art (history and theory) and popular culture, (cultural) theory, cultural anthropology, sociology (of culture), cultural geography, linguistics (cognitive linguistics and discourse studies), identity studies (gender, class, ethnicity, race), economics and management (of cultural resources), political science (accentuating the notion of civic society and related issues), comparative and transnational religious studies, media, communication and technology studies, etc. The program also obliges its participants to undergo solid foreign language education (the required courses are in English and one additional foreign language) and thorough (user-oriented) computer education (both being obligatory throughout the BA cycle), while, on the other hand, it gives the opportunity to students to select areas of more specific, individual interest, such as that on media, education, tourism, sport, popular culture, uses of information technology, cultural management, etc., and to sharpen their selected focus in the course of the subsequent MA cycle. This brief content-based description reveals the underpinning notion of the curriculum, that of Cultural Studies as a multidisciplinary field positioned at the crossroads of humanities and social studies, primarily interested in the deconstruction of everyday reality, its cultures and subcultures, and as such deeply immersed in identity studies, yet basing its insights against a historical perspective which aims to shed light on the evolution of philosophical, sociological and psychological concepts woven into the present-day cultural practices, and viewed through the lenses of the contemporary cultural theory.

The *what*, even at the surface level, reveals some aspects of the *how*. What it perhaps most obviously points to is that the program, though largely focusing on the study of more recent, 20th century developments in Cultural Studies, namely those related to the major turn in the history of cultural thought linked to the names of researchers of the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies (Hoggart, Williams, Thompson, Hall), resists the imposition of a narrower, in academic discussions also often oversimplified, Birmingham-based definition of its field of study. While certainly not downgrading the role and the implications of the Center's role in the

3 The detailed text of both the undergraduate and the graduate curriculum is available at <http://www.ffri.hr/cultstud/english.html>

constitution of the present-day notion of Cultural Studies, the program maps its points of reference across a broader understanding of the Anglo-Saxon heritage (crossing over towards authors like Turner and Geertz), relating it also to other relevant traditions, such as German (Cassirer's research of symbolic forms, Elias's theory of civilization, cultural and historical works of E.R. Curtius and W. Benjamin, Adorno and Horkheimer's cultural critique), French (anthropology of Lévi-Strauss, Barthes's critique of mythology, Bourdieu's history of mentality, Foucault's study of discourse, de Certeau's revalorization of popular culture), Italian (the cultural poetics of Umberto Eco), Russian (Lotman's semiotics of culture, Bakhtin's research of the carnivalesque) While the radical Birmingham impulse had much to do with the geographical expansion of Cultural Studies during the last decades of the 20th century (involving movement from Great Britain to the United States, Canada, Australia, France, India, Central and Eastern Europe), the differentiation of themes and approaches (e.g. American textual analysis; multiethnic and diaspora studies in Canada; the Australian interest in the forms of local absorption of the British tradition; the post-colonial French identity studies; the Subaltern Studies Collective in South Asia etc.), as well as the post-modernist co-mingling of theoretical and practical approaches (feminist, queer, post-colonial, post-Marxist, ecological, etc.), along with the inclusion of more specific, disciplinary and sub-disciplinary (anthropological, ethnographic, ethnomusicologist etc.) conceptions and methodologies, seems more understandable against the previously illustrated broader heritage. In that sense, the first and probably the most notable element of the *how* of Rijeka Cultural Studies is its transnational scope viewed from a broader historical perspective.

However, despite the differences regarding its general approach to the subject of culture, and those within the scope of the interests it maps across space and time, the Rijeka curriculum nevertheless aspires to continuity with the notion of Cultural Studies as developed in relation to the radical democratic turn put into effect by its famous British predecessor. The radical impulse is well present in the Rijeka program, which not only specifically articulates the moral and the political dimension identifiable with the entire Cultural Studies project through its thematic courses (as in the studies of social turns and upheavals, of democratic processes, of transitional processes and of civil society), but these dimensions are also inevitably reflected in its own daily practices determined by its position within its own concrete institutional setting. Dedicated to the idea of progressive change and to the deconstructive analysis leading to exposure of power-based hierarchies, Rijeka Cultural Studies cannot but maintain a full awareness of its unique, not to say tricky, institutional position. By the logic of the traditions it is dedicated to, but also by the logic of its interdisciplinary span and the unavoidable counter-disciplinary connotation, it cannot but find itself in the role of mediator, or even that of a deconstructive agent within its own institutional

life-space, with the tasks of exercising corrective and self-corrective practices consistent to its position and mission. Rijeka Cultural Studies is therefore, partly by nature and partly by choice, creator of a form of cultural critique that grows from within the university environment and self-subversively feeds on its very own institutional legitimacy. Channeling resistance to bureaucratic structures, engaged in the emancipatory practices of producing new cultural forms within and outside of its milieu, it embraces Gramscian standards⁴ in proposing a definition of the radical, resistant and necessarily political nature of all intellectual endeavor.

The idea of a curriculum is hence not that of disciplining Cultural Studies, but rather that of building foundations upon which to enact its free spirit. The Rijeka curriculum has therefore been designed upon a broad disciplinary base, constructed into a body of knowledge through links which enable effective permeation of disciplinary boundaries. The act of transgression of disciplinary boundaries is therefore a topic in itself, a meta-topic which calls for discussion not only from within the exposed disciplines, but also on a metadisciplinary level which gives space to epistemological and practical issues which derive from interactive association amongst the disciplines, in short - in a space in the curriculum dedicated to the critique of knowledge and of the sustaining disciplinary structures. However, there is also a simple truth here that needs to be admitted, which is that in stating that *any* curriculum, no matter how actively it may sustain deconstructive methodology nor how supportive it may be of both the internal and the external critique, it still remains unavoidably tied to the principles of knowledge acquisition, involving, as ever, both learning and teaching, carrying on a life dependent on the students which it enrolls, on the academic staff which it employs, on publishing and on reviewing, or more broadly, on academic interaction in all its institutionalized and extra-institutional forms.⁵ In acknowledging these facts, I am therefore also stressing my reasons for expressing belief that no curriculum, Rijeka Cultural Studies being no exception, can in effect be equated with the practice of Cultural Studies. A curriculum provides *grounds* upon which students are given knowledge and carefully designed tools to enable the release of the free spirit of Cultural Studies. Yet though a curriculum as such cannot be equated with Cultural Studies, it can still represent it in a metonymical sense of the word. In that sense, it deconstructs knowledge by mimicking a discipline, involving the entire disciplinary apparatus, only to get rid of it all in the long run, at some point beyond itself, in which it will become ready to emerge or perhaps *to mutate into* Cultural Studies. The idea of the Rijeka curriculum is therefore *not to be*

4 Compare to Gramsci, 1971.

5 Listed elements add up to *institutional factors ... which led disciplines to reproduce themselves* (i.e. recognition of academic subjects by elite universities, creation of department; sufficient students and lecturers; learned societies and journals; career structures - sustained by highest degrees). Quotation: Moran, 2002: 13.

Cultural Studies, or to replace it. What it comes down to is, rather, its aim *to be replaced* by it. And this is, I for myself am deeply convinced, not only a complex and demanding, but also a truly worthwhile cause.

So, yes, in proposing a curriculum, we *are* mimicking a discipline, but with a distinctly pronounced aim *to subvert* the very idea which sustains the notion, and with an ever-present ironical edge constantly employed as a deconstructive tool. The duality is probably inescapable, and Rijeka Cultural Studies has inherited it from its many predecessors who varied in degree of their awareness of its presence. The matter is, I am inclined to believe, related to the inescapable blend between the distinctive features of Cultural Studies, and the various forms in which these features appear, the requirement being that of not falling victim to mere appearances. While it may, for example, be seen as part of the disciplinary mimicry of Cultural Studies to function within the bureaucratic university set-up, the relevant issue shifts to the level of employing various against-the-stream strategies as a practical imperative, involving continuous questioning of the nature of knowledge, the role of institutions etc. While it may also be a part of disciplinary mimicry to embrace the canons, which indeed seem to have come to life (principally: Richard Hoggart's *Uses of Literacy*, 1957; Raymond Williams's *Culture and Society*, 1958; E. P. Thompson's, *The Making of the English Working Class*, 1963, etc.⁶), the disruptive strategy can be put to work not by eliminating the works which are evidently no less important for being proclaimed canonical, but by extending insights beyond them and aiming to capture the relevance of less known, but nevertheless relevant contributions. While, again, it might seem to be the peak of disciplinary mimicry to sustain the myth of "the beginning of Cultural Studies", it is the disruptive power of theory which can be put to work to dissolve the mythical year 1964 into the questioning of history itself, just as juxtaposing this particular notion of a "beginning" against other possible "beginnings" may lead us towards a similar effect. It seems rather obvious that the idea of Cultural Studies as an academic discipline is by no means a new one, since the canonization process, explicitly pronounced by some practitioners of the "discipline", or unpronounced but nevertheless embraced by others, seems to have been at work for quite some time. These facts need to be dealt with if the trend is to be questioned at all, or indeed, if Cultural Studies is to be saved from the totalizing disciplinary tendencies contrary to its essence. Likewise, the institutional threat that Stuart Hall repeatedly warned of remains in effect, not underestimated, yet dealt with rather boldly, without the bias of what Tony Bennett had contemptuously called the "disciplinary bashfulness" of Cultural Studies (Bennett, 1998).

6 I am purposefully quoting the very same corpus of works referred to as canonical by Shane J. Blackman (2000: 43-65). The list of works which might qualify for the attribute could, of course, be easily extended.

Finally, let me add that there is much work for Cultural Studies in Croatia, and in Rijeka: what the curriculum aims to do is to establish the framework to enable this work to begin, and to last. While on the one hand it is meant to provide future researchers and Cultural Studies experts with sound theoretical and practical knowledge, it just as importantly aspires to furnish them with the necessary openness that should, and hopefully will, become the lasting assets of the yet-to-be Rijeka Cultural Studies on its way to a rediscovery of the multicultural ambience which it resides in. On a broader scale, Rijeka Cultural Studies is also called upon to explore the present day post-war/pre-Europe Croatia, and to produce the much needed unbiased outlooks, crucial to the on-going processes of the reconstruction of Croatian identity. Rijeka Cultural Studies enrolls for the mission, not just as mere witness to the phenomena by which it is surrounded, but also as active participant, ready to extend itself towards the times of anticipated change. While promoting the idea of plurality as opposed to the crude idea of discipline, Cultural Studies moves from the realms of its own interdisciplinary existence towards the realms of an increasingly pluralized social reality, ready to question exclusions, restrictions and boundaries, and just as ready to engage in the debate on the inevitable limits drawn around the *ethos of pluralization*,⁷ which it sustains.

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⁷ The syntagm refers to the title, and indeed, to the content of William E. Connolly's book (1995).

Managing Cultural Transitions: Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and Minority Policies

Melita Richter Malabotta

In Europe, the debate about the concept of “cultural transitions” is mainly linked to two phenomena: the enlargement of the European Union and the changes resulting from the immigration flux characterizing the near past and the present of all the states of the Union. Both processes open the debate on “identity” and “exclusion” in an expanded European Union. However, the topic should be widened towards the area still excluded from the integration process, towards the “Other Europe” that is generally considered a no man’s land, a no man’s land which is continually under observation, a land fragmented into different states on which the admission criteria formulated in the West sometimes feel like a heavy hammer blow.

There is no doubt that the debate about European identity (which is not linked exclusively to the political objective of admission to the EU but rather to the redefinition of its cultural self) should move from the political and government vertices towards the promotion of a larger debate on what it means for the citizens, on what the genuine feelings of a European supranational identity are, on the European identity as a multiple identity, on the values it is founded on, on multiculturalism, on intercultural praxis. To start the debate, we will first devote our attention to some topics that we consider to be an integral part of our reflection on the process of European re-unification, the term we prefer to the one of enlargement.

There are at least three concepts we would like to start with:

1. the creation of new/old borders
2. the existing and increasing differences
3. the new/old fears.

1. In spite of the diffused conviction of many scholars that globalization creates a single world in which there are potentially no confines between “us” and “the rest of the world”, we can observe new borders between the two Europes

shaping the soil of the continent, and a new process of inclusion/exclusion dominating the European political scene. Those countries promoted for membership of the EU are exclaiming “back to Europe!” and to its cultural construct, while the others feel humiliated, punished, excluded. New separations are appearing in the area which was never before divided into different socio-political entities. Therefore, the question arises: will the establishment of new political borders produce new barriers (ideological, psychological, cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious) on the soil of Europe?

2. Besides the economical and financial aspect and the degree of democracy achieved, one of the most important differences between the EU partners, the South European and Central European post-communist countries concerns the identity issue. While the aim of the EU is to build a supranational European identity based on plural feelings of belonging and multiculturalism, most of the new member countries - once a part of the Soviet block and countries born from the dissolution of Yugoslavia - are searching for their identity deeply rooted in the national past, in the affirmation of “ethnically pure” homogenized society corroborated by myths of the nation.

3. The **multiple belonging**, the overlapping cultures, **indispensable elements of being European**, are still strongly doubted, not only where a part of the plural identity is being destroyed with weapons (as the case of Yugoslavia demonstrates) but also in any places where a complex personality decides to become one, indivisible, absolute, when it decides to expel the other part of itself and to jump to one side only, alone. It is not possible without violence to the Self.¹

The European enlargement process is accompanied by **diffused fears** on both sides - the side of the EU members and the side of the newcomers. Let us reveal some of them.

The most diffused fears of Union partners are:

- that the newcomers - most of them with a communist past and some of them with a strong nationalist present - will bring **elements of their political culture, their behaviour and their conflictuality into the Union;**
- that the newcomers - mostly situated on a new Eastern and South Eastern **border** of the Union - will **not be a capable new guarantor of European impenetrability and a proper warden of the fortress;**
- the fear of being **invaded from the East**, which is very strong in some Western European countries;

1 About the meaning of overlapping cultures see more in: Melita Richter Malabotta, 2001.

- the fear that the entrance of “new poor” will **take away the opportunity of important communitarian financial support to less developed areas assigned to some regions of the EU**;
- the fear of a **new kind of internal mass migration and the pressure of new immigration on the borders of the Union**.

The fears of the candidate countries are:

- the fear of **becoming subject to a new hegemonic policy**;
- the fear of a **non-parity role of cultural identity actors** and the diffidence with which the “small” (states, nations, minorities, weaker regions) regard the **possible new cultural domination of the transnational center of power**;
- the fear that **cultural information and communication could become “one-way oriented”**;
- the **sense of inequality and marginalization**. Most of the candidate members are small, not very rich or stable countries. This fact is introducing significant changes in the balance between the four strong partners of the Union and a new consciousness of **being in the center or in the periphery of Europe**;
- the fear of **“paying too much” for entrance** - (unemployment, unequal starting conditions for competitiveness, compulsory participation in the financial structure of transnational military formations, etc.).

In this framework context of mutual fear, very much spread among the members of both Europes, how is it possible to develop and guide a practice of “cultural transitions”? What content is it possible to give to the concepts of “multiculturalism” and “interculturalism”? And what about minority policies in a new geopolitical European constellation?

In order to understand concepts of multiculturalism and interculturalism, both national and immigrant minorities have to be considered. It means that the area of our interest would be the socio-political space of nation-states within which the policies towards the Other become concrete. At the same time the EU level should be taken into account because it is at this level where the problems and the solutions deriving from the presence of the Different become apparent.

According to the Italian scholar Giovanna Campani: “Nations and nation-states show a great ambivalence in relationship to diversity: on one side, nation-states exasperate differences at the ‘horizontal’ level, that means among them (opposing

strongly to other nation-states beyond the borders); on the other side, they want to eliminate all differences at the ‘vertical’ level, that is, internal diversity” (Campani, 2004: 55).

The whole history of the nation-state is scored by the efforts to simplify the internal differences and to lead them towards a homogenized image of a united nation. In the majority of cases these efforts to achieve a union have been accompanied by oppressive policies of assimilation and destruction of minorities. Campani states that during the process of nation-state building, ethno-regional cultures have been destroyed, languages have progressively disappeared, while other languages, which have been the languages of supra-national areas, have been ethnicized.

This process has not always been easy or linear and has not achieved the desired affect:

“The elimination of internal diversity was a long process in the history of European nation building and it has not succeeded completely: the cultural unity and the national unity do not coincide completely, as shown by the presence of minorities that are today demanding different forms of political organization and cultural recognition” (Campani, 2004: 60).

In spite of the construction of a monolithic image of their societies, the majority of the European nation-states are multinational states: multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-religious. To this plurality of internal subjects it is necessary to add a new factor: the arrival of an immigrant population who are adding new elements to the internal differences. Taking into consideration the importance of the new emerging subject, the immigrant population, into the globalized stage of the world, the Canadian scholar Will Kymlicka makes the distinction between multicultural societies (dominated by the presence of national minorities) and *poly-ethnic* societies (marked by the massive presence of immigrants) (Kymlicka, 1999: 22-48). The majority of the European societies of Southern and Western Europe are at the same time multicultural and poly-ethnic. Within themselves, alongside the differences represented by different minorities and national identities a “new difference” is emerging: the difference of the newcomers. The latter is not homogeneous; its distinguishing trait is the ethnic, cultural, religious, gender and age variety and it is in itself a *changing entity*. One of the basic questions concerning the development without conflict of the multicultural and poly-ethnic societies remains therefore: *how to include the two types of differences in a system of mutual respect and positive interactions?* (Campani, 2004: 61).

In this paper we will try to circumscribe the Italian experience of the management of this difference without forgetting to underline that *there is no European model of multiculturalism* because the history of immigration in individual countries differs; it

is historically determined and socially and politically marked by different experiences. It would be difficult, for example, to imagine the multiethnic British reality without Britain's colonial past; Swedish society without welfare and social democracy; France without its centralized policies; Spain without its multinational constellation, Basque autonomy or the Catalan identity. This is the reason why we consider it appropriate to mention some of the well-known and schematic models on which the inclusion of the differences in different societies is organized.

- the **French model** - generally known as assimilationist. The socio-political system absorbs the differences giving the newly arrived immigrants the opportunity to become citizens (in the second generation) with the same rights of the autochthonous populations. The price to pay is to forget their cultural difference. Integration into the republican system of rights and duties is strictly individual, based on individual rights. There is less predisposition to recognize collective identities and ethnic minorities;
- the **German model** - or the model of "no integration". The culture relating to acceptance of the Other is contained in the word *Gastarbeiter*. Participation in society is organized as a separate body; generally, it is not possible to become a German citizen. The concept of citizenship is based on cultural and hereditary (German) origins (*ius sanguinis*). The social classes and the ethnic minorities are kept separate;
- the **British and Dutch model** - not restrictive, favorable to accepting the newcomers as citizens. It is the model that best represents *multicultural societies*: the society is structured on the minority-majority relationship. The majorities and minorities are subject-communities, small ethnic fatherlands/motherlands, existing and operating in a common citizenship. It may be described as the *coexistence of non-communicating vases in the same shared space*, or with the metaphor "*living side by side*". It facilitates the maintenance of the original identity of the immigrant, but on the cultural level there is no significant synthesis;
- the **intercultural model** - based on the plural presence of individual subjects not only on the communities they belong to. The meeting and exchange take place between the different elements within the public space, citizenship is acquired in the second generation and the society has a low ethnic conflict rate. The stress is on the word "inter", thus the stress is on the *relationship*;
- the **Italian reality** belongs to the **segmented pluralist model**. There is an acknowledgement of the differences and a consciousness of the need for recognition of differences, but, at the same time, between the

subjects-in-relation there are visible social inequities and asymmetries, for example discrimination in the labor market, marginal positioning in the social environment, accommodation and access to the social rights. Political integration and a common political culture is not stimulated.

The distinctive features which are attributed to the above models of integration are in reality never “pure” and some authors, instead of schematic and simplified distinctions, propose to use the analyses as a process of *convergence of models of immigration* (Pajares, 2005). This process implies *change*, which we can observe as a transition. The transition from a multicultural to an intercultural model requires not only an internal evolution within the society but also the *cognitive* maturation regarding the Other, the different, the faraway. Some authors (for example Favaro, 2005; and Baraldi, 2003) also foresee the need for an *affective* level. We think that it is important to focus on a *legislative aspect* because it remains the normative base of the orientation of a whole society concerning the inclusion/exclusion concepts and their reflection on its democracy.

In the context of the normative, the Italian example can be useful to better understand:

- what the integration policies are; how it is described by the legislator in current immigration law;
- how the concept of multiculturalism is used.

With regard to the first aspect, Article 6 of the 1947 Italian Constitution states that: “[t]he Republic protects with specific norms all the linguistic minorities”. Avoiding here the extent of the discussion about the evolution of the norms concerning how to approach the Different (not only immigrant but national and ethnic minorities), may we recall that the current immigration law (the so-called “Bossi-Fini”) uses the theoretical model of integration, which gives the cultural exchange a central value and regards it as a guarantee of equal opportunity of access to services and the protection of differences. One field where this theoretical model was more successfully applied is in the national school and the schooling system in general. The model of reception and integration of the foreign pupils in Italian schools (Ferretti, 2004) is closely linked to the subject of integration understood as construction based on dialogue and cooperation. Intercultural teaching has been indicated, already in 1995, as the objective that joins the formative process throughout all the subjects promoting “the critical spirit and the capacity to think for different models, a premise for a conscious solidarity and an introduction into a labour world characterised by the mobility and by the presence of operators of every country”.²

2 “L’educazione interculturale e l’integrazione degli alunni stranieri” (Intercultural education and the integration of foreign pupils), *Annali della Pubblica Istruzione* No. 71, Rome, 1995.

The many circulars from the Ministry of Education push the pedagogy increasingly towards intercultural experiences.³ However, the Bossi-Fini immigration law demonstrates the restrictive character of the new legislation by identifying the foreigner, above all, as the needed (“but not beloved”) workforce and the advantages of his/her presence mostly in terms of them filling the available spaces in the labor market (above all the black market or so-called grey economy). In other words, immigrants are available to work in those niches of the economy that are characterized by the four “Ps” (*pesanti* - hard, *pericolosi* - dangerous, *pagati poco* - poorly paid and, *penalizzati socialmente* - socially penalized). In this ambiguous general environment where the foreigner, the different and the immigrant are reduced to one single function, the one of workforce, and are not considered as whole individuals, where the complexity of their social being is dismissed and where their cultural identity is understood as mere folklore, what are the means and the **risks of the management of the differences?**

Considering that the presence of this difference is structural to the society, not sporadic or the mere result of emergency (as it was first interpreted in the 1980s), there are scholars (e.g. Favoro, 2005) who describe informal and institutional dealing with differences through the following behaviors:

- the **removal or refusal of the differences**; this is a mental behavior that tries to overcome the differences by taking away the singularity of the different individuals and underlining the universality of human beings;
- **identifying the differences while considering them as a social lack**; a “hole to fill”, naturally with Eurocentric modalities and concepts;
- **stressing the differences**; hyper-evaluating the differences together with an a-critical vision of the dynamics of multi-ethnic society; whatever comes from the Other is beautiful and positive;
- **folklorizing the differences**; reducing their complexity to simplified ethnographic or gastronomic elements. The reduction of the meaning of the difference very often leads to the banalization (the so-called “couscous” pedagogy);
- **considering the differences as a socio-cultural anachronism**; considering the different peoples in different positions in the linear scale of the universal development from “tradition” to “modernity” as if there was a

3 Concerning intercultural pedagogy and the specific Italian experience see Richter-Malabotta in Mesić, 2004 and Richter-Malabotta in Krainz-Durr, Enziger and Schmoczer, 2004.

single development model which could be applied to measure the others in terms of how *far* from or how *close* to “us” they are;

- **making the differences rigid and static**; *reifying* the culture, thinking of the culture in terms of things (*res, rei, lat.*) and static stereotypes: “they behave like that because they are Chinese, Moroccan or Muslims ...”;
- **underlining the differences too much** without seeing the analogies, the resemblances that unite the individuals facing each other; seeking their social, cultural and symbolic separation, whatever the cost;
- **simulating the difference**, often present in a cultural and religious “passage” of autochthonous to different religious patterns (neo-Buddhist, Islamic ...).

Some of the risks of the management of differences that we have mentioned above can be resolved by *adjusting* the relationship as demanded by the new intercultural scenario: “The adjusting not only involves the immigrant who has to deal with a new reality and who has to appropriate it; it concerns also the host society and the individuals who are part of it, because with the necessary changes of the social structures and dynamics, the interpersonal relationships and the single subjectivities change also” (Jabbar and Lonardi, 2003: 20).

The term *adjusting* can be replaced by others that interpret the continuous search for a *replacement in the world* in which geographical and political borders are diluted and the margins of acquired certainties of collective identities have vanished. The terms change but their sense refers always to the re-interpretation of the diversity felt as *alien*; it refers also to the need for overcoming the self-centrality. Antonio Nanni calls it *deconstruction* and in his book entitled *Decostruzione e intercultural (Deconstruction and Interculture)* (2001: 4) he writes: “I consider that de-constructive behaviour facing the own culture is an essential prerequisite in order to build a better tomorrow in the time of the plural-universe that has already started”.

Using Emmanuel Lévinas’ concepts (the philosophy of face), this would mean the most challenging of the changes - a change in attitude: “This choice is feasible, provided that the historically dominant subject accepts its own disempowerment and its auto-destruction. This heralds the possibility of a genuine encounter in the domain of real, non fictive equality where it is no longer demanded that only the other should change, but that we expose ourselves to the process of change” (Richter Malabotta in Mesić, op.cit: 130).

The demand for “adjustment”, for “overcoming the own centrality” or for “de-construction” is related, in a first instance, to the ethics of the relationship, to the society acknowledging that there is a change process within it but, still, it remains only a demand.

The elements which would help to avoid the change depending on the sporadic character of the maturation of the society’s imaginary, in which the inclusion of the diversity process takes place, are **citizenship rights** and their concrete application, therefore, citizenship intended on the **juridical** and the **social level**.

On the juridical level, citizenship establishes the formal belonging to a certain territory, defining a set of rights and obligations, the form of representation and participation deriving from that registration. On the social level, citizenship may be seen as *factual belonging*, meaning being part of a community, living on a certain territory, contributing to the material maintenance and to the development of the society (Jabbar and Lonardi, 2003). Beyond that lies *critical autonomy* - the ability to situate, criticize and, if necessary, challenge the rules and practices of one’s society, in other words, the ability to act as a “critical citizen”, as Ruth Lister would say. In our analysis the concept of “critical citizen” is important in the same way as is the concept of “lived citizenship”, introduced by Lister in her work, taking as a departure point the theoretical contribution of Hall and Williamson (1999), that is: “the meaning that citizenship actually has in people’s lives and the way in which people’s social and cultural backgrounds and material circumstances affect their lives as citizens” (Lister, 2003: 3).

The majority of the theoretical scholars dealing with the concept of citizenship in the light of the development of the multiethnic and intercultural society underline the importance of social cohesion through participation. Campani will stress: “The new citizenship is not a formal legislation, it is a process of participation, where the recognition of cultural difference and the sure linguistic and cultural rights are a point of departure and of arrival, a point of departure which acts dialectically (thesis, antithesis and synthesis) in the society, bringing new forms of identity, of representation, of freedom” (Campani, op. cit: 65).

In these particularly articulated and complex frameworks in which occur cultural transition in western societies, with the premise of the articulation of *political citizenship* with *social citizenship*: “through the associative practices and the movement tending to transform the societies and the dominion structures” (Gallissot, 2001: 64), we would like to focus on an area where the new citizenship, often not recognized or sanctioned from the legal point of view, comes forward and gets hold of

the singular cultural identity, where it re-acquires the VOICE and the right to public speech. It is a new cultural expression, the **migrant writing** in intercultural societies.⁴

The phenomena is giving shape to the specific space of a *third dimension*, the dimension that enables the emergence of multiple positions (Seyhan, 2001: 5) and gives the opportunity to reinforce the subjective identity. It is an *open* dimension, trans-cultural, a space which is crossed frequently and, as such, a space of encounters and contamination where, as Clotilde Barbarulli (2003: 174) would say, “new relationships between subject, body, history and world are built”.

Appropriating the new language, the migrant writer expresses him/herself in the linguistic code of the country where he or she lives and affirms, besides the self-affective memory linked to the migratory experience (nostalgia, loss, uprooting), the participative will, the essence of the practice of the *citoyen*. In this space, the exchanges, the *metissage* take place. Here the world is re-elaborated, the world of writing that just a short time before was the expression of the homologating national culture. Migrant writers produce different modalities of the discourse; they “creolize” the autochthones’ language and culture. This modality adds new meanings of reality and it pushes them in continuous search of cultural repositioning which embraces a wider sphere than the mere area of culture: it implies a *new social visibility* and confirms their presence in the agora of the word, of the thought. The immigrant, the foreigner is no longer just a working body; the immigrant becomes also a mind, a mind which expresses the participation and shared longing, the cultural apportion. The autochthones cannot ignore this presence any longer and should ask how such a meeting takes place and how it modifies the being of the culture understood until now as “national”.

Through the cultural representations and writings of immigrant authors the fragments of their existences are rebuilt, going beyond the private sphere, beyond the boundaries of their history and their spiritual geography. Word and language become the tools of struggle and the places in which cultural change occurs and a new citizenship takes shape.

The same phenomenon is spreading through all the European Mediterranean countries. The Spanish scholar Josefina Bueno Alonso gives to the immigrant women-texts and to writing the meaning of *an ideal space in which to reconstruct an*

4 More and more often we bump into literary work written by non-Italian-speaking writers, by immigrant narrators, poets or simple persons who give to the pages the stories about themselves, adopting the “foreign” language and appropriating it. There is an exponential growth of the conferences on this subject; the Faculties of Literature and Languages open degrees devoted to the migrant writing. They call the emerging authors “citizens of the letters”.

identity marked by the person's sex and by the desire for representativity with regard to the normalized "Other". We feel very close to the strong conviction of Alonso who identifies writing as "the best way to deconstruct and reconstruct new parameters and to use various different practices of resistance through discourse".⁵ But we would add, however, that writings and narratives are not enough. Social praxis is needed to achieve transformation of the social framework and dominant cultural structures.

Word-participation, word-appropriation of the subjective identity of immigrant-in-becoming-citizen, the transformation of *non-citizens* into *citizen subject of policy*; this process is neither generated nor exhausted just by legislation but happens alongside and together with the profound cultural transition of the society over a period of time: *has it still any sense to keep the link between the concept of citizenship and of national belonging?*

Some significant steps in the direction of finding the answer to this question have been made. In Italian society, there is on the agenda another dimension of *being an immigrant* which slowly and relentlessly enters into meanders of thought, in "national" narration, through the expressive capacity of writings. According to Seyhan, "the migrant, exile, or voyager not only crosses the threshold into another history and geography but also steps into the role of an itinerant cultural visionary" (Seyhan, op.cit: 14).

Talking about the literature of migrant women - particularly referring to the writing of Shirin Ramzanali Fazel - Clotilde Barbarulli writes: "The migrants use the linguistic code of the country to be able to communicate but, exposing themselves to the new language, they bend it towards *their* pain, *their* happiness, mixing it with their own oral culture, their own lexicon. It is a way to *write between many languages*, in a wondering that without erasing the place from where the word is articulated opens the polymorphism of the totality of the world" (Barbarulli in Borghi and Barbarulli, 2003: 172).

The "totality of the world", or the acknowledgement of being engaged with the dramatic event of "being-in-the-world", as Lévinas (1998: 3) would say. It is in this universal frame that we should observe the phenomenon of the "cultural transitions". In the difficult search for equilibrium between I and the world, migrant writing finds its place; a migrant writing that has its origins in the multiple positions of the nomadic subject and his plural identity. These narratives that originate at border crossings cannot be bound by national confines, languages and literary and critical traditions.

⁵ As also expressed by Hélène Cixous: "Writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement, of a transformation of social and cultural structures". (quoted in Silvia Caporale Bizzini, 2005).

There is no doubt: *managing cultural transitions* in Western multi-ethnic societies means taking into account the “third space” where the cultures and the languages find their places and participate in the encounter outlining a grammar of new discourses of community beyond territorial borders.

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Creative City vs. *Kulturstadt*: Implications of Competing Policy Formulations

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This paper discusses the implications of competing policy formulations implicitly contained in the designations “creative city” and “*Kulturstadt*”. The discussion is undertaken as a contribution to resolving a cultural policy dilemma faced by selected cities in the post-socialist countries of the Southeastern European region.

These cities, rich in cultural resources, are currently being encouraged to import the notions of the “creative industries” and “creative cities” as models of their urban regeneration and future economic development.¹ However, what is also on offer, at least implicitly, is the Central European idea of *Kulturstadt*, connected in its post-World War II guise with the social democratic model of publicly accessible culture. This model is traditionally closer to the Central and Southeastern European understanding of culture and the role of culture in the life of a city, but is increasingly seen as “unfeasible” in the current, globalized socio-economic context.

The text that follows discusses issues belonging to two sets of policy considerations connected with the mentioned models. On the one hand, it tries to estimate whether the “creative city” model can be effectively transplanted into the Southeastern European context, and discusses whether this should be done even if it can be done. On the other hand, an estimate is made of the degree to which the

1 Following the Central and Eastern European Pilot Project in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (begun in 2003), the British Council has extended its “creative industries in transitional markets” program to the Southeastern European region via the Creative Industries Strand of its UK-South East Europe Forum. The initiative was launched in the year 2004. Within it, the representatives of ten cities from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the UN-administrated territory of Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro are developing creative industries strategies for their cities. Detailed information on the initiative is available at UK-SEE Forum (2005).

traditional model of publicly accessible culture can survive in present conditions, at least in a modified version exemplified by the European city of culture model, opening up towards commercialization in a more regulated way and counting on long-term beneficial effects for the community.

Following the discussion of these issues, we argue that one should opt for a hybridized model, opening up towards the economic aspects of cultural activity while at the same time preserving planning mechanisms and a genuinely public motivation of the “architect” approach to policy-making.

The notion of the “creative city“

The fact that selected cities in the Southeastern European region are being encouraged to adopt the “creative city“ model as a model of their economic development comes as no surprise: within the creative industries discussion, the cities and regions surrounding them have proven to be a preferred point of reference.

There are a number of reasons for this, ranging from the dynamic interconnectedness of various global and local structures in the contemporary economy, to the promise of a certain self-referential efficiency the city level appears to hold. In the words of a noted advocate of the concept: “Cities provide opportunities and interactions which can solve their own problems and improve the quality of life of whole regions” (Landry, 2000: xii-xiii).

To a certain degree, this appears to be true in the Southeastern European context as well. There, the idea seems to be particularly appealing in countries with convoluted and inefficient systems of federal government, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the UN-protected territory of Kosovo. But it also holds appeal elsewhere in the region, wherever it is felt that the periphery is disadvantaged in relation to the national capitals.²

This phenomenon, coming about as a result of overcentralization of government and economic activity, can actually be said to be almost universal not only in the Southeastern European context, but in the context of a wider European post-socialist transition. It, at least partly, explains the wish to bypass the national level of reference and integrate directly into the global economy via the concept of the “creative city”. However, before assessing how realistic this wish is, one needs to explain what precisely is meant by the concept in question.

2 Anecdotal evidence for these claims was easy to obtain in contacts with the representatives of the cities included in the British Council’s UK SEE Forum initiative.

In the context of this paper, the notion of the “creative city” carries three possible explanations or connotations. One is connected to the seminal works of Charles Landry (Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000), who has been advocating the concept for more than a decade. Another one springs to mind owing to the popularity and impact of Richard Florida’s books on the “creative class” (2002; 2005a; 2005b). Finally, the third one has to do with the city focus of the recent British Council initiative to promote the “creative industries” in the countries of Southeastern Europe. Although related in certain aspects, the three definitions are still distinctly different from one another.

(1) Landry-inspired definition of the “creative city”

Landry’s consulting activity revolves around the idea that cities should deal with their problems and development potential “creatively”, i.e. resourcefully and innovatively, heeding the changing definitions of terms and responding to the most recent global trends. Although his consultancy also attempts to “identify, harness, promote and sustain the creative, cultural resources that are present in every human settlement”, the main thrust of his work is creating “pre-conditions for decision makers at all levels to think, plan and act with imagination and in an integrated way” (Comedia, 2005).

In other words, in Landry’s case, “creativity” largely refers to the policy process. His consultancy “advises cities on *creative approaches* to planning, economy, social inclusion, culture and local identity” (Comedia, 2005; emphasis ours). Within such a framework, “the Creative City notion is now the umbrella concept for [Comedia’s and Landry’s] work”, crystallizing the range of strategic documents that the consultancy can produce for a city.

The ultimate result of these should be a motivated constituency (“people encourage[d] to think differently”) and changed organizational culture of a city, creating an impression (and a reality) of a dynamic and imaginative community.

(2) Florida-inspired definition of the “creative city”

Florida’s general description of the cities and regions that attract the members of the “creative class” bears resemblances to the desired outcome of the policy measures advocated by Landry. However, beyond vague calls upon decision-makers to invest in creativity and cultural amenities that can attract people predisposed to generate wealth in their cities, Florida does not really engage in policy discussions.

As an academic, in his initial two books on the subject (2002; 2005a), he attempted to provide evidence for the hypothesis that there exists a relationship between the economic growth of a city and the structure of its population, as well as its general characteristics as a place. According to Florida, those cities that have a larger proportion of workers engaged in creative occupations, and the ability to harness “the multidimensional aspects of creativity” (Dreher, 2002) for economic ends, will tend to prosper in the contemporary economy.

The required “multidimensional” approach to creativity includes technological aspects (innovation), economic aspects (entrepreneurship), and last but not least cultural and artistic aspects (“the ability to invent new ways of thinking about things”) (Dreher, 2002). In order to tell how well an individual city fares on these counts, Florida has developed a set of indices measuring the ability of a place to generate economic activity. According to him, one of the key preconditions for economic growth is the ability of a city to attract people necessary to fuel creativity in all its aspects.

However, it should be said that - in spite of a consistent city focus of his research - Florida does not use the term “creative city”. His equivalent for it is “creative center”. By this he means not only places that “have high concentrations of Creative Class people”, but also “high concentrations of creative economic outcomes, in the form of innovations and high-tech industry growth”. Likewise, “creative centers” should “show strong signs of overall regional vitality, such as increases in regional employment and population” (Florida, 2002: 218). For the purposes of this article, the quoted phrases can be taken to be the second explanation of the notion of the “creative city”.

(3) “Creative industries”-centered definition of the “creative city”

Finally, there remains the third explanation of the “creative city”, connected with the British Government definition of the “creative industries”. These are defined as “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (DCMS, 2005).

According to British classifications, used in government-organized mapping exercises on the subject, the “creative industries” include: advertising, architecture, the art and antiques market, crafts, design, designer fashion, film and video,

interactive leisure software, music, the performing arts, publishing, software and computer games, television and radio (DCMS, 2005).

By analogy with Florida's definition of the "creative center", the creative city in this sense would be a place showing a high concentration of activities connected to the "creative industries".

"Creative cities" in the European context

Now that the scope and possible connotations of the term "creative city" have been outlined, it is in order to try and assess how compatible they are with the context they are currently being transplanted into. We intend to do so by setting the salient details of each of the outlined explanations of the term against what we see as social, cultural and economic realities of the cities in the Southeastern European region.

To be sure, not all the cities in the region (nor their respective countries) are in a uniform position with regard to the feasibility of the concept in their midst. Individual mapping exercises and policy decisions can only be made taking into account the specificities of each individual place.

However, a degree of commonality can be found among the cities in the region, in the same way as this can be done for the cities in the parts of the world that have given rise to terms such as "creative economy" and "creative class". We feel that this kind of general orientation is needed exactly in order to refine subsequent individual case studies.

Likewise, the topics outlined below should not be seen as a permanently disqualifying list of obstacles to the implementation of the concept in the Southeastern European region. Rather, they should be approached as issues that need to be dealt with when the feasibility of "creative cities" in this particular context is discussed and realistically assessed.

Factors working against a smooth implementation of the concept in the region are presented in the same order as the three possible explanations of the creative city given above. We start with Landry's concept, continue with Florida's, and end with the British definition of the "creative industries".

Obstacle No. 1: insufficient organizational capacity

On the whole, in the Southeastern European context, Landry's approach to the "creative city" seems to be the most promising of the three outlined ones. To begin with, it is culturally more compatible with the objectives of a "European" approach to strategic urban planning. Furthermore, and even more importantly, it does not focus so much on economic and cultural constraints to the realization of the creative potential of a city.

Landry's goal is to motivate the decision-makers to induce change in varying and not always completely favorable circumstances. In the Southeastern European context, as anywhere else where circumstances are far from ideal, the appeal of his approach partly stems from its generality, its flexibility in dealing with what are identified as cultural resources of a city, and its overarching optimism. At any rate, it seems fair to say that at least a part of the attraction of Landry's efforts lies in their being geared to producing proposals for policies rather than statements of (discouraging) facts.

However, such a policy orientation is bound to lose a part of its appeal as soon as it faces the region's complicated institutional realities. Namely, what Landry sees as the "precondition of preconditions for a creative city" (Landry, 2000: 117) is a developed organizational capacity, which includes open governance arrangements at every level "from individual to institution". This capacity is seen as an overarching skill, involving components ranging from leadership qualities to the ability to overcome sectional interests and "stick to an agreed course of action in the face of opposition and difficulties" (Landry, 2000: 117-118).

As Landry says elsewhere: "without an effective institutional framework, a city will never be able to translate its creative ideas into action" (Landry and Wood, 2000).

Unfortunately, in a number of various Southeastern European micro-contexts, the required organizational capacity appears to be in particularly short supply. It is impossible to provide systematically elaborated empirical evidence for such a statement, but there exist a number of indicators pointing in that direction. To take an extreme example, the qualities associated with the organizational culture of public administration figure prominently among the indicators that have brought Bosnia and Herzegovina onto the "Failed States Index", developed by *Foreign Policy* magazine and the Fund for Peace (*Foreign Policy*, 2005).

The “delegitimization of state”, “progressive deterioration of public services” and “factionalized elites” cannot be said to be so acute in all the countries of the region. Nevertheless, it appears that “the capacity [of] public officials to systematically and effectively apply their skills and knowledge” (Landry, quoted in Murtaja, 2000) is harder to find there than it is to locate visionaries and active, complaining, “difficult citizens”. The latter are, according to Julia Middleton (Murtaja, 2000), also a prerequisite for realizing the idea of the “creative city”.

Obstacles Nos. 2, 3 and 4: Technology, Talent, Tolerance

In his *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002), Richard Florida attempted to complement and update the human capital theory, which states that economic growth will occur in places that have highly educated people. Florida went a step further and tried to explain why “creative people cluster in certain places” (2002: 223). Doing this, he bypassed the conventional view postulating that economic remuneration was a key factor in the location choices people make when looking for employment.

According to Florida, what members of the “creative class” look for in communities are “abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, an openness to diversity of all kinds, and above all else the opportunity to validate their identities as creative people” (2002: 218).

Florida claims that newly formed urban concentrations of creative people rest on what he calls the “3Ts of economic development: Technology, Talent and Tolerance” (2002: 249). He considers each of them “a necessary but by itself insufficient condition”, and claims that “to attract creative people, generate innovation and stimulate economic growth, a place must have all three” (2002: 249).

Diversity increases the odds that different types of creative people will be attracted to a place, the concentration and mix of their particular skills and ideas speeds the flow of knowledge, and this in turn leads to higher rates of innovation, high-technology formation, job generation and economic growth (Florida, 2002: 249).

It is of course questionable whether the same confluence of qualities would produce the same economic outcomes in a different context, for example one in which - for cultural reasons - technological innovation does not translate so quickly into capital gain. Nevertheless, there can be no harm in briefly discussing the likelihood of a confluence of Florida’s “3Ts” in Southeastern European cities.

Technology

Unfortunately, what Florida sees as prerequisites to growth can only be seen as obstacles to growth in the Southeastern European context. There not only tolerance, but also technology and talent appear to be in short supply.

When technology is at stake, its availability and level of development actually vary across the region. What is common to the countries that make it up is, however, a position of economic dependency that makes it difficult to use this technology to the ends that Florida has in mind.

Böröcz and Sarkar (2005: 160-161) argue that the societies of East-Central Europe soon after the collapse of state socialism fell into an intense, singular dependence on the European Union. According to these authors, “by the time the EU’s new applicant states came within arm’s length of the Union, they were already profoundly transformed into export-oriented, second-tier service and manufacturing sites [...] reconstructed almost exclusively by foreign capital [...] to produce for the EU market”.

Under such circumstances, it is unreasonable to expect that creative uses of technology will flourish. To make things worse, many Southeastern European countries are only in the initial phase of EU-accession negotiations, which is bound to make their quasi-dependency status much longer.³

Talent

Under this heading, we should remember Florida’s argument according to which the presence of a major research university in an area is a huge advantage for its creative economy (Florida, 2002: 291-293; 2005a: 143-154), in addition to a high concentration of talented creatives in an urban setting.

Unfortunately, both the talent base and the quality of higher education in the Southeastern European region have significantly deteriorated in the period of post-socialist transition.

3 Böröcz and Sarkar (2005: 158-159) argue that structural dependence of former socialist states not only on foreign capital but also on a foreign authority for laws and regulations is reminiscent of the history of colonial empires’ “indirect rule”. The authors remind us that the quasi-dependency status for EU entrants during the 2004 round of accessions (who will enjoy equal rights within the Union by 2011) will have lasted for 18 years. In an optimistic scenario of only a five-year delay, for next-round members Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey it can be expected to be circa 23 years.

According to Nechifor et al. (2005), research indicates that two out of three teaching jobs were lost in some university facilities. The devastating effects of a massive migration of skilled professionals (known as “brain drain”) were in many places enhanced by “brain waste”, i.e. the trend of scientists leaving their university positions for better paid jobs in the private sector.

To mention but one pertinent indicator of the intellectual capacity lost over the last decade, one can quote the World Bank’s index of “scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people)” (World Bank, 2005). According to this index, all the Southeastern European countries for which data is available, save for one, have suffered significant decreases in the period between 1995 and 2002.⁴

Added to this should be the fact that not a single university from the region is represented in the academic ranking list of 500 top world universities developed by Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s Institute of Higher Education (Academic Ranking, 2005), although universities from several transitional countries (Russia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, in the 2003 edition also Slovenia) have made it onto the list.

To make things worse, for a number of reasons,⁵ academic centers in the region are not in a position to reap the benefits of the so-called “brain circulation”. For the time being, they seem not to be able to attract either the members of an increasingly globally mobile population of qualified people, or those researchers originally from the region but now working abroad.

4 The data on the number of “scientists and engineers in R&D (per million people)” can be found in “ICT at a Glance Tables” (World Bank, 2005) providing data by country. According to this data, the number of scientists and engineers in R&D in Bulgaria dropped from 1,665.5 in 1995 to 1,316.1 in 2002. In Croatia, in the same period, the number dropped from 1,922.5 to 1,187.0; in FYR Macedonia from 1,332.7 to 387.2; and in Romania from 1,393.3 to 912.6. The data for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are not available. Serbia and Montenegro is an exception in the region in that in it the number of scientists and engineers in R&D actually rose from 1,598.1 to 2,389.3.

5 Among the reasons preventing the academic centers in the region from benefiting from “brain circulation” are: a generally deteriorating situation of university research, limited possibilities of economic remuneration, the unfavorable structure of regional economies, lack of cultural amenities enabling self-actualization of members of the “creative class”, and last but not least a general lack of diversity and tolerance dealt with in the subsection below.

Tolerance

In the Southeastern European region, the likelihood of a successful implementation of a “creative city” in Florida’s sense of the word gets even smaller when his third “T”, equally important as the other two ones, enters the picture.

Eleven years after Beck (1994b) offered his view on the causes of the new nationalisms in the post-socialist countries, collectivist values are still far more attractive in the region than values of a “Europe of individuals”. The only exception to the rule seems to be certain individualism in the economic sphere,⁶ emerging already in the initial stage of the transitional period.

To be sure, however, this is not the kind of individualization based on Inglehart’s “post-materialist values”, finding expression in such concepts as Beck’s “subpolitics” (1993). Rather, one could speak of an early capitalist individualization based on heedless accumulation of material wealth. In the Southeastern European region, it takes place in specific socio-political circumstances,⁷ making it culturally dependent on collectivist, ethno-national concepts aimed at preserving “our authenticity” in the face of globalization processes.⁸

6 This is suggested by the findings of five case studies (on Croatia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic/Slovakia, Lithuania, and Russia), published in a special 1997 edition of *Culturelink* on institutional and value changes in Central and Eastern Europe. As summarized by Malešević (1997), “various surveys interpreted in these five case studies show [...] a firm rejection of collectivist values in the economic life”. However, the individualist and materialist values that predominate in the field of economic relations are mixed with the “socialist legacy” in many other respects. Most importantly, there is considerable support for state intervention in the domain of social welfare, and state paternalism is often preferred to individual responsibility.

7 According to Kürti (2001), capitalism developing in the post-socialist countries is inconsistent with traditional market mechanisms. It develops on the basis of redistribution of public goods through privatization. The culture of crime appears to be an inherent part of such capitalism. Genov (2002) states that, in the first half of the 1990s in Bulgaria, the lack of clear legal standards and the lack of domestic capital often made previously unknown private entrepreneurship equal to criminal or quasi-criminal activities. According to the same author, the weakening of the state in the process of privatization and concurrent social and cultural processes, led to the flourishing of social pathologies in the country throughout the 1990s.

8 Katunarić (1997), as summarized by Malešević, describes a new form of cultural hegemony that developed in the 1990s in Croatia, based on a symbiosis of market absolutism and the perception of the ethno-national state as an unmistakable, almost divine entity. Other case studies in the same edition of *Culturelink* indicate what Malešević (1997) describes as a “chaotic and conflict-ridden relation between the globalist tendencies and the struggle for the preservation of authentic cultures”.

Although taking place at the end of the 20th century, this kind of “individualization” is obviously not one typical of Beck’s “second modernization”. Rather, it resembles what Beck - referring to the former East German component of the German society - terms *Armut* - *Individualisierung* or *Zusammenbruchs - Individualisierung* (individualization induced by poverty or by the collapse of the previous social system) (Beck, 1994a).⁹

This kind of individualization, that can be said to be typical of the post-socialist transition in general, is obviously not automatically conducive to tolerance for different identities and lifestyles, as individualization associated with “second modernity” appears to be.

To make things worse, the experience of war and the concurrent homogenization and retraditionalization of society have brought about a reversal of trends even in those parts of the region that exhibited post-materialist values in the period preceding the disintegration of socialism (Croatia, urban centers in the north of Serbia).¹⁰

In spite of all this, it would be wrong to simply write the entire region off as a place marked by ethnic and other kinds of intolerance, pronounced right wing tendencies, and collectivist value systems that predate the period of transition and that have recently been exacerbated by globalization fears. But it cannot be denied, as Genov

9 Beck clearly distinguishes between what he calls “*Vollkasko-Individualisierung*” (fully insured individualization), typical of the countries with developed and comprehensive social states, such as Sweden, Switzerland and former West Germany, and poverty-induced individualization “*Armut-Individualisierung*” that he notices partly in former East Germany, but above all in the ex-communist countries and in the Third World (Beck, 1993: 160). Elsewhere, he also stresses that “*Die frühbürgerliche Individualisierung*” (early bourgeois individualization), essentially based on capital accumulation, should be “historically and systematically” distinguished from “*Arbeitsmarkt-Individualisierung*” (labor market individualization), which presupposes state-regulated labor (Beck, 1983: 45).

10 The results of a large-scale empirical survey of Yugoslav youth carried out in 1986 indicated that the youth populations of Slovenia and Croatia consistently exhibited individualist values (Ule, 1988; Radin, 1990). The findings of this survey were confirmed by another survey carried out in 1988 (Ule, 1989). The northern Serbian province of Vojvodina and the city of Belgrade were found to be the only parts of Serbia and Montenegro where there existed a pronounced distance to the authoritarian collectivist paradigm. The depth of the reversal of trends that ensued among the urban youth in the following decade can perhaps be illustrated by the results of a survey of Zagreb university students carried out in the year 2000 (Živković and Bagić, 2001). The findings of this survey indicate that 70% of the surveyed students considered it necessary to have a strong leader in crisis situations for the country to survive. However, it should be added that the quoted survey was far less comprehensive than those carried out in the second half of the 1980s, and that it was not explicitly centered on post-materialist values.

(2002) says for Bulgaria, that the last decade of the twentieth century was “a decade of political instability, economic crisis and far-reaching value-normative disorientation”.

What should be done in the context of the “creative cities” discussion is to check the resilience of each individual place to trends adversely affecting tolerance.¹¹ This would be consistent with the “place” (as opposed to “country”) focus of the concept of “creative cities”, and would certainly more precisely reflect the realities of the studied individual parts of the region.

On the regional and country levels, however, it is accurate to say that the wider societal trends in the last fifteen years have mostly worked against the development of tolerance, and that they continue to do so, undermining the base of Florida’s third “T”.

Obstacle No. 5: unfavorable position with regard to global economic flows

The final obstacle to a smooth implementation of the concept of “creative city” in the region refers to the version departing from the British Government definition of the “creative industries”. As has been explained above, the concept would in this sense refer to a place showing a high concentration of activity in various sectors of the “creative industries”.

Such a concept of the creative city would arguably be the most difficult one to realize in the regional context, because of its high dependence on global economic flows and an unfavorable position of the regional economies within them.¹²

If - because of global competition and capital concentration - it appears not to be easy to reap the full benefits of the “creative industries”, even for the originators of

11 How much an individual place is prone to tolerance need not necessarily be measured by Gary Gates's “gay index” utilized by Florida (2002: 255-258). This index simply takes the concentration of gays in an area as an indicator of its openness to diversity. What can be used with far more analytical precision are complex indices found in Roland Inglehart's World Values Survey, which Florida quotes at length in his *Flight of the Creative Class* (2005). Indices measuring ethnic distance can be said to be particularly important in many countries in the region.

12 This unfavorable position has been outlined in the already quoted article by Böröcz and Sarkar (2005). Added to the status of second-tier service and manufacturing sites producing for the European market, should be the devastating effects of brain drain, which also affect sectors classified as the “creative industries” in the British Government definition.

the term,¹³ it is obvious that the task would be yet more difficult for those whose position in the global context is much less favorable.¹⁴

For a number of reasons, ranging from language to ownership issues, it is hard to imagine a creative center in the Southeastern European region which would contribute significantly to the local economy by virtue of a wide international integration of its products and services. What appears possible, however, is the development of the local versions of city concentrations of the creative sector, following the model applied in the British regions.

Culture in the “creative city”

The closing section of this discussion of the “creative city” in the Southeastern European context is devoted to a brief contrastive analysis. It attempts to find out how compatible a general understanding of culture in the region is with the roles of culture pertaining to each of the three possible interpretations of the “creative city” outlined above (the Landry-inspired, Florida-inspired, and “creative industries”- centered one).

Before we embark on this analysis, however, we should stress that there is no understanding of “culture” that would extend across the region without any variation. As with other topics of regional scope, it would actually be more appropriate to speak

13 In a recent speech, the British Minister for the Creative Industries, James Purnell (2005), stated that: “having creative people isn't a guarantee of economic success”. Purnell sees a possibility of a future waning of the current British superiority in the field as a “genuine threat”, in view of the facts such as that Bollywood is already the biggest film industry in the world (in terms of sheer volume), that China turns out over 2 million graduates annually, and that South Korea has one of the best on-line content industries in the world. Purnell also mentions that EMI are the last major British company in the music industry, and that with the selling of Polygram and scaling back of Film Four there is less prospect of a British or European company rivaling the dominance of US studios. According to him, the key to economic advantage lies in learning how to better exploit creative resources, in creating mutually beneficial partnerships with new players in the field, and in making Britain “the best environment for creative businesses in the world”.

14 A recent report on the state of the creative industries in Vienna concludes that while there is “rarely a lack of innovative and partly internationally marketable 'products' [of the local creative industries] there is, however, a lack in capital strength and in marketing-oriented realization of know-how” (Ratzenböck et al., 2004: 4). The city of Vienna is geographically and culturally closer to the region than the world capitals of the creative industries, but with a far better developed infrastructure. If such a city is characterized by “a low degree of implementation of the creative potential in the context of economic activities and within export”, it is only logical to think that it will be even more difficult for its SEE counterparts to capitalize on their creative resources.

about a number of specific “micro-understandings” of the term, both in the sphere of cultural policy and among the population at large.

Nevertheless, certain overarching trends are discernable in this case as well, and can be said to relate to: (1) a widespread understanding of the public funding of culture as “expenditure”; (2) a common past that includes the prominent role of the state or quasi-independent advisory bodies¹⁵ in the public funding of culture; (3) a present in which there is a reluctance to adopt an instrumental approach to culture, at least among the intellectual elites,¹⁶ and at least insofar as commercialization of previously publicly funded art is concerned.¹⁷ (One readily accepted instrumental role of the arts and of culture at large seems to be its role as an important tool in the preservation of national identities.)

Culture in the Landry-inspired notion of the “creative city”

Given what has just been said, it is obvious that Landry-inspired interpretation of the “creative city” is, again, best suited to the Southeastern European realities, this time with regard to a regional understanding of culture.

Landry not only allows for but actually emphasizes a connection between the citizens and the cultural sense of a place, finding expression in both its material and immaterial culture, along the trajectory of its specific history and traditions.

15 In the Yugoslav system of self-managing socialism, as it developed in the second half of the 1970s, funding of cultural activities took place through a network of theoretically arm's length principle operating associations through which workers in various fields (including the cultural) “exchanged labor”. In practice, however, such exchange of labor was strongly influenced not only by the state, but also by ideological priorities of the ruling communist party.

16 Whether public funding of culture continued to be generous in the transitional period (like in Croatia), or was rather disastrous (like in Bulgaria), across the region there seems to be a very slow acceptance of the approach in which culture is seen “as a tool, instrument or value adding device for other sectors of [...] life” (Landry, 1998: 12). One indicator of this can perhaps be the slowness by which the recommendations of the panel of European experts in this regard (Landry, 1998) are becoming reality in the case of Croatia. On the whole, as evidenced by numerous articles in cultural reviews, the intellectual elites in Croatia seem to be more positively disposed toward the use of culture which highlights its “enduring role [...] in identity creation and education” (Landry, 1998: 12).

17 Externally imposed imperatives of commercialization are frequently seen as unfair because of the small national markets and a perceived inability to compete on an equal footing with foreign competitors on the international market (for a number of reasons, ranging from language issues and the choice of subject-matter to the ownership of distribution channels).

He places cultural resources at the center of policy-making and says that the purpose of [his version of] the creative city is “to see how the pool of cultural resources identified can contribute to the integrated development of a locality” (Landry, 2000: 175).¹⁸

It is obvious from Landry’s publications and consultancy work that his approach also entails an instrumental use of culture in order to achieve economic ends. However, he departs from “an image of the ‘good city’ that reflects European urbanism” (Landry, 2000: xiv) and includes, among other things, “the feeling that urban life itself has a self-sustaining quality beyond the individual” (Landry, 2000: xiv). This is why Landry’s approach can find resonance with the urban and cultural traditions of the region to a much larger extent than the remaining two approaches to the “creative city”.

Culture in the Florida-inspired definition of the “creative city”

Florida, on the other hand, presupposes a purely instrumental use of culture. Although he makes a prominent reference to the “power of place” (Florida, 2002: 215-234), any reference to a community tied to the historical attributes of a city is missing from his account. Instead, what makes a specific urban locality attractive is its character of a setting in which the individual needs of highly mobile and highly qualified members of the “creative class” can be fulfilled.¹⁹

In other words, in Florida’s version of the “creative city”, the notion of culture is by and large reduced to mere “cultural amenities”. These contribute to the quality of life of the members of the “creative class”, including their need for “self-actualization”. On the whole, culture is treated as important only inasmuch as it is connected to economic growth. The latter, in its turn, is seen as an outcome of a specific

18 In the introductory part of *The Creative City*, Landry states that, in his experience of consultancy work, “an appreciation of cultural issues, expressing values and identity, was key to the ability to respond to change” (Landry, 2000: 3). An example of such an approach developed for a Southeastern European country can be found in the report of a European panel of examiners on Croatian cultural policy, which includes guidelines for its future development (Landry, 1998).

19 Florida specifies that the “quality of place” generally has three dimensions: (1) “*What’s there*: the combination of the built environment and the natural environment; a proper setting for the pursuit of creative lives”; (2) “*Who’s there*: diverse kinds of people, interacting and providing cues that anyone can plug into and make a life in that community”; (3) “*What’s going on*: the vibrancy of street life, café culture, arts, music and people engaging in outdoor activities - altogether a lot of active, exciting, creative endeavors” (Florida, 2002: 232). Obviously, all three dimensions depart from and emphasize individual needs, and essentially treat the place as a setting for their fulfillment.

interconnection of the human capital and resources available at a locality. Unlike in Landry's case, growth is not at all conceptualized as a product of an economic mobilization of the cultural resources of a community.

The difference between Landry's and Florida's approach partly stems from the fact that one author's subject is the creative use of culture in urban revitalization, while the other one defines himself as "a student of economic growth" dealing with "hard data and empirical research" (Florida, 2004: xvii).²⁰

But the crucial difference here is one of cultural background. Unlike Landry's, Florida's approach simply does not reflect a "European" idea of the city, as evidenced - among other things - by his definition of the region, which is reduced to the formula "city plus suburbs". Such a definition obviously excludes historical and cultural variables so central to a European interpretation of organized urban living.

In addition to the region's prohibitive deficiencies in Florida's "3Ts", it is also this cultural proximity that makes Landry's approach more promising in the Southeastern European context.

Culture in the "creative industries"-centered definition of the "creative city"

A British approach to strategic urban planning, although more pragmatic and empirical than the "continental" ones tend to be, is still culturally much closer to the region than the strategies of Florida's followers on the North American continent. However, coupled with the notion of the "creative industries", this approach loses a significant part of its cultural compatibility.

Namely, what is missing from the "creative industries"-centered definition of the "creative city", at least if the current official British definition of the term is followed, is a shared sense of purpose implicit in the culture of a community.

This is made clear already by the wording of the definition of the "creative industries" used in the first British national mapping exercise in 1998, and still in force today. This definition states that "creative industries" are "[t]hose industries that have their origin in *individual creativity*, skill and talent and which have a

20 In the introduction to his *Cities and the Creative Class*, Florida explicitly says that he had for a long time been a student of how technological advancements help regions, urban centers and nations to grow, that he came late in his career to issues having to do with arts, culture and diversity, and that he has only a cursory understanding of their internal functioning (Florida, 2005a: 2).

potential for *wealth* and *job creation* through the generation and *exploitation* of intellectual *property*" (DCMS, 2005 [emphasis ours]).

Looked at in isolation from the actual political practice,²¹ this definition reveals a painful absence of the component crucial to Landry's interpretation of the "creative city": a community's culture.

Admittedly, Landry's approach to policy-making attempts to productively channel the cultural resources of a community to stimulate its economic growth. However, it also aims at helping it retain and develop its cultural specificity. In contrast with this, the British Government definition of the "creative industries" is centered on individual competences and a "trickle-down" interpretation of how an effective exploitation of these can bring about a flourishing economy.

This "trickle-down" approach is decidedly neo-liberal,²² as is the reduction of the potential benefits of "creativity" exclusively to the economic domain ("wealth" and "job creation"). Likewise, the approach to the "creative industries" advocated by the quoted definition is obviously based on a concept of creativity that excludes what Madden and Bloom (2004) describe as "the affective dimension of artistic creation". Since the latter is "also about reproducing traditions and emotional [...] processes", its lack is obviously not conducive to the development of a sense of community with shared cultural resources.²³

21 It is no secret that, in spite of the definition emphasizing the importance of individual creativity and skills for the "creative industries", the UK government provided a great deal of support to stimulate the development of these "industries" in the British regions, where they do not function "by themselves" as seems to be the case in the national (and "global") capital London.

22 Hesmondhalgh (2005) discusses New Labour's project as "a particular hybrid of neo-liberalism, conservatism and social democracy, distinctive from the New Right neo-liberalism of the 1980s." However, the idea that progress and even social justice can be achieved by implementing business-friendly policies has been present in neo-liberal practice since the late 1970s. The "trickle-down approach" was especially characteristic of what was referred to as "Reaganomics". On the other hand, New Labour's project certainly does not advocate the view that "government is the problem", as did Reagan's followers in the 1980s. In public policy, such hybrids and inconsistencies contribute to what Hesmondhalgh describes as New Labour's "profound ambivalence about the public domain". Garnham (2005) also makes a reference to Reagan-time rhetoric when he notices that the "creative industries" approach to arts "legitimizes a return to an artist-centred, *supply side* defence of state cultural subsidies that is in contradiction to the other major aim of cultural policy wider access" [emphasis ours].

23 According to Madden and Bloom (2004), the "invention-cognition view of creativity" is simply too narrow. Although it cannot be denied that parts of what is classified as the "creative industries" also "reproduce traditions" and include "emotional processes", the "industrial" aspects of creativity are certainly in the forefront of what is defined as that field.

In sum, it can be said that the “creative industries”-centered definition of the “creative city” has tipped whatever balance existed between the economic and the cultural aspects of urban life²⁴ in the direction of a Florida-like instrumental definition of culture, geared primarily to the needs of individuals.²⁵ This approach can be said to have been introduced by the initial 1998 “creative industries” definition and mapping exercise. It obviously reflects a vision of a globally commercialized world consistent in many ways with the “neo-liberal” agenda, or at least with what is referred to as “neo-liberal” in popular parlance.²⁶

24 As Selwood (2002) states, the notion that the arts and the cultural industries were grounded in economic reality emerged during the second half of the 1980s, “as the ‘new financial reality’ began to bite”, and as the Arts Council actively sought to increase subsidies on the basis of making an economic case for increased public “investment” in the arts. Such an approach was decisively boosted by John Myerscough’s research into the Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain, published in 1988. What can be said from the current, post-“creative industries” perspective, however, is that the previous concept - as evidenced by Myerscough’s title - still retained the notion of the centrality of the arts, whose economic aspects were being highlighted in order to help “bring our cities back to life”. The “creative industries” concept, on the other hand, relegates the arts to a secondary position, and views them as an instrument for job creation and production of wealth.

25 The exclusion of the community and its culture from the official British Government definition of the “creative industries” becomes evident even when it is compared to the definition of “cultural industries” provided by Hesmondhalgh (2002). Namely, according to this definition, the “cultural industries” are involved in the production of social meaning [emphasis ours]. What are considered by Hesmondhalgh as core cultural industries are, again, those activities centrally concerned with the industrial production and dissemination of *cultural* “works” [emphasis ours]. In other words, what could be objected to with regard to the products of cultural industries - if the line of traditional criticism of “cultural industry” is followed - is their “inauthenticity” and an insufficient level of their cultural sophistication. That a certain culture (however unsatisfactory to the critics) is created around these products and that they help create social meaning was not doubted even by the harshest opponents of “cultural industry”. In contrast with this, the official definition of the “creative industries” not only rhetorically bypasses any reference to the terms “culture”, “community” and “social”, but also includes in its scope some “creative” activities that, according to Hesmondhalgh’s criteria, clearly lack the industrial form of production and reproduction. Such activities can be said to be ideologically compatible with the initial emphasis on the “individual” talent, which can set in motion a chain of industrial production (and be financially rewarded for it), but can also be exercised on a small scale (both in production terms and in terms of financial remuneration). Although there has recently been a change in the Department for Culture, Media and Sport rhetoric concerning “the value of culture” (Jowell, 2004), it is again defined (or, rather, justified) in individual and capitalist terms as “an important *investment in personal social capital*” (Jowell, 2004: 16 [emphasis ours]).

26 What is generally understood and referred to as “neo-liberal” is in reality by no means a uniform project. In different contexts, the traits associated with it are modified and hybridized with the local political traditions in various ways. For instance, as has been mentioned earlier, New Labour’s project can be described as “a particular hybrid of neo-liberalism, conservatism and social democracy” (Hesmondhalgh, 2005).

This vision goes a step beyond the harm that - according to the traditional critics - even “culture industries” have inflicted on “authentic” community culture. Namely, however “unsophisticated” or “inauthentic” the products of the “cultural industries” are, it would be hard to argue that they do not contribute to a formation of a certain common culture. In contrast with that, the DCMS definition of the “creative industries” almost seems to be a realization of the Thatcherite ideal according to which there is “no society, only individuals”: it centers on creativity seen as a tool for individual economic gain.

Although we have witnessed a partial reversal of the British Government’s position on the “value of culture” to society,²⁷ the rhetorical nuances of the recent writings and speeches of highly positioned officials are not reflected in the materials exported to the Southeastern European region through the British Council’s “creative industries in transitional markets” program.²⁸ Perhaps this is why a need was felt among a part of the participants of that program to discuss a different approach to the culture in the city, epitomized by the notion of the “city of culture”, or - still more precisely - by its German language equivalent: *Kulturstadt*.²⁹

27 Recently, attempts have been made by highly positioned government figures to at least rhetorically redress the imbalance of the “industrial” and “cultural” elements of the creative industries. In her 2004 essay on “Government and the Value of Culture”, Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell states that “complex cultural activity” is “at the heart of what it means to be a fully developed human being”. She also concludes that “markets have their place but [...] intelligent public subsidy [is needed] if complex culture is to take place at the heart of national life”. In short, Jowell's essay reintroduced the need to offer “improved access to culture for what it does in itself”. While the Culture Secretary now speaks about the value of “culture on its own terms”, in a recent speech the Minister for Creative Industries, James Purnell (2005), cursorily even justified “art for art’s sake”. It should not be overlooked, however, that the change of line is not complete and that “culture” (this time “complex”) is again justified primarily by its instrumental uses. On the one hand, public subsidy is seen as producing “what the market may not sustain”: “a bulwark against globalised commercialism that might not be sensitive or responsive to local and national cultural expression” (Jowell, 2004). On the other hand, engagement of the citizens with “complex art” is seen as “an important investment in personal social capital” (Jowell, 2004: 16).

28 For an overview of the program cf. British Council (2005) and UK SEE Forum (2005).

29 The notion of the “city of culture” as an alternative to the “creative industries” model implemented at the city level appeared in discussions led informally as well as in various workshops that were part of the UK-SEE Forum-organized Creative Cities Seminar, held in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, between 14 and 18 March 2005. The same issue came to the fore on several occasions during the mapping methodology workshop (entitled Mapping Creative Cities), organized within the same initiative in Split, Croatia, between 18 and 23 June 2005.

The notion of the “city of culture” (*Kulturstadt*)

Although the phrase “city of culture” and its German language equivalent are used interchangeably in the German-speaking context,³⁰ to foreign ears their respective uses carry quite distinct connotations and help form different associations. While the phrase “city of culture” simply invites collocation with the adjective “European”, the German noun *Kulturstadt* calls into mind a dual set of associations. On the one hand, it points to the social democratic notion of a city with a rich and cultural life accessible to all of its citizens. On the other hand, just like the related term *Kulturnation*, in the hands of the cultural conservatives situated on the political right it can carry more sinister connotations, contrasting cities and nations rich in the products of high culture with those that are allegedly *kulturlos* (uncultured, lacking in culture).

In the context of this article, we obviously have in mind the social democratic connotation of the term, which - as Wimmer (2004: 7) argues for Austria in the 1970s - entailed “a comprehensive project of social reforms [...] highly driven by cultural expectations”.

In theory, political reforms carried out in Austria by the then Prime Minister Kreisky, were expected to lead from the established “rule of law (*Rechtsstaat*) to welfare state (*Wohlfahrtsstaat*) and from there to a cultural state (*Kulturstaat*)”. According to Wimmer, such a concept of a “continuous success story of the state by permanent cultural reform” was to eventually enable all the members of the society to take an active part in cultural life. In practice, this also entailed a comprehensive, non-discriminate funding of cultural activities, which also included those activities taking place outside of the traditional institutions of high culture.

Such a concept of democratically funded and widely accessible culture is what some of the Southeastern European participants³¹ of the UK SEE Forum’s Creative

30 One interchangeable use of the discussed designations notable in the context of this article is that found in the German- and English-language versions of the websites displaying information on individual cities in the German-speaking cultural space. What is referred to as “*Kulturstadt*” in the German versions of such sites is translated as “city of culture” in their English versions.

31 It should be noted that “Creative Industries” Strand participants with a memory and awareness of the full scope of a social democratic model of culture came almost exclusively from the countries of former Yugoslavia. There, after a period of convergence with what was happening in the West in the 1970s, a counterpart to the funding model described above lasted well into the 1980s, even later in Western Europe, and most notably in the UK, a movement “from state to market” (McGuigan, 1996: 51-73) and the strategy of “privatising culture” (Wu, 2002) were well under way. Breznik (2004) also documents a move from the social democratic to the neo-liberal model in the series of national reports on cultural policies produced by several European countries between the years 1986 and 1995.

Industries Strand contrasted with what was described above as the “creative industries”-centered definition of the “creative city”.

It should be noted, however, that - in spite of the obvious social democratic inspiration - the model contrasted with that of the “creative city” was that of the “city of culture” (*Kulturstadt*) and not that of the “cultural state” (*Kulturstaat*).

The reasons for this are twofold. On the one hand, they obviously have to do with the city focus of the program within which the comparison was made. On the other hand, the reasons for the conceptual transition from *Kulturstaat* to *Kulturstadt* have to do with the internal working of the social democratic model in the past.

Namely, as remarked by Breznik (2004: 34)³² in a country like Austria, with a strong tradition of cultural centrality of the capital city, the process of decentralization “brought the greatest advantages to the provincial capitals, which earned for themselves a representative image similar to that enjoyed by Vienna”.³³ One such example, well known in the Southeastern European region, is that of the city of Graz, which not only boasts the designation “*Kulturstadt*” on the brown signage positioned near the highway exits to the city, but also became the “European capital of culture” in the year 2003.

On a symbolic plane, the latter event can be viewed as yet another reinforcement of the city focus of cultural activity, as well as a structured attempt to move from the national to the international (i.e. “European”) frame of reference. At the same time, in terms of a general cultural policy conception, the designation “European capital of culture” implies a further opening to the enterprise model of culture.

It can be argued that the model of “representative” culture, centered on the prestigious cultural institutions, survived in Austria after 1945 because “it tallied with the goals of the tourist industry” (Breznik, 2004: 32). The label of the “European capital of culture”, however, is supposed to add a new dimension to the symbolical positioning of a city in an international context. Among other things, it is supposed to raise the profile of a city in order to attract investment. In this respect, it comes close to the instrumental treatment of culture postulated by the various definitions of the “creative city” discussed above.

32 Page references in quotations of Breznik's book refer to the English translation of the original text (included in the quoted volume).

33 Breznik (2004: 34) remarks that similar processes took place in Sweden and France, and that what worked so beneficially for the provincial capitals “did not even touch upon the issues plaguing rural regions”.

Creative city and Kulturstadt compared: implications of competing policy formulations

Taking into account what has just been said, it could be concluded that the competing notions of the “creative city” and the “city of culture” (*Kulturstadt*) are actually converging in important aspects. A further conclusion that could be drawn from this is that there is not too much sense in insisting on their historical differences.

However, we are of the opinion that the nuances of policy implications expressed by a differentiated use of the two terms serve the purpose of an important corrective to the planning activities. The more we know about the background of various policy conceptions, the more accurate our estimate of the needs in any concrete policy planning situation can be.

The purpose of this section of the text is to briefly discuss which of the two competing policy formulations would be more suitable for application in the Southeastern European context. From the very outset, this seems to be an impossible task, as both models are plagued by numerous problems in their original settings, and the transitional context further burdens them with its own issues.

The original social democratic model is now said to be impossible to finance (*unfinanzierbar*).³⁴ Furthermore, it is also at odds with the ideological premises of the policy conceptions directed at transitional countries in other fields of social life. These policies invariably emphasize market solutions and advocate enterprise culture.

Finally, any cultural policy conception based on the notions of the “creative city” or “creative economy” is bound to meet with almost insurmountable difficulties in the transitional Southeastern European context. These difficulties range from the lack of Florida’s “3Ts” in specific localities to the generally unfavorable position of transitional markets in the global economy. Beyond ownership issues, a major development problem in this regard is a lack of social and cultural maturity which would enable the transitional countries to take part in the “creative economy” developing in the post-industrially modernized countries.³⁵

34 It should be said that the reasons for the current rejection of the social democratic model must be at least as much ideological as they are financial, since as Wimmer (2004: 3) says “nobody really believes that cuts in cultural funding would be able to redevelop public budgets sustainably”. After all, the total public expenditure on culture in a country like Austria, in which this is traditionally a highly prestigious field, offering the political elites numerous legitimation possibilities, stands at about 1% of the national budget.

35 For a more detailed account, see the discussion of Florida’s “3Ts” presented above and Tomić-Koludrović/Petrić’s article “Creative Industries in Transition: Toward a Creative Economy?”, in this volume.

What is to be done? It would be hard to argue that a model in which varied cultural resources are on offer to the citizens would be of no value in the transitional context. On the contrary, it is beyond doubt that some of its elements would also be beneficial to the development of the “culture-based economy”.³⁶ As such – to adopt for a moment the vocabulary of enterprise culture – this model could be seen even as a justified “investment” and a capacity-building instrument.

Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that a sustained government effort to maintain and further develop public institutions would be highly beneficial in the social context that has been exposed to a number of disintegrating trends over the last fifteen years.

An additional benefit of the adoption of the now already historical social democratic model would be its resonance with the cultural past of the transitional Southeastern European countries, in which the state had a prominent role in deciding on cultural matters and culture was seen as “representative”.³⁷

The problem, however, is that such a model is inextricably linked with the world of modernism. As such, it is increasingly out of step with the developments in a post-industrially modernized context. On top of this, it is doubtful whether the cultural policy apparatus in the Southeastern European countries would be capable of fashioning a “recycled” version of the model, more adaptable to the new circumstances.

In the European Union context, the notions of the “European city of culture” and “European capital of culture” have offered a new lease of life to at least the elements of the social democratic model.³⁸

36 This argument resonates with those criticisms of the neo-liberal model which argue that e.g. more public subsidies to the education system are in order if the desired “flexibility” of the labor market is to be achieved.

37 The model of “representative” culture relates to the Austro-Hungarian, French and even the socialist Soviet models that have in various ways and to different degrees influenced the cultural policies in the region’s past. It should be noted that in the second half of the 1970s and over the 1980s, in the cultural policies of the countries of former Yugoslavia there existed pronounced participatory elements attempting to partly deconstruct the previous models. However, the latter still form the dominant matrix, especially with the reversals participatory elements suffered over the 1990s.

38 Following an initiative by the then Greek Minister of Culture, Melina Mercouri, the European Council of Ministers launched the project of “European city of culture” in 1985. In 1999, the title was renamed into “European capital of culture”. Information on the history of the project is available on the European Commission’s website (EC/European Commission, 2005).

For different reasons, these notions are not of much use in the Southeastern European context. On the one hand, the Southeastern European cities are still not in a position to fully participate in the initiative on equal terms. On the other hand, even if they were, it should not be forgotten that the model of the “European city of culture” also carries numerous dangers, the most harmful among them being the tendency to view the local culture as folklore. Another one, which it actually shares with the historical *Kulturstadt* model, is a predilection for “manifestation” culture, i.e. for demonstrating the achievements of high culture rather than contributing to its more even development across the entire social spectrum.

One trap of the “representative” culture model that the notion and practice of the “European city of culture” helps avoid is cultural isolationism: local criteria of “value” are relativized in an international context. This also inevitably happens in the “creative city” model, but comes about in a less regulated way and can therefore be more shocking to the local population.

The “creative city” model relies on a type of culture with strong hegemonic potential (media, all-pervasive use of the English language) and is therefore bound to bring about homogenization, both of the existing cultural practices and of those population strata resisting their change. Since this model relies on the neo-liberal perception of the relationship between an individual and the community, it is also bound to cause polarization and friction between those adhering to the old ways and those favoring what is seen as ruthless economically minded individualism.

However, the model of the “creative city” also has certain positive aspects. In a context heavily burdened with the notion of culture originating in the period of Romanticism, it represents practices from the framework that was historically the first to face a new, globalized context of culture. It reflects and is able to deal with the change in the type of industry that came about in the post-industrially modernized context. Furthermore, it has already experienced multicultural hybridization, as well as other social and cultural trends connected with the ongoing process of globalization. As such, the elements of this model can be an important corrective to the practices and attitudes taken over from historical models available in the region.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the elements of the “creative city” model can be effectively used on completely pragmatic grounds in various political negotiations regarding cultural policy. In the context in which public funding of culture is traditionally seen as “expenditure”, a case can be made for increased budgets on account of the expected economic and social benefits resulting from this “investment”. Likewise, in the context notorious for its wasteful approach to

historical architectural resources, one can attempt to preserve some of them on account of the preference of the “creative class” for “authentic” urban spaces. It goes without saying that such goals and actions cannot be at the heart of a development policy, but it is good to have them in mind as possible bargaining tools in a generally adverse situation.

Conclusions: toward a hybridized model

Following the discussion presented above, it becomes clear that neither the already historical social democratic model of *Kulturstaat* nor its updated version implied by the notion of *Kulturstadt*, are fully applicable in the Southeastern European context (nor, for that matter, anywhere else, in the present set of political and ideological constellations).

The same goes for the model of the “creative city”, which actually refers to no less than three distinct definitions of the term discussed above (Landry-inspired definition, Florida-inspired definition, and “creative industries”-centered definition). Although the Landry-inspired definition comes closest, none of the discussed visions of a “creative city” seems to hold a promise of full implementation in the Southeastern European context.³⁹

The only logical solution seems to be a move toward a hybridized model, containing elements of all the discussed models, the exact mix of which should be in keeping with the needs of a specific local situation.

In addition to helping them fine-tune local solutions, such an individualized approach would help policy-makers emphasize the diversity of the region, frequently overlooked by international policy advisors and funding agencies.

Given this diversity, one should be wary of suggesting a “universal” model that could help plan cultural development across the region. Nevertheless, empirical evidence from the recent past seems to suggest that “enterprise culture”-led models have had a disastrous effect on the cultural life of the communities in which they were

39 The same is true of other transitional contexts as well. In a recent article, O’Connor (2005) argues that there are three sets of reasons that explain the resistance to the “internationalization of the cultural industry agenda”. Based on his research of the attempt to develop such an agenda in St. Petersburg, he suggests that modernization tensions that the “cultural industry agenda” brings with itself are a significant source of resistance. The second problem, according to O’Connor, is that the United Kingdom’s independents-led approach might have real limitations in other contexts. Finally, the idea that cities are able to compete within an ever more global cultural market seems to ignore some very real problems faced by the losers or outsiders in this process.

applied.⁴⁰ Bearing this in mind, it seems logical to suggest that the elements of the historical Nordic “architect” model, according to which cultural practitioners are viewed and protected as a public good, should be adopted by as many Southeastern European communities as possible.

Over the years, the Nordic approach has itself undergone numerous changes, of which the most sinister is what Duelund (2004: 10) terms “an expanding economic colonization of art and culture”. Regardless of this, a case should be made for the application of the original tenets of the model wherever possible, because it is – even in its present guise – still less destructive than other models on offer.⁴¹

A rational approach given to long-term planning could prove useful even if merely invoked as a corrective principle in an excessively short-term oriented context. Likewise, in the current economy-oriented climate, it can serve as a precedent pointing to the benefits of long-term “investment” into culture that eventually produces social cohesion and economic gain.

The question, of course, is whether there is enough time at the disposal of the Southeastern European cities willing to try their hand at the proposed hybridized model. As Charles Landry told decision-makers in Hong Kong, the transformation of their city is “not going to happen in five minutes, but if [the city] starts to be strategic today, there will be a result in five years’ time” (HKGCC, 2002). Given the speed of the disintegrative processes and the level of social erosion, in the Southeastern European context five years seem to be a very long period. But precisely that could perhaps serve as an incentive to the decision-makers to get down to work as soon as possible.

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40 The consequences have been particularly grave in the countries such as Bulgaria, in which the previous “engineering” approach based on all-pervasive state intervention (and control) was replaced by scarce funding on “market” principles. Even in the case of Slovenia, an economically stable country with a previously well-developed model of cultural policy along “social democratic” lines, the change of the ideological agenda in the 1990s has brought about a significant reduction, if not a complete overturn, of the previous attempts to mitigate the consequences of cultural and social exclusion. According to Breznik (2004: 68), the “general principle of public redistribution [in Slovenia] has been replaced with a policy that places public funds, meaning the financial burden shouldered by all citizens, into the hands of a narrow circle of privileged citizens”.

41 For a comparison of the differences between the Nordic model and the original French “architect” model, as well as differences between the UK’s “patron” and US “facilitator” model, see Duelund (2002).

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Managing Information Flow Through Cultural Portals

Lidia Varbanova

Cultural portals in Europe: a brief overview

The information sources in the field of culture in Europe form a complex and very diverse “virtual landscape”, operating on pan-European, transnational, national and regional levels. Many of the existing websites serve, in one way or another, the role of online cultural portals.

Portals as gateways

These are portals which serve as structured gateways, giving visibility to other information sources, aiming at structuring the information online in one specific cultural/artistic field. In Europe we have examples of EUROZINE (www.eurozine.com) - the largest independent network/portal for European cultural journals; GABRIEL (<http://portico.bl.uk/gabriel/>) - the gateway to Europe’s national libraries; the European Music Navigator (www.musicnavigator.org), providing access to more than 1.4 million music-related entities; the European Audiovisual Observatory (<http://www.obs.coe.int/>) - the major information portal for the audiovisual sector in Europe; On-The-Move (www.on-the.move.org) - an online tool for mobility in the field of performing arts and beyond.

Portals as databases

Online databases and resource centers constitute a good resource for a particular artistic field. Classical Artists Worldwide (<http://www.classical-artists.com/>), Culturebase (<http://www.culturebase.net/>), Artcyclopedia (<http://www.Artcyclopedia.com/>), Classical Net, Operabase, World Artists Directory, Art Resources, are some of the many examples of international databases and browsers, which cover one artistic field in depth, providing mainly access to individual profiles of artists and, in some cases, to artistic organizations as well.

National cultural portals

Most European countries have cultural portals and gateways, providing comprehensive information about each country's main cultural organizations, events, projects, national and regional cultural associations, centers and networks. Their aim is to promote national culture abroad and to give access to the main cultural resources in a specific country (CultureNet - Denmark; Kultuuri.net - Finland; cult.bg - Bulgaria; etc.).

The Ministries of Culture and National Arts Councils portals also play a role as national gateways, and many of them provide online information about the structure and programs, granting policies and practices of the respective government bodies supporting arts and culture.

Portals of cultural observatories

Several regional or local cultural observatories in Europe gather and disseminate information about a specific region or city. They observe, monitor, collect and disseminate information; deal with documentary services and archives; project development on specific subjects that are important to the region; provide a calendar of cultural events and links to other cultural organizations, for example the Observatoire des Politiques Culturelles (OPC) <http://www.observatoire-culture.net/>, the Budapest Observatory (<http://www.budobs.org>) and Interarts, Barcelona (www.interarts.net).

Websites of networks as portals

Many European cultural networks rapidly improve their visibility online and provide comprehensive information in a specific cultural/artistic field. The websites of many cultural networks serve also as rich online resources for projects, publications, news, archives, job opportunities, databases of members' organizations, etc. Examples:

- European Festival Association (www.euro-fest.net),
- Europa Nostra (<http://www.europanostra.com>),
- Artfactories (www.artfactories.net),
- ARTS Management Network (www.artsmanagement.net),
- CULTURELINK www.culturelink.org.

Portals as online community spaces

Some portals develop forum groups online, asking for opinions, reflections, providing an opportunity for sharing ideas among professionals in one field. In some

cases these portals post documents, papers, case studies online, asking for opinions and reflections. For example, Policies for Culture (<http://www.policiesforculture.org>) started up such a forum space for exchange of current issues on the agenda of cultural policy research in Southeastern Europe.

LAB Portal for Cultural Cooperation

This new portal is under development as a component of the Laboratory for European Cultural Cooperation. Its public launch is expected in Spring 2006 (www.lab4culture.org). It will focus on providing information that is useful for transnational cultural cooperation and will be capable of dealing with specific requests from users. The main features of the portal, developing in planned stages throughout the 4-year pilot project period are: a comprehensive search engine; orientation framework on who is who in the field of European cultural cooperation; information on funding opportunities; practice and case studies; resource collection and critical views and news; a range of interactive features, such as expert consultation on funding and legal issues; careers in culture and the arts; training opportunities; forum and community spaces for reflection.

The LAB's technical development team is currently looking at the most appropriate means of delivery of information, and is considering open source software. An Editorial Group oversees the development of the content. Active user group feedback will be sought. The core of the portal's development is the G2CC project, funded by the European Union, Directorate General for Education and Culture. The four co-organizers: the European Cultural Foundation/LAB (www.eurocult.org), the Fitzcarraldo Foundation (www.fitzcarraldo.it), ERICarts (www.ericarts.org) and the On-the-Move Association (www.on-the-move.org), will provide the portal with specific up-to-date information.

For the necessary synchronization of cultural resources and to make them more visible and with priority ranking at the search engine of the future portal, the Lab team is working on a feasibility study on metadata schemas aimed at describing the features of the pre-selected metadata schemas: Dublin Core (DC), MACHine-Readable Cataloguing 21 (MARC 21), Metadata Encoding & Transmission Standard (METS) and Metadata Object Description Standard (MODS), according to the wishes and expectations of the project partners. Another feasibility study - on classification systems - aims at comparing the features of the pre-selected classification systems: the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC), the Universal Decimal Classification (UDC) and the Visiting Arts Classification (VAC).

The two studies will score the pre-selected metadata schemas and classification systems, outlining the best scenario seen from the technical and operational points of view, for the use of the future portal and its partners. A complex roll-out process for

metadata implementation and testing the development of an agreed classification system have to start as of October 2005 based on a broad partnership basis.

Culture.Mondo

Culture.mondo (www.culturemondo.org) is a recently established informal network that encourages and facilitates communication among experts responsible for creating, developing and maintaining cultural portals worldwide. It aims at bringing these different players together in an informal cooperative forum for knowledge sharing, establishing good practices amongst cultural portals, facilitating partnership and becoming an acknowledged voice for cultural portals. The first round table was held in Aichi Japan (7-8 June 2005) on the subject of “Cultural Portals: new challenges and good practices”. The culture.mondo website will serve as a gateway to cultural portals and will allow portal authorities to share experiences and test new ideas.

Gaps in cultural information online

The information in the field of arts and culture available in Europe is not unified, but rather dispersed. There are certainly geographic and country imbalances - European networks often cover specific country groupings and there are few which genuinely cover all EU member states. Going beyond the EU, many fewer cultural and artistic projects are present online (especially from countries like Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Belarus, etc.).

In addition to that, provision is not seen as evenly spread across the different cultural sectors and art forms. In some cases, cultural information resources are narrowly focused on the sectorial interests of the concrete network and often an “inter-disciplinary” and “cross-country” approach is lacking.

There is also a discrepancy between sectors: the most developed information resources online are in the field of performing arts, music and the audiovisual sector, while cultural heritage and the visual arts have fewer web resources and possibilities for cooperating online.

The analytical dimension (inside views, exchange of opinion, statement papers) and innovative artistic aspects of cultural cooperation are also not very much present. Most resources are about exchange of information.

Resources on the commercial aspects of arts and culture in Europe (marketing the arts, creative industries, cultural entrepreneurship, etc.) are not a common practice.

An important gap is the lack of sufficient and coherent partnership between networks and cultural organizations in the process of collecting information and disseminating it online. It is important to emphasize that information, knowledge,

projects and databases are seldom shared, nor is there much evidence of two or more organizations working together to collect information (the recent G2CC project is a positive example of such partnership for online content development).

It is difficult for the user to discover online how a specific cultural or artistic field in Europe is developing over a period of time, who the main players are and the cross-artistic, cross-cultural and cross-national links between the organizations and institutions involved in European cultural cooperation.

An important issue for many online resources is the tendency to target a concrete group of users. It is rare that they follow up not only the numbers of users visiting the website, but also look at the profile of users based on various characteristics (profession, age, location, etc.).

Online consulting for artists, managers, producers, etc., is something currently missing, but at the same time it is too expensive to develop, as it requires high expertise and involvement of human resources.

Some common concerns and risk factors

Sources of funding

While principle sources of financial assistance for a cultural portal are: foundations, governments and arts councils, business sponsors, the European Commission and subscriptions from beneficiaries, the ability to attract resources always depends on how convincing the artistic and the business case is for a portal, and also what is the planned balance between commercialization and free access to information. The long-term financial stability of cultural portals depends on the one hand on the policy of the funders (which sometimes change over a certain period of time) and the users' willingness and availability to pay for obtaining online services (which in the cultural area is sometimes a difficult issue).

Sustainability

Several factors of sustainability are considered by experts and practitioners as necessary for the maintenance and further development of a cultural portal:

- the usefulness of the information provided and whether it reflects practical needs;
- the credibility of the portal within the cultural sector;
- the attractiveness, friendliness and flexibility of the portal from the user's perspective;

- the quality control of the contents;
- the filtering/selection of information without centralizing and censoring it;
- the quality of partnership between the content providers of the portal;
- an extensive ongoing promotion and marketing strategy.

Operational structure, management and staff

Cultural portals are structured organizationally in different ways. Most of them operate with 1, 2 or maximum 4 full-time employees, one of them usually the Chief Editor. Some portals have content providers and/or an editorial group of experts on a consulting part-time basis. In general, several operational options are discovered in the practice of cultural portals in Europe:

- a network of existing content providers, having equal distribution of labor between the partners and administered by a committee or board, representing all content providers - a fully decentralized solution;
- a network of content providers and operators, managed by an organization which takes care of the central content and management functions and providing a sense of stability - balanced centralized and decentralized solution;
- an organization which is fully responsible for operating the cultural portal - centralized solution;
- an online network of existing cultural portals - fully flexible “matrix” structure.

Any operational structure has to measure the cost benefit ratios and the relation between investment costs and operational costs once when the portal is launched.

Marketing and promotion

The success of any cultural portal seems to depend on a good match between content development and maintenance, and a cleverly designed marketing strategy. On average, cultural portals spend less than 5% of their annual budget on marketing and very few of them use between 6-20% of their budgets for such purposes. In most cases, there are no special experts on marketing and promotion strategies, and cultural experts, artists and volunteers are mainly responsible for promotional and advertising tools. The main promotion strategy for the portals happens online (online banners, shared links, cultural online journals and regular newsletters, e-mail lists of contacts).

Addenda

Add. 1
Report on the conference/course
Cultural Cooperation in Southeastern Europe.
Managing Cultural Transitions: The Impact of Creative
Industries

**Report on the conference/course
Cultural Cooperation in Southeastern Europe.
Managing Cultural Transitions: The Impact of Creative
Industries**

Jaka Primorac

The expert meeting and postgraduate seminar on cultural transitions and contemporary cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe was held from 9 to 15 May 2005 at the Inter-University Center (IUC) in Dubrovnik, under the title “Managing Cultural Transitions in Southeastern Europe: The Impact of Creative Industries”. The organizers of this meeting were the Department for Culture and Communication of the Institute for International Relations (IMO), Zagreb, in association with the UNESCO Chair Program at the University of Arts in Belgrade and the Department for Cultural Studies at the Faculty of Philosophy in Rijeka. The event was organized with the help of The East East Program: Partnership Beyond Borders, the Open Society Institute and Soros Foundations Network and the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports, Croatia.

This year’s experts’ meeting and postgraduate seminar evolved from previous postgraduate seminars that started under the common title “Redefining Cultural Identities”. This year the postgraduate course has been developed through the introduction of the experts’ meeting in conference form with the topic “Cultural Cooperation in Southeastern Europe”. This innovation followed the very active participation of the 2004 student class, and their proposal to open up more opportunities for students to participate and be involved in discussion on issues of interest to them.

In previous years the courses were concentrated on the following topics: the first course in the year 2000 was devoted to the “Multicultural Contexts of Central European and Mediterranean Regions”, and it was followed in 2001 by the course that dealt with the “Redefinition of Cultural Identities in Southeastern Europe”. The third course, entitled “Cultural Industries and Technological Convergence”, concentrated on cultural industries, technological convergence, cultural consumption

and on cultural identities in Southeastern European and Central European countries. In 2004 the focus switched to “Managing Cultural Transitions: Southeastern Europe”.

This year the intention of the expert meeting and postgraduate course was to provide direct discussion on regional cultural development among expert speakers and interested young professionals coming from the regional cultural sector. The objectives of this year’s event were: to provide an analytical insight into theoretical and conceptual issues of cultural transitions and cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe (SEE); to examine cultural policies in the context of cultural transitions and EU integration; and to analyze cultural cooperation and cultural communication in the area of SEE. This meeting was planned as a platform for organizing a network of experts in the future, that will substantially influence cultural bureaucracies and ministries of culture in the region, and in this way have an impact on inter-state cooperation. It also aimed to investigate the European approaches and understanding of multiculturalism and interculturalism so as to adapt them to the local and regional settings. The event gathered together twenty-two experts and postgraduate students from SEE countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, and Serbia and Montenegro) and EU countries (Czech Republic, France, Italy and Slovenia).

The work started with an introduction to the postgraduate course and expert meeting given by the course directors, Nada Švob-Đokić and Jiřina Šmejkalova. Firstly they gave a brief introduction to the background of this year’s event, and secondly they presented their views on the approach to cultural transitions in Southeastern Europe.

The introductory lecture by Nada Švob-Đokić entitled “Cultural Transitions: From Theories to the Cultural Transitional Changes in Southeastern Europe” was organized around three main points: cultural transformations and transitions in Southeastern Europe, reassessment and redefinition of cultural identities in the process of transition, and cultural links and cooperation established on the basis of development of cultural industries and new technologies used in the process of cultural communication. Southeastern Europe underwent major and substantial changes in its 20th century history. Liberated from the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in the first quarter of the century, the established states went through the formation of kingdoms, through socialist federation and re-emergence of the national states by the end of the century. The dynamism of the changes was particularly reflected in the redefinition of cultural identities that have been developing from the pre-modern ethnic into modern, territorial, national and corporate identities, structured by the state, to being post-modern, trans-territorial and structured by markets and new technologies. Such rapid and dynamic developments have enabled the parallel existence of very different types of identities,

and the resurgence of these different identity types at the same time. The spiritual geography of the whole region therefore reflects a horizontal presence of structurally and historically diverse types of culture and cultural identity. Influences of global information societies are now introducing respect and understanding for the plurality of social and cultural models and for a new kind of multicultural diversity. Although not fully or well established, these appear as new frameworks defining cultural transitions. The specific regional and disciplinary differences produce a specific expression of cultural transition in Southeastern Europe. All countries of the region are undergoing or have undergone major systemic transitions, and their cultures are re-interpreted now in the frameworks of globalism, Europeanism and information technologies. The spiritual geography of the region has moved from the ethnic myths, heroic epics and destruction of cultural influences of other Southeastern European cultures to the rationalization of myths and histories and a better understanding of the challenges of global integration.

Jiřina Šmejkalova gave an outline of the methodological approach to cultural transitions in the post-socialist countries. She stated that “transitology” had been established as a discipline through Latin American studies. In the European post-socialist states it had established itself very slowly. Rare works have developed different types of approach: horizontal (comparative), vertical (going deep into one situation), and those that use a number of combined approaches through concentration on the phenomenology of approaches. Nevertheless, the gap in the production of knowledge on transition remains very wide: Western theoreticians dominate. Would it be possible to develop a ‘home’ approach to cultural transition? The context for this might be offered through cultural studies. It would be important to find the most appropriate apparatus for research into the changes that have occurred in the last fifteen years. The researchers from the “region” need to map the existing situations, and not to wait for the mapping to be done from the outside. Jiřina Šmejkalova gave examples of the “revolutionary” rhetoric coming from the Anglo-Saxon theoretical fields (e.g. Anthony Giddens defining the events of 1989 as “revolutions”). On the contrary, the research done in the region suggests that transitional processes are more about continuity, rather than discontinuity. In conclusion, she advocated the redefining of cultural studies in the region and active communication between experts in the region, in order to decipher the position of cultural transition through local research efforts rather than waiting for input from outside.

The workshop entitled “National Perspectives on Cultural Transitions: Cultural Identities Redefined” was facilitated by Jiřina Šmejkalova, and focused on two closely inter-related issues: “culture” as an object of production of knowledge and “culture” as a subject, i.e. producer of knowledge (how does culture co-construct our “national” identities?). The participants were encouraged to present a cultural

product of their choice (a painting, a film, a fiction book, a song, a poem, a website, etc.) that recently redefined and/or reinforced stereotypes about national identity in their own countries. The inputs were various: presentations on the artistic urban regeneration of Tirana facilitated by Mayor Edi Rama, redefining of the book (and video/DVD) market by actions such as “books/DVDs with newspapers” in Croatia, etc. In connection to this, Mirko Petrić and Inga Tomić-Koludrović presented the latest findings of the content analysis of Croatian web-portals that show their sexist, nationalistic and sensationalistic position. All these examples presented in the workshop revealed the changing nature of cultural production in SEE, and its wider social implications.

The next day the stress in the program was put on cultural policy in the regional context. Nina Obuljen gave a presentation on “Managing Cultural Transitions: Impacts of Cultural Policies (EU and Regional Experiences)”, that tackled the burning questions of cultural policies in the context of EU integration. Nina Obuljen presented some current issues of research into cultural policies of the countries of the region. She gave an overview of the Council of Europe’s National Policy Reports that included countries from the region, and of the Council of Europe and ERICarts’ Compendium - Cultural Policies website that monitors 36 country profiles. Although many were skeptical about the first appearance of both of these reports and their usefulness, there were many more positive aspects of writing them - a certain level of knowledge was reached, and for the first time people from the cultural sector worked together on joint projects. As a result, with the description of the existing phenomena, a first step towards elaborating cultural policies was made. When discussing cultural policies, it is important to stress that they deal with crosscutting topics, such as: the status and mobility of the artist; the introduction of the market-trade in cultural goods and services; the question of cultural diversity; the development of cultural indicators; and, last but not least, the application of state aid rules. In the SEE context the latter topic is highly important as great expectations are put on the state, since there is a lack of other funding in the region. Crosscutting topics demand a more proactive approach in policy-making - not only dealing with the consequences of decisions taken in other policy fields, Nina Obuljen stressed. In this context it is necessary to take account of the influence of cultural conglomerates and changes in the structure and functioning of domestic markets for cultural goods and services. Nina Obuljen concluded that their impact is a global one, and in a way represents indirect global cultural policies. Traditional instruments of aid are in this way put in question.

In the presentation entitled “Creative City vs. *Kulturstadt*: Implications of Competing Policy Formulations”, Mirko Petrić and Inga Tomić-Koludrović offered an insight into two different concepts of urban development, so as to try to decipher which model would be appropriate for cities in transition countries. The common

denominator of all the countries in transition is their socialist experience, however different it was. The influence of globalization is currently common to them. When discussing urban development one has to analyze two influential concepts: the concept of “creative cities”, and the concept of “*Kulturstadt*”. The first one, the neo-liberal concept of “creative cities”, stressed in the work of Charles Landry and Richard Florida, perceives culture as an economic resource: culture has an instrumental role in urban and economic development. The other concept is the concept of “*Kulturstadt*”, a model in which varied and developed cultural resources are on offer to the citizens. This model has a resonance with the cultural past of transition countries. In itself it is a concept in crisis due to the crisis of the social state, and the lack of a reference to the global context. In addition, Petrić and Tomić-Koludrović note that one can perceive the appearance of the third model: the “EU city of culture”, that started back in 1985 following the initiative of Melina Mercouri. It is a supranational model that is based on the mobilization of community resources, but also on outside funding, that helps get the best possible international promotion of the city. Which model can be chosen for the transitional countries? Petrić and Tomić-Koludrović suggest that the hybridized model, combining the presented concepts, would be the best - to construct for ourselves what we need and not just to implement what is exported from outside.

The organizers felt that the participants should learn more about the problems of the local Croatian urban cultural scene, and during the afternoon session, participants were taken to Art Workshop Lazareti (AWL), a non-governmental association that was established in 1988. Over time AWL has grown into the most influential independent cultural institution, not only in Dubrovnik, but also in the whole of Croatia. Its director, artist Slaven Tolj, presented the overall work of AWL and its plans to establish an independent cultural center in the unique space of the former “lazaretto” that would combine gallery, educational premises, workspace for artists and a multimedia centre. Slaven Tolj enumerated the difficulties that AWL encountered while trying to implement the project - beginning with those relating to funding, to the difficulties with the city government, the obstruction of the project due to the interest of big investors in the real-estate value of the Lazareti, etc. The situation was temporarily solved when the contract with the city government for the use of the space was signed. This visit gave an opportunity to discuss the concrete problems of local artists and cultural managers. It also provided some insight into the state aid, as Slaven Tolj is Chair of the Cultural Council for New Media Cultures, the advisory body of the Ministry of Culture of Croatia.

The next part of the program was devoted to cultural industries. The morning session started with the presentation by Jaka Primorac entitled “Development of Culture Industries and the Spread of New Technologies”. The presentation was an overview of how the term “cultural industries” has changed over time with the

emergence of each new technology. It began with Adorno and Horkheimer's definition of "the culture industry", that occurred with the first massification of cultural production as a result of the emergence of radio, TV and the cinema. Then the terminology shifted towards "cultural industries" (the plural form), with the work of Bernard Migege's team for UNESCO and John Myerscough's report from the Thatcherite period concerning the abundance of cultural production that occurred in the last century and to distinguish it from the negative critique of Adorno and Horkheimer. Even larger massification of cultural production followed as a result of digitalization. This was also reflected in the terminology as terms such as "creative industries" (that also includes cultural industries), "content industries" (largely in the US), "entertainment industries" or "copyright industries" emerged. The presentation closed with several inputs for discussion on what the new technologies and cultural industries mean for SEE. A lively discussion followed on questions of accessibility of new technologies in the SEE region, its dependence on state aid, the small markets of SEE, changing aspects of work habits in cultural industries and the issue of outsourcing.

In her presentation "Culture Industries: In Between the Global and the Local" Maja Breznik gave an overview of the Slovenian book industry as a local cultural industry. She tried to examine the book industry in a small country under the influence of globalization. She offered a thorough analysis of Slovenian publishers' profiles, book genre profiles, lending of books in public libraries and how some of the state-aid instruments work in this context. Maja Breznik defined the publishing program of big Slovenian publishing houses as monoculture publishing, because their publishing policy is orientated exclusively toward commercial programs, while non-commercial programs and more demanding book projects depend entirely on little publishing houses and state subsidies. As regards the public lending right that was recently introduced in Slovenia, Maja Breznik is doubtful about it: it gives the greatest reward to the most commercial authors, to international bestsellers and obligatory school literature, which in any case do not have problems in being published or read. Maja Breznik concluded that the local cultural industries are not protecting the community from the global entertainment industries, but are rather their Trojan horse.

The discussion on the cultural and creative industries continued in the afternoon session entitled "Creative Industries in Transition: Toward a Creative Economy?" Inga Tomić Koludrović and Mirko Petrić tried to give an overview of how, through the creative industries and the knowledge economy, "culture" is perceived as an economic resource. They thoroughly examined the British creative industries model that started with the "Creative industries mapping document" of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) and criticized the direct implementation of this model in the respective countries of SEE. What Tomić-Koludrović and Petrić are

questioning is the applicability of the model and of the strategies used, to the local situation. Transition countries are not ideal typical “post-industrial societies” (Daniel Bell) nor are they “post-industrial modernized societies” (Ulrich Beck), but they are rather “mixed societies”, having traditional structures, but encountering globalization processes. In this way, one should try to create a model that is applicable to the transition societies, and to see the position of culture in it, and not to directly apply a creative industries model examined elsewhere.

During the next morning session the discussion shifted to the “Managing Cultural Transitions: Multiculturalism, Interculturalism and Minority Policies”, in which Melita Richter Malabotta stressed that there is no EU model of multiculturalism - every country has its own past, and in that way, its own model. The fear of candidate countries is more of a one-way approach - it is the West’s fear of the East. She gave an overview of these multiculturalist and interculturalist models, such as the “assimilationist” French model, the German “*Gastarbeiter*” model, the segmented pluralist (Italian) model, the intercultural model, and the British, Dutch and North American model of “parallel worlds”. The key point of all these models is the question of dealing with differences - either by negating them, individualizing them, stressing the differences, folklorizing them, making the differences rigid and static, considering the differences as a socio-cultural anachronism, etc. What it is important to note is that new borders in Europe have also constructed new models of migration and immigration that will need a thorough analysis. In this way it is necessary to take into account the communities beyond borders, examine them and develop regional trans-border cooperation, including it in a process of established regional knowledge.

In the second part of her contribution Richter Malabotta focused on the concept of citizenship in a multiethnic society taking as a departure point René Gallissot’s theoretical contribution that says that an effective citizenship can only take place through the articulation of political citizenship with social citizenship, through the renewal of associative practices and the movement tending to transform societies and their dominion structures. One of these practices she identified in migrant writings.

In the subsequent presentation the topic switched to “cultural studies”. In the first part of her presentation entitled “Cultural Studies (New Perspectives)” Marina Biti reflected upon Fredrick Jameson’s article “On Cultural Studies”. She remarked that what is needed is the positive definition of cultural studies, noting that she understands cultural studies not as a discipline but as a field that needs a curriculum. When discussing the field of cultural studies one has to bear in mind not only the development of British cultural studies from 1964, but also of culturology, (*Kulturwissenschaft*) that has a history of its own. After the migration of cultural studies across continents in the 1980s and 1990s, the field was connected to “area studies”. Cultural studies have appeared there as “post-disciplinary” and were

developed as an external point of reference to the established disciplines. This relationship appears to accommodate both the intellectual and knowledge challenges and to provide for better understanding of numerous different cultures.

This overview was an introduction to the second part of the presentation in which Marina Biti gave the outline of the program of the Department for Cultural Studies at the University of Rijeka that was created based on the views previously mentioned. The curriculum of the newly established graduate course is an interdisciplinary one (a horizontal approach) that “bounds” several areas so as to present its diversity in its richest form. The presentation of the curriculum triggered a lively discussion that tackled several issues: from the question of why the local history of cultural studies was overlooked in the curriculum (e.g. the Cultural Theory Conference at the Faculty of Pedagogy in Rijeka in 1979), to the issues of the input of regional knowledge into the program. The debate concluded with a discussion on the issue of the future labor market for students who graduate from this department. The initiative to establish the Department for Cultural Studies is an important milestone in the future development of the cultural sector in Croatia, and in the region, as it shows the strength of opinion on regional knowledge.

Milena Dragičević-Šešić gave the lecture “From Neighborliness to Globality: Has a Regional Niche Been Discovered Yet?” in which she raised the question of imaginary and real borders - how we are creating new divides among ourselves. In this way, cultural policy appears to be a tool of distinction. In the EU, cultural policies have been territory driven (the territory and citizenship inclusive approach), while in Eastern countries, Dragičević-Šešić stresses, cultural policies are driven by constructed communities, i.e. ethnicity is seen as the key element of self-identification. She offered a list of differences that are notable between the EU and the East, such as: market of cultural goods vs. public interest in culture, feelings of self-confidence vs. feelings of dependency, widening of international mobility vs. feelings of territorial isolation, cosmopolitanism vs. ethnocentrism, etc. What she sees as important is the question as to whether there is a niche that is common to the entire region. Can we define something as a “Balkan niche”, a niche of “turbulence”, but yet of excellence, particularly in terms of the knowledge on how to survive in such turbulent times? In this way the question of regional knowledge and expertise has been raised again - regional expertise has to be acknowledged firstly in the region, and then applied. It is absurd that regional knowledge comes to us through Western channels, after it has been approved there (case of Maria Todorova, etc.). In addition, Milena Dragičević-Šešić presented the case study on the Eurovision song contest in 2004, where one could perceive the neighborhood voting policy, but also the territory of cultural clashes and conflicts (the comparison with football matches was also offered).

The discussion of different media texts, partly based on views of the films shown during the first part of the program, followed. Two recent movies by young directors from (S)EE were shown: the *Fine Dead Girls* (Fine mrtve djevojke, 2002), by Croatian director Dalibor Matanić, and the *Champions* (Mistri, 2004) by Czech director Marek Najbrt. The idea was to present recent works by young artists in order to compare their perceptions of the national identity of the countries in question, and in this way to prompt discussion on its redefinition. The participants noted that the young directors are trying to present contemporary grim reality, and to give a critique of the problems of the societies in transition, such as unemployment, defeatism, changing identities, etc. The strongly supported option of “national” identification misses the real problems of populations.

The expert meeting on “Cultural Cooperation in SEE” was held the following day and the first part was devoted to “Cultural cooperation in Southeastern Europe: From States to (Market) Projects” by Dona Kolar-Panov. After the general introduction on the situation of audience research in SEE, she gave an interesting comparison of two projects under the same title - “*Toa sum jas!*” [*This Is Me*] These are two television programs dealing with different kinds of cultural cooperation, and are both broadcast in the region. It is important to note that both programs claim to promote “communication and understanding among young people in the Balkans”.

The first one is a children’s program *Toa sum jas* [Balkan Kids’ Mosaic] that involves children living in Albania, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro and Macedonia, in making a joint program in which the children present some specific cultural experiences from the region they are coming from. The second project is the reality show named also *Toa sum jas!* - a “Big Brother” type of reality show whose participants come from the countries of former Yugoslavia, and who were living for a period of time in one house in Skopje, Macedonia. This show is not much different from other reality TV shows, but, to the producers’ surprise, the participants in the show did not confront on the basis of their nationalities, but rather exchanged common knowledge on the pop culture of the former Yugoslavia. There was a public outcry due to some explicit sexuality in the show, and due to legislative issues linked to the fact that it is shown on Macedonian public television. That triggered questions as to whether the public is better off with or without this type of reality show cultural cooperation.

It also raises the issue of localization of global formats of media. Copycat television (which reality shows are) does not address issues of cultural diversity. As regards the first show *Toa sum jas* [Balkan Kid’s Mosaic], although it is addressing the issue of cultural cooperation in a far better manner than the latter one, as the funding for the program comes from international organizations and every part of the

show is made in the local surroundings, the question is how much of it is real regional cooperation, as regional bodies are not involved and children do not meet each other.

Aldo Milohnić who presented his views on the changing nature of employment in the cultural sector gave the input to the discussion. He sees it as a shift from the Fordist to post-Fordist system of employment, that is, from so-called “typical employment” (stable forms of employment, i.e. permanent and full-time jobs) towards “a-typical employment” (non-stable forms of work, i.e. temporary, part-time or second jobs, self employment, freelance status etc.). These forms of “flexible” working conditions, that are actually typical (and not “a-typical”) in the cultural sector, have created a new socio-economic situation, where the division between work time and leisure time is being blurred. Another point that is interesting for the discussion on cultural or creative industries, is the orientation of the post-Fordist organization of production towards so-called “new economy” products, towards selling images, styles, designs etc. In that way the emergence of creative industries is also the result of a much broader process of the post-Fordist mode of organization of production. The bad side of post-Fordism and the constant process of “flexibilization” of working conditions is called “precarity”, i.e. instability of employment, social insecurity, dependency and economic weakness. Although precarity is usually associated with marginal employment situations such as seasonal and other types of casual work, there are more and more artists and cultural workers living in precarious conditions. Aldo Milohnić noted that in the context of SEE, the position of employment in the cultural sector is even more difficult as the pressure for the funding of culture on the state budget is rather strong.

The expert meeting part of the event was concluded with the lecture by Lidia Varbanova entitled “Cultural Economics and Financing Culture: Dilemmas and Perspectives (or Money, Markets and Muses)”. Lidia Varbanova first gave a historical overview of the field of cultural economics - from the role of patronage and individual donations towards the birth of cultural economics as a discipline. Mapping the current situation of the financing of culture, she gave some basic structured views on state support, art markets and alternative funding for culture. Considering state support for the arts, there are several dilemmas present that everybody dealing with cultural policy is struggling with: the question of the balance of direct and indirect support; the question of support of state, non-profit or commercial art forms; center vs. periphery; contemporary vs. traditional; established vs. emerging art forms; amateur vs. professional art, etc. The question arises as to whether state support should be for cultural products, processes or maintenance. But the key question that arises is the question of how to foster creativity through policy decisions. As regards alternative funding for culture, Varbanova gave an overview of the possible models, such as support from foundations, corporate philanthropy and sponsorships from the

business sector, and also less popular ways of supporting culture and social activities, such as loans, lottery funds, shares, mutual funds, etc.

In the second part of her presentation she stressed the practical view of cultural economics, that is, Varbanova offered some practical advice on project proposal writing, shared some common mistakes which applicants make when applying for project grants, gave information on possible funders and their web-links, and in addition she stressed the importance of visibility of a project, its public accountability and reporting structure. During the discussion that followed, there were several questions raised on the difficulties of funding for cultural cooperation in SEE, and the lack of sufficient communication between cultural organizations and networks from various parts of Europe as well as on a regional level. The LAB (The Laboratory for European Cultural Cooperation) was presented as well as a new pan-European initiative which aims to provide access to opportunities for transnational cultural cooperation and stimulate intercultural dialogue across Europe (www.eurocult.org/lab/).

The last day of the meeting was devoted to the evaluation of the program. In general, participants were satisfied with the program and very satisfied with the organization of the meeting. The amount of knowledge offered and gained, and the special type of atmosphere of the event (the equal participation of experts and students) was highly valued. It was stressed that this is a one-of-a-kind event in the region. There were some suggestions for the future, including one to accept more students, and for them to prepare presentations on specific issues in the region, such as different art forms, multimedia presentations, and particular regional projects. All participants supported the continuation of this type of program.

Add. 2
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